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This edited book originated in the inaugural Timor-Leste Update held at The 
Australian National University (ANU) from 28–29 November 2013. Entitled 
‘Timor-Leste: A New Era? Prospects and Challenges for Timor-Leste’, the Update 
was an occasion for focused analysis and lively debate on a broad spectrum 
of issues facing the nation over the next 5–10 years. Attended by around 150 
policymakers and scholars, and hosted by the State, Society and Governance 
in Melanesia (SSGM) program at ANU, there was general consensus that the 
Update should become a biennial event.
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and enthusiastic colleagues who joined us on an organising committee that met 
regularly during 2013 to refine the topics and program. Our sincere thanks go 
to committee members Susan Harris-Rimmer, Janet Hunt, Joanne Wallis, Ruth 
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ran smoothly, and to Peta Hill, for negotiating complex travel arrangements. We 
also thank Louana Gaffey for administrative support and Jonathan Barrett, for 
ensuring the event was recorded and podcast. 
We are extremely grateful to the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Timor-
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Proclamation of Independence Day, the Embassy organised a very successful 
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Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Julie Bishop, offered commemorative remarks. 
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Introduction: Building the 
Nation: Legacies and Challenges 
for Timor‑Leste
Sue Ingram, Lia Kent and Andrew McWilliam
Background to the update
Timor-Leste has made rapid progress in its first decade as a new state, casting 
aside the instability that blighted its early years and achieving strong economic 
growth and institutional development. During 2012, the nation experienced 
peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections, the winding-up of the 
Australia-led International Stabilisation Force, and the completion of the United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission after 13 years of UN presence. But significant 
challenges remain for the fledgling nation as it struggles to diversify its economy, 
implement its ambitious social and economic development plans, and preserve 
stability in the face of projected declines in petroleum revenues. 
To mark this transition and reflect on the road ahead for Timor-Leste, the College 
of Asia and the Pacific at The Australian National University (ANU) convened 
an inaugural Timor-Leste Update on 28–29 November 2013. The opening day 
of the conference was set to coincide with Timor-Leste’s national Restoration 
of Independence Day—the date on which the nation unilaterally declared 
its independence in 1975 and experienced a short-lived independence of 
10 days before the Indonesian takeover that lasted 24 years. Full independence 
was eventually restored on 20 May 2002, following two-and-a-half years of 
transitional UN administration. 
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
2
The Timor-Leste Update was designed with a number of complementary 
objectives in mind. Firstly, it was intended to contribute to Australia’s developing 
knowledge of and engagement with a close regional neighbour by providing a 
public forum to discuss recent developments and plans. The Update also aimed to 
sustain and strengthen relationships between government agencies, civil society 
organisations and research institutions working on Timor-Leste, while helping to 
build the profile and capacity of East Timorese researchers and policy analysts.
Highlights of the two-day event included an opening address on Timor-Leste’s 
‘path to prosperity’ by His Excellency, Agio Pereira, Minister of State and of the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers, entitled ‘The Challenges of Nation State 
Building’. His remarks were underscored by a presentation from Mr Fidelis 
Magalhaes, Presidential Chief of Staff, Presidency of the Republic of Timor-
Leste, who spoke on the topic ‘Timor-Leste, Past, Present and Future; Why 
History Matters’. Their considered remarks provided the platform for a series of 
presentations by Timorese and Australian speakers around three framing topics:
• trends in economic development
• stability 
• active citizenship. 
The lively discussions that accompanied the presentations, the high level of 
interest shown in the proceedings, and strong audience attendance from the 
academy and government, all pointed to both the success of the Update and 
support for a continued forum of this kind that facilitates shared understandings 
and critical debates between the two nations. It is hoped that the Timor-Leste 
Update will become a biennial event.
Key themes 
A number of broad themes ran through the presentations at the Update. They 
reflect Timor-Leste’s remarkable politico-historical journey to independence and 
the subsequent gradual progress in defining values and building the structural, 
political and institutional foundations of the newly independent nation. 
We have identified five key themes, each of which is discussed in detail below:
1. achievements and challenges 
2. legacies of the past and future prospects
3. theories of the liberal democratic state versus the realpolitik of state-building 
and participatory democracy
4. national and sub-national governance 
5. policy intent and policy action: bold visions, modest progress. 
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1. Achievements and challenges 
‘Achievements and challenges’ was a framing idea for the Update, and was 
something of a leitmotif through the two days of discussions. Timor-Leste has 
made huge achievements in the 11 years since independence. Stability was 
quickly restored following the internal divisions and build-up of conflict that 
came to a destructive head in 2006. Following the 2008 attacks on the president 
and prime minister, the leadership responded swiftly and effectively within the 
framework of the constitution, preventing collateral damage to the state and 
redoubling efforts to strengthen security. 
Today, while the country is not conflict-free, episodes of civil discontent are 
minor in character and do not threaten development or political stability. 
The  last few years have seen effective democratic consolidation, with a 
maturing of the institutions of the state and an active civil society. The nation 
is also emerging as a significant player on the international stage: chairing the 
g7+ forum, which is leading the discourse on the way that the international 
community engages in conflict-affected states; positioning for membership of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the near future; and 
chairing the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) in 2014.
Nonetheless, serious challenges remain. Timor-Leste is the second or third most 
petroleum-dependent state in the world, with a downstream risk of petroleum 
revenue collapse if new fields are not quickly brought on-stream. The state also 
faces a looming fiscal crisis unless revenue and outlays are brought into line and 
expenditure from the Petroleum Fund returned to the calculated sustainable 
level. The prospect of greater fiscal restraint in turn risks a rise in grievances 
and instability where declining public revenues translate into a paring back 
of generous social transfers, particularly to veterans, and reductions in public 
sector employment. The economic and social gulf between urban and rural 
areas continues to widen, despite a significant increase in social transfers 
and infrastructure development beyond the capital, Dili. Timor-Leste has 
experienced rapid population growth since the end of Indonesian occupation, 
and the population is projected to double in 17 years. However, the burgeoning 
numbers of school leavers face a weak labour market with little capacity to 
absorb the growing demand for jobs. 
Timor-Leste is also marked by significant gender inequalities, despite 
constitutional guarantees of equality in all areas of family, social and cultural 
life and reasonable levels of representation of women in public office. As Laura 
Abrantes’ presentation at the Update noted, women hold 25 out of 65 seats in 
the national parliament, equating to 38 per cent of seats—the highest percentage 
in Asia. In the newly constituted Araujo government, 3 of 17 ministers, 2 of 11 
vice ministers and 3 of 9 secretaries of state are women, equating to just over 
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20 per cent. Nonetheless, the influence of women parliamentarians in lawmaking 
and oversight arguably remains limited—women hold few of the top executive 
posts, and the sphere of local politics remains overwhelmingly male dominated. 
Looking beyond their representation in public life, it is apparent that women 
remain significantly disadvantaged vis à vis men in the private sphere: they 
are poorer and have a lower literacy rate, have a lower rate of participation 
in the workforce, and are usually in lower level positions than men. Fertility 
and maternal mortality rates are among the highest globally. Rates of domestic 
violence continue to soar. All of this suggests that in Timor-Leste, as in many 
other societies, the process of translating women’s formally guaranteed rights 
into substantive equality remains an ongoing challenge. 
2. Legacies of the past and future prospects 
Timor-Leste’s past—its history of decolonisation and occupation, of political 
divisions and violence—informs the present. On the one hand, the strength of 
Timorese national identity lies in its history. On the other hand, the absence of 
a shared elite history through the 24 years of Indonesian occupation has set up 
divisions that are still playing out. There is controversy over what constitutes the 
‘true’ history of the past and who controls that history—a feature most evident 
in continuing public disputes over historical events and the role of particular 
identities in relation to them. There is also contestation over who has a place in 
that history and who should be recognised for their contribution: the claims 
of FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste; Armed 
Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) veterans are being treated very 
differently from those of other groups in society, for instance women, young 
people and former members of the clandestine front. 
A powerful actor in Timor-Leste’s political history that continues to shape 
the present is the Catholic Church. It was a bulwark for the Timorese people 
during the Indonesian occupation, a defender of their security and cultural 
integrity, a crucible for youth activism, and an early and influential proponent 
of a referendum on Timor’s political future. It has continued to play a political 
role after independence where it perceives a threat to its interests, as in the 
2005 demonstrations challenging the government’s plan to withdraw religious 
education from the formal primary school curriculum. Two of the presentations 
touched on the Catholic Church’s continuing role both as a pastoral carer and a 
service provider to the people.
History also shapes Timor-Leste’s democratic development path and the policy 
and the structural choices that it makes. A number of presentations at the 
Update highlighted how veterans are becoming a privileged group in society 
due to the size of veterans’ pensions. While Timor-Leste seeks to honour the 
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struggles of the past, the spotlight is strongly on the future. The country’s 
Strategic Development Plan, launched in 2011, charts an ambitious path for the 
inclusive development of Timor-Leste through to 2030. Its vision is to create 
a middle- to high-income country with a diversified economy and strong 
human capital by the target date. Yet there are real doubts whether the vision 
is achievable, and whether its major focus on infrastructure development—
the aspirational Tasi Mane program and the high modernist master plan of the 
special economic market zone in Oecussi1—are well conceived. The alternative 
is to shift investment to Timor-Leste’s people, investing in education, nutrition, 
food sovereignty and manufacture for local consumption. One speaker at 
the Update called for a greater focus on the children of Timor-Leste, who 
are its future. That  the bilateral relationship with Indonesia is also forward-
looking, rather than dwelling on the past, is a source of consternation to those 
still searching for criminal accountability for the crimes committed during the 
24-year occupation. 
Just days before the Update was held, Timor-Leste’s Prime Minister, Xanana 
Gusmão, announced his intention to resign mid-term in 2014. The prospect of 
his imminent departure signalled a profound political transition for the young 
nation. Gusmão is a towering and revered figure who has led the Timorese people 
in different capacities—as head of the Resistance, as president and as prime 
minister—for 30 years. Many Timorese were fearful of a return to instability 
when he relinquished the helm. In the quest for a new leader, there were calls 
for a generational transfer of political power, but no clear successor was apparent 
beyond speculation about a possible move by the President, Taur Matan Ruak, 
to the prime ministership. An important question discussed during the Update 
was whether the next generation of leaders could command the same authority 
and the same commitment to constitutionality as the current leadership, 
whether they would feel the weight of other, non-democratic narratives that 
are powerful in the region, and the extent to which a growing engagement with 
Indonesia would influence public policy. 
Gusmão delayed his resignation until 5 February 2015—the precise mid-point of 
his term—and in the weeks leading up to it he worked to secure the succession, 
eventually anointing the highly regarded Dr Rui de Araújo from the official 
opposition party, FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor). The move was dramatic: 
it guaranteed the total overhaul of Gusmão’s bloated and underperforming 
1  Tasi Mane refers to the development of three industrial clusters and interlinking infrastructure along the 
south coast of Timor-Leste to support the planned domestic petroleum industry. The Oecussi special economic 
zone refers to the development of a trade, commerce and tourist hub in the enclave of Oecussi; the initiative 
is known as the Zona Espesial Ekonomia Sosial Merkadu (ZEESM; Special Economic Zone for Social Market 
Economy).
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government since constitutionally the resignation of a prime minister triggers 
the departure of the entire government; it marked the transfer of power from the 
’75 Generation to the Jerasaun Foun (New Generation)2; and it marked Gusmão’s 
own victory over partisan politics, which, ever since his youth, he has regarded 
with suspicion. 
In persuading his own coalition parties to support Araújo, Gusmão encouraged 
them to put the interests of the state above the interests of the parties. Prime 
Minister Araújo, in his inauguration speech, echoed this theme, pledging that 
the national interest would be paramount and committing the members of his 
government to putting the interests of the people above partisan interests. 
The president, in his speech at the inauguration ceremony, captured the essence 
of the political and policy transition underway, describing the transfer of 
power ‘from the generation which has conquered liberation to that which must 
conquer development’. This is the huge challenge now confronting the country.
3. Theories of the liberal–democratic state versus the 
realpolitik of state-building and participatory democracy
Institutional choices and the drivers of those choices emerged in various ways 
through the course of the Update as a domain of contest and competition 
between international policy orthodoxy and endogenous approaches anchored 
in local context and realities. A decade after independence, there is evident 
frustration over homilies on good governance by development partners whose 
own institutions may be less than exemplary. Equally, there is frustration at the 
criticism of approaches pursued in Timor-Leste that do not adhere to orthodox 
models of the structure of the liberal democratic state when patently the home-
grown approaches work on the ground. ‘Democracy’ was described as both 
an end and a means; there is a form of ‘democracy à la Timor’ that arguably 
works in context, even if it does not always accord with liberal democratic 
prescriptions. Those prescriptions may sound noble, but they can work against 
sustainability. Either way, the question of democracy and development remains 
a lively and contested arena, both within Timor-Leste itself and as a continuing 
dialogue among critics and interested observers. 
Several examples emerged over the course of the Update illustrating the 
difficulty of striking the right balance between fiscal or policy ideals and 
shoring up the stability and security of the state. For example, the design 
2  ’75 Generation refers to the older generation of Timorese leaders who emerged over the period from 
Portugal’s decision to decolonise its territories in April 1974 to the invasion by Indonesian forces in December 
1975 and the subsequent armed resistance. Jerasaun Foun refers to the younger generation who spearheaded 
the campaign of civil disobedience of the late 1980s and 1990s that put the question of East Timor back on the 
international agenda. 
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and implementation of the 2009 Pakote Referendum (Referendum Package) to 
initiate public works on a massive scale was heavily criticised for bypassing 
ordinary budgetary approval processes. While there have been allegations that 
project funds have been manipulated, not implemented, or implemented below 
standard, others argue that the package was a critical mechanism for stability 
that necessitated some trade-offs around procurement processes. Similarly, 
the decision to bring the police and the military together operationally under 
a joint command following the crisis of 2008 was criticised at the time but has, 
arguably, proven to be an effective response that is widely endorsed by the 
population. A third example was the decision to pardon Maternus Bere, the 
former Laksaur Militia Leader indicted for crimes against humanity for his 
role in the 1999 Suai Church massacre. Although attracting significant local 
criticism from human rights groups, this decision can also be understood as a 
pragmatic response by the Timor-Leste state to larger security interests, and one 
that signalled the importance of the Indonesia relationship. A fourth example is 
the collaboration and rapprochement now evident between the government and 
opposition parliamentary benches. An important point of discussion was where 
the line should be drawn between liberal democratic templates and realpolitik, 
and how well the benefits of endogenous approaches to nation-state building are 
understood by the international state-building fraternity. These were flagged as 
potential areas for research.
A larger, related question that was canvassed as a major political challenge was 
how Timor-Leste would use its wealth into the future. Two alternative paths were 
outlined: would the state establish firm rules for all areas of public expenditure 
with a neutral state apparatus disbursing funds; or would it further entrench a 
patron–client system that is fundamentally anti-democratic and based around 
elite interests and political favouritism?
4. National and sub-national governance
Timor-Leste remains two very different worlds: divided between the globalised 
capital Dili and the isolated and poorly serviced rural hinterland; and between 
relative wealth and extreme poverty. Troublingly, key indicators suggest that the 
gap is widening. Several factors were discussed that both informed understanding 
of and affected developments in these two contrasting worlds. First, gross 
domestic product (GDP) is a very poor indicator of real per capita incomes 
as it is dominated by Timor-Leste’s oil wealth, much of which is transferred 
off-shore. Wealth is concentrated in Dili, and distributional inequity across 
the population is extreme, despite significant levels of social transfer payments 
since 2008. Distributional inequity mirrors the split between participation in 
the formal economy and largely subsistence-level rural livelihoods. 
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That said, there are clear and positive changes occurring across the hinterland, 
not least with the near completion of the national electricity grid that was 
rapidly rolled out from 2010. The benefits of lighting and power have extensive 
multiplier effects, including much more widespread access to communications 
and the internet, which Timorese, like people everywhere, are embracing with 
enthusiasm. 
The government has also invested extensively in a range of decentralised 
construction projects, including new health centres, school buildings, road 
maintenance, and monuments to the nationalist struggle. And despite criticism 
over tendering processes for these contracts and the quality of construction, 
most district centres have at least seen a revival of local enterprise and contract 
services companies. 
There remains an ongoing debate about expenditure priorities—in particular, 
the very large commitments to big-ticket physical infrastructure versus the very 
modest investments in human services and agriculture—and the beneficiaries of 
these priorities. The current policy to distribute cheap imported rice at discount 
retail prices, for example, provides short-term benefits to rural households but 
inevitably undermines incentives for local rice production to the long-term 
detriment of East Timorese producers.
Timor-Leste is experiencing a brain and age drain, with young, educated 
people relocating from the rural areas to the capital seeking further education 
and job opportunities absent in the regions. Small but significant numbers of 
young people are travelling overseas for employment, and their remittances are 
highly visible in upgraded housing stock in rural areas. Social transfers and 
remittances are also underwriting household expenditures in the districts, 
but are very unevenly spread, with veterans receiving the lion’s share of these 
publicly funded distributions. 
Sub-national governance remains a key systemic question to be resolved, and a 
critical component of the unfinished agenda of state-building. Earlier enthusiasm 
and policy discussions around the organisation and implementation of 
decentralised government have seemingly stalled. The result is that regional 
government programs and participatory decision-making across the region 
are constrained and remain heavily dependent on Dili based national level 
directives. 
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5. Policy intent and policy action: bold visions, 
modest progress
A number of presenters commented on the apparent marked disjunction 
between stated policy intentions of the government and parliament and the 
decisions actually taken. At the next level down, policies approved are then 
poorly executed. Institutional capacity and organisation, in its many elements, 
is the central factor. One aspect highlighted was the insufficient separation 
of political and technical responsibilities in the implementation of policy. 
Other organs of state, including parliament and its associated accountability 
structures, as well as media and civil society, have an active role to play in 
ensuring that policy translates into effective and responsive service delivery. 
Recent criticism and controversy over cases of alleged and, in some cases, 
proven corruption among high officials and ministerial appointments have 
caused reputational damage to government and politicians among the citizenry. 
These high-profile cases of apparent conflicts of interest and misappropriation 
of funds only highlight the need for stronger institutional and public systems 
of transparency and accountability. Despite its best efforts, the Comissão Anti-
Corrupção (Anti-Corruption Commission) still struggles for legitimacy and 
strong political backing. 
Contributing papers 
We are pleased that the great majority of speakers at the inaugural Timor-Leste 
Update have been able to prepare written versions of their presentations for this 
volume. Other than acknowledging the recent change of prime minister, most 
chapters describe the status quo at the time of the Update. Some authors whose 
texts were affected by the political transition or the release of more recent data 
revised their chapters immediately prior to publication. The updated chapters 
are those by Charles Scheiner, Rui Feijó, Michael Leach, and Saku Akmeemana 
and Doug Porter, while Cillian Nolan has added a postscript.
The organisation of the book largely mirrors the structure of the conference 
itself, and while we have sought to encapsulate some of the sentiments and 
criticism offered by the audience during the Update sessions, we are unable 
to publish these commentaries within this online book format. For those who 
are interested, we direct you to the following ANU Timor-Leste website, which 
provides a number of additional recorded materials and associated discussions: 
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm/events/2013-timor-leste-update-follow. 
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Part One of the volume, Building a Nation-State in the Shadow of History, 
sets the scene for the remainder of the collection. Each chapter reflects 
on the achievements and challenges of nation-state building and engages, 
either explicitly or implicitly, with the legacies of history. Agio Pereira’s 
chapter—a  revised version of his keynote address—provides an ‘actor’s 
perspective’ on the challenges of building peace and securing development 
since the nation’s independence. While acknowledging that many outstanding 
issues remain, Pereira points to the nation’s high levels of economic growth; 
reduced rates of infant mortality and increased life expectancy; improvements 
in the provision of water, sanitation, and electricity; positive bilateral relations 
with Indonesia; and Timor-Leste’s leadership roles within international forum 
such as the g7+, as evidence that Timor-Leste has made great strides since 2002. 
Complementing this piece, Fidelis Magalhães’s chapter similarly reflects 
on achievements since independence, while also highlighting a number of 
significant challenges confronting the nation. Key issues include high youth 
unemployment, high levels of mal- and under-nourishment, poor-quality 
education, and the growing dependency of segments of the population on cash 
transfers. Magalhães is more pessimistic in his assessment of the economy than 
Pereira, pointing out that the increasing level of state expenditure is a serious 
issue when the country faces a more than US$1 billion non-oil fiscal deficit 
each year. More so than Pereira, Fidelis Magalhães engages with the legacies of 
history, arguing that a number of Timor-Leste’s problems—for instance, its lack 
of human and financial resources—are linked to the underdevelopment of the 
territory during foreign occupations. 
Like Magalhães, Michael Leach tackles the theme of historical legacies. In a 
reflective piece, Leach discusses the ongoing contested ‘ownership’ of the 
national liberation narrative and the ‘struggles for recognition’ by those 
who perceive themselves to be excluded. He suggests that not only is there a 
‘politics of recognition’ in Timor-Leste, but there is also a ‘political economy 
of recognition’ given that those who can successfully claim veteran status 
receive significant annual pensions. He notes that the lack of a consensus among 
political elites about what constitutes the ‘true’ history of the Resistance also 
poses difficulties for the writing of a national history curriculum for primary 
and secondary schools. Leach asks whether the recent rapprochement between 
factions of the political elite may create more favourable conditions for dealing 
with controversial issues in the curriculum. He also wonders whether the rise of 
the post-’75 Generation might transcend the divisions embodied in the leaders 
of the ’75 Generation.
Rui Feijó reflects on key challenges for the consolidation of democracy. 
Like  Leach, Feijó raises the issue of generational turnover, asking what will 
become of the legacy of Xanana Gusmão and other leaders of the ’75 Generation 
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once they reach the end of their active political careers. He identifies other key 
challenges including that of managing the nation’s wealth in line with democratic 
precepts and building a decentralised state that will make democracy both more 
representative and more participatory.
Part Two, Trends in Economic Development, reflects on economic developments 
at both national and sub-national levels. The first chapter, by Charles Scheiner, 
a researcher with the civil society think tank La’o Hamutuk, is entitled Can the 
Petroleum Fund Exorcise the Resource Curse from Timor-Leste? The answer 
presented in compelling detail is a pessimistic one, and points to a range of 
risks and concerns over the sustainability of the Petroleum Fund itself. Drawing 
largely on data from the government’s own statistical compilations, Scheiner 
argues that Timor-Leste’s currently active oil and gas fields may be dry by 
2020 and that the Petroleum Fund may be empty within five years after that. 
While this should underscore the urgency to develop Timor-Leste’s non-oil 
economy, increase revenue and use public money wisely, Scheiner believes 
that the Petroleum Fund may have created an ‘illusion’ of financial security 
that has allowed difficult decisions to be postponed. Scheiner’s presentation at 
the Update resulted in a lively ‘Q and A’ discussion, and drew attention to the 
critical importance of the fund and additional fossil fuel development to the 
future prospects for Timor-Leste. 
The following chapter, by Mr Antonio Vitor, Adviser to the Minister for 
Public Works, provides a measured account of progress made in the area of 
infrastructure development. Vitor cautions that infrastructure built prior 
to 1999 is deteriorating, and that ports, airports, major road networks, and 
telecommunications urgently need upgrading. While some progress has been 
made—in particular, in the sectors of rural water supply and sanitation, and 
electricity—key constraints are limited public sector capacities and capabilities 
to deliver infrastructure and poor co-ordination between relevant ministries.
The subsequent two chapters focus on economic developments at the 
sub-national level. World Bank governance specialist Saku Akmeemana, and 
Douglas Porter, consultant adviser at the World Bank, provide an overview 
of sub-national spending programs and the pragmatic increase of public 
expenditure directed to the regions in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis. They offer 
instructive lessons about the need to balance often competing technical, social, 
and political priorities, and adjust to changing needs over time. Meabh Cryan 
tackles the issue of continuing tensions over land use. She draws attention 
to how the lack of legislation for the resolution of land rights claims, and the 
increasing demand for land from the state for domestic and foreign investment, 
is contributing to land deals, alienation and forced evictions. She describes the 
flawed consultation process surrounding the 2009 draft transitional land law 
(which was later vetoed by President Ramos-Horta), which was the impetus 
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for an alternative, civil society-driven process. The civil society consultations 
highlighted that land holds multiple meanings for East Timorese communities 
and challenges the government’s view that so-called rai mamuk (empty land) 
can be easily appropriated for development purposes. 
Part Three turns to the theme of Stability and Social Cohesion. Cillian Nolan 
offers a detailed and insightful reflection on the post-Xanana political landscape 
and the role of different influential segments of society in national politics. 
His  chapter offers an excellent entrée to the two chapters that follow, by 
Catharina Maria and Damian Grenfell, which move beyond a focus on national-
level stability issues to offer ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on achieving peaceful 
solutions to conflict. Maria’s chapter reflects on her experiences as a peace-
building practitioner with the Laletek (Bridge) Project—a combined effort of 
the Catholic Relief Services and the Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission of 
Dili—that encouraged opposing groups to find common ground and collaborate 
on issues of mutual interest. Her chapter is a reminder that there are no ‘quick 
fixes’ to communal conflict and that peace-builders need to invest time and 
resources in understanding and responding to each local context. Grenfell’s 
chapter is a more conceptual piece that explores possible applications of 
customary connections and practice as part of the peace-building process. He 
argues that politics in Timor-Leste, while frequently represented as essentially 
‘modern’ in form, also encompasses ‘customary’ and ‘traditional’ systems of 
power. He suggests that the concept of ‘hybrid political orders’ might assist 
those involved in peace-building to better recognise and engage with different 
kinds of social practices and meanings that coexist in Timor-Leste, allowing 
practitioners to locate ‘sustainable practices amidst the intense pressure of 
social change in Timor-Leste’.
Part Four is entitled Citizens, Inequalities and Migration. The five chapters 
presented in this part focus on the challenges of building a society that 
encourages the participation of its citizens, recognises their diverse experiences, 
and addresses enduring inequalities. The first chapter, by Adérito Soares, former 
anti-corruption commissioner, reflects on how the problem of corruption in 
Timor-Leste might be addressed. Soares argues that, given the difficulties of law 
enforcement, comprehensive efforts to combat corruption must include public 
awareness-raising as a critical component. These efforts are needed especially 
at the subdistrict and district levels, where more and more projects are being 
initiated. 
Turning to the issue of gender inequalities, Lia Kent and Naomi Kinsella highlight 
the policy discrimination evident in the veterans’ valorisation scheme’s lack of 
recognition of women’s roles in the Resistance. They are also critical of the way 
in which the scheme is elevating the status of former male combatants over that 
of other citizens through the provision of symbolic recognition and material 
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benefits. This, they argue, is leading to a militarised construction of citizenship 
in which women’s inequality is further perpetuated. Andrew McWilliam 
explores the continuing disparities and inequalities between the bustling capital 
of Timor-Leste, Dili, and the majority rural populations. The lure of the city is 
seeing a continuing rural–urban drift, especially by young people in search 
of opportunities, and a small but significant number who are pursuing labour 
migration opportunities and education overseas. 
Joanne Wallis’s contribution explores the recent and important impacts of 
cash payments and social transfers to the rural hinterland. She finds that they 
have been an important mechanism to facilitate and support stability after the 
2006 crisis, but have also created a legacy of welfare dependency that will 
inevitably burden the state with long-term financial commitments. In the final 
chapter, Pyone Myat Thu examines the complex social politics and legacies of 
displacement and return that were experienced by many communities in the 
violence of 1999. Drawing on case studies from Baucau, Thu demonstrates 
how changing patterns of cross-border communication and kinship networks 
enable communities to gradually rebuild their lives with minimal government 
assistance. 
Other presentations at the Update
In addition to the papers that appear in this collection as book chapters, the 
Timor-Leste Update was enriched by the presentations delivered by a number 
of other invited speakers. James Scambary offered a provocative presentation 
as part of the panel on economic development trends, casting doubts on the 
feasibility of the much-vaunted Tasi Mane economic zone development project 
on the south coast of Timor. Deb Cummins presented a paper on the theme of 
decentralised development as part of the panel on sub-national development. 
Drawing on her experience with the Asia Foundation, working with community-
driven development initiatives, she reflected on achievements and challenges in 
this field. Santornino Amaral, also of the Asia Foundation, presented another 
paper as part of this panel, which reinforced ongoing concerns about inequality 
of opportunity in the rural areas and highlighted the challenges of effective 
decentralisation. Ines Martins of La’o Hamutuk co-presented a paper with 
Meabh Cryan examining tensions around land use. 
As part of the panel on active citizenship, peace-building specialist Laura 
Abrantes discussed women’s representation in the political arena, and the need 
for greater opportunities for women to contribute their voices and opinions in 
public debates and policy development. Parliamentarian Lurdes Bessa discussed 
the relationship between the national parliament and civil society, arguing that 
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there are many positive signs that show that civil society is helping to shape 
decision-making on key pieces of legislation and policy. Jose Neves provided a 
paper reflecting on the work and challenges of the Anti-Corruption Commission 
in pursuing its important work supporting transparency and accountability in 
government and public expenditure. As part of the panel on stability, Nelson 
Belo offered an analysis of the security sector situation and the role of security 
forces in the stability of the state. Belo noted that, given the central role of the 
police and military in previous periods of instability, effective management of 
the security sector is vital. Last but not least, Gordon Peake provided some 
pertinent concluding remarks. He commented that the papers presented over 
the course of the two days highlighted Timor-Leste’s growing self-confidence as 
a nation, and the extent to which, after 13 years of UN presence, East Timorese 
are making their own decisions (including their own mistakes), and firmly 
charting their own course. This is, of course, how it should be.
Conclusion
Following the turmoil and destruction in the wake of the 1999 popular 
referendum, the half-island territory of Timor-Leste emerged as the first newly 
independent sovereign state of the 21st century. Its democratic credentials 
established, the country has become a poster state for managing internal 
conflict and demonstrating strong policy leadership both domestically and 
internationally. Its windfall oil revenues from the Timor Sea have provided 
much-needed funding for critical infrastructure and important social transfers 
for pensioners, the disabled and veterans of the independence struggle. At the 
same time, the still very significant challenges of nation-building, of developing 
capable statecraft and participatory democracy mean that Timor-Leste remains 
a work in progress—one where popular expectations are often frustrated by the 
incremental pace of progress. The chapters that follow do not attempt to present 
a straightforward or unified narrative of these developments. Rather, they serve 
to highlight the richness of public debate and the diversity of views that exists 












Eleven years since Timor-Leste became a nation-state, it is now timely to reflect 
upon where the country has come from, what has been done to build the 
state—particularly the institutions of the state—and to lay out the direction 
that nation-state building has taken and will continue to take into the future. 
This nation-state account is done by way of a narrative, as it comes from an 
actor’s perspective, an actor who is actively involved in driving the state 
apparatus, charged with legal-rational responsibility to do so. I do this with 
honest reflection. 
I shall also account for the development, design and delivery of the country’s 
Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030 (RDTL 2011). This seminal work and 
the commitment to its steady implementation will see Timor-Leste develop 
into a society that has a large middle class, a vibrant private sector with a 
diversification of the resources economy, an educated and healthy population, 
and, importantly, a society based on the rule of law. For Timor-Leste, it is not a 
case that development must come first and democratic values will follow, but a 
case that both should proceed simultaneously. The Strategic Development Plan 
is the culmination of years of painstaking work, replete with consultations, 
debates and discussions, leading to multipartisan political agreement and 
acceptance by the people. 
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The task of nation-state building is not one that comes easy or naturally. One has 
to learn, and be willing to learn. One has to be courageous enough to fail and to 
admit failure and to change course. All failures are of course loudly trumpeted, 
with successes receiving much less attention. 
After the jubilation of the 20 May 2002 restoration of independence celebrations, 
the political leaders had to quickly absorb the mammoth challenge that lay 
ahead. The dawning day brought with it the reality of government. We now had 
our own executive, parliament and judiciary—and indeed the nation and the 
state—and we were responsible for it. We had barely a dollar to bless ourselves 
with, but we had our freedom, our dignity, and some very capable leaders. 
The latter cannot be underestimated, as political leadership is one of the key 
determinants of successful nation-state building, but not much touted and 
largely absent from the development nomenclature. Technocrats alone do not 
a nation-state build. The nation requires nurturing; it requires care; it requires 
leadership. The state requires institutions to be created and given competency 
with staff and systems. 
On 20 May 2002, there was no blueprint handed to our political leaders or to 
our handful of public servants that said: ‘This is a How to Build a Nation-State’. 
There  were no 30-second nation-state building books available. The  United 
Nations (UN) had kick-started the process in 1999, also without a blueprint 
or guides. The UN had never in its history had to build a state or govern one. 
There was no red book as there is in Australia to prepare incoming governments. 
There was no blue book either presented from the UN Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNTAET), when they handed over power. There was no guide. 
I recall here what our former Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão said in a speech 
he gave at the Johns Hopkins University in 2011. The speech captures the 
challenges that our people and political leaders faced:
When, on 20 May 2002, we became the masters of our fate, as a State that was 
finally independent and sovereign, the expectations were that we, Timorese, 
might decide the future of our Nation. Naturally we believed that this future, 
in freedom, was promising. But I would like to remind you that there were some 
factors that seriously threatened this ideal, namely: lack of prepared and qualified 
human capital; lack of political experience in democratic governance—a system 
that was completely new to our society; lack of basic infrastructure and other 
essential equipment; and most importantly, the lack of financial resources of the 
Country itself (Gusmão 2011). 
I have read the critiques of our nascent state, which cause me to take a sober 
look at how we are building the nation-state. Frequently, though, they draw 
their critique from a ‘developed state’ perspective, with little understanding of 
nation-state building and the heavy impact of donor policies and approaches. 
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They are mostly post-hoc, detailing where they think we have gone wrong, or 
have given too much here or too little there; not spending enough resource fund 
money, or spending too much; doing too little for health and education, and too 
much for the veterans, with no real impact on living conditions. Critiques are 
valued but one cannot ignore the fact that nation-state building is a daunting, 
long-term process. 
The birth of the state
The official name of our state is Timor-Leste. This name was agreed to and 
acquired on 20 May 2002, when Timor-Leste became a sovereign independent 
state. As the national flag of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was raised 
at midnight, the world’s then newest independent country was born. Given the 
great jubilation of the people, the ceremony itself was solemn. The secretary-
general of the UN, Kofi Annan, Australian Prime Minister John Howard and 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarno Putri witnessed the birth of the new 
nation-state. 
Our nation-state’s momentous birth became a reality after almost a quarter 
of a century of conflict imposed by the illegal occupation of the territory by 
the Republic of Indonesia, with full support from Australia, the United States 
and the United Kingdom. In the UN, however, international law prevailed, 
and the question of East Timor remained on the list of the Special Committee 
on Decolonization until the territory exercised its inalienable right to self-
determination and independence. There is much to be said for international 
law, even if it is sometimes said that it is soft law. Importantly, it carries moral 
persuasion. 
Soon after, in September of the same year, Timor-Leste became a full member 
of the community of nations—becoming the 191st member of the UN. In his 
first speech to the UN General Assembly, president Xanana Gusmão reminded 
the international community that the core reason for Timor-Leste’s success in 
achieving independence was its people. He noted that: 
Our people proved to the world to be worthy of the respect that we all owe and 
know’. It is the respect that we, one of the world’s smallest states, is starting to 
garner for our solid work to consolidate peace and to take our place as an open 
democracy in the international community (Gusmão 2002). 
It is against this backdrop of history that one can begin to understand the 
Timor-Leste of today. First, it is a democratic republic subject to the rule of law. 
Its constitution is recognised as one of the finest examples of liberal constitutions 
in the world. It is a constitution that the people take pride in. The respect for 
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law and human decency is enshrined in the constitution and the objectives of 
the state are in accord with the most valued principles of the UN. These are 
values I know are shared by Australians as well, including the refusal to accept 
capital punishment. 
Security Council Resolution 1272, which authorised the establishment of 
UNTAET on 25 October 1999, mandated that it would have full responsibility 
for the administration of East Timor and control of the executive, legislature, 
and the administration of justice. UNTAET would also maintain law and 
order, assist in the development of the civil services, facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and humanitarian assistance, support capacity-building, and 
establish an effective administration and conditions for sustainable development. 
This resolution bestowed upon the transitional administrator, Sergio Vieira de 
Mello, the powers of a Roman governor. He exercised executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers. Under UNTAET, transitional governance institutions were 
established (UNSC 1999). These institutions were developed from the perspective 
of what was required in a post-conflict, war-torn country that needed time to 
recover and to identify the best possible ways to move forward. 
At the same time, intense consultation with the leadership of Timor-Leste 
was occurring to ensure that whatever the UN was planning to do not only 
reflected the best possible expectations of the Timorese people, but would also 
have sufficient legitimacy to survive the challenges of a post-UN era. For our 
leadership, that was one of our most pressing challenges; given that the UN had 
some human resources and some expertise, we had ourselves and our friends 
from the years of the struggle. We drew heavily on our friends for advice and 
information, and set about making new friends who had the human resources, 
the skills and the expertise we needed. 
We actively participated in the consultative and governance mechanisms 
established by UNTAET regulations, but we were not in charge—the UN 
was. The Timorese political leadership, however, were not passive during this 
period, undergoing whatever preparedness technical training and professional 
development for independence we could muster, but there was no corporate 
governance history or architecture to step into, to inform us and to build on. 
From September 1999 until May 2002, East Timor evolved steadily into a 
nation-state, with its sense of sovereignty enhanced and with a strong sense of 
pride for finally attaining the goal of independence. The road ahead was filled 
with uncertainties. Who were our true friends? Who were or could become our 
enemies? These were legitimate concerns for a nation embracing peace after 
almost 25 years of living in an environment of conflict against illegal occupation. 
We asked ourselves which nations were truly receptive to our national interest 
and our future and which nations may not be. We understood that Timor-Leste 
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would stand the best chance of survival if it had no enemies. We also recognised 
that in a world dependent upon energy self-sufficiency, and with Timor-Leste 
being a country rich in oil and gas, we ought to expect the best but be prepared 
for the worst, hoping that the latter would never materialise. 
In the first decade after May 2002, Timor-Leste strove to consolidate peace-
building, and, despite a number of serious internal conflicts, there is a general 
consensus that it succeeded. As we enter the second decade of independence and 
sovereignty, Timor-Leste has said goodbye to conflict, to welcome development. 
Development is being carried out within the framework of the Strategic 
Development Plan. This conflict-free phase gives the government the breathing 
space it needs to focus on development. For development to succeed, any 
country needs, above all, to be conflict-free. Timor-Leste is no exception. I am 
not referring to small-scale conflict which every country, big or small, developed 
or developing, necessarily confronts every now and again, particularly in the 
political sphere, but conflicts that can derail national development. Timor-Leste 
has evolved since 1999 as a post-conflict nation. 
From the Restoration of Independence Day on 20 May 2002 (which we mark 
and celebrate every year) until 2006, Timor-Leste experienced its own serious 
conflicts that arose almost at the rate of one a year. In 2007, this trend was finally 
broken when our leader, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão took over the executive of 
the country and successfully strengthened governance. The period from 2007 to 
2012 was the first time a prime minister had managed the country for a full five-
year mandate. While the surprise attempt to assassinate President Ramos-Horta 
on 11 February 2008 and the attack on Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão shook 
the nation, the Timorese leadership successfully took control and prevented 
undesired collateral damage against the state. Both these attempts, in fact, were 
not part of a new development, but were a direct consequence of the unfinished 
saga of our 2006 crisis. 
From a positive point of view, 11 February 2008 set a benchmark for the 
capacity of the country to act with resilience and to sustain serious conflict 
without allowing collateral damage to further hinder national peace and 
stability. The  manner in which the pillars of sovereignty handled this crisis 
was exemplary. The international community recognised the maturity of our 
leadership at this time. It was a significant benchmark in the process of nation-
state building. February 2008 represented a turning point. It demonstrated 
that the resilience we had exercised during the long and brutal occupation was 
transferable to nation-state building. We had achieved our own successful skills 
transfer, and a significant one at that. 
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
22
Our people acted with shock, yes, but restraint, as did the leadership. As President 
Ramos-Horta recovered in Darwin Hospital, cared for by the Australian and 
Timorese community, Prime Minister Gusmão took over the security portfolios, 
including the armed forces and police. His leadership enabled both forces to 
build their own capacity while having their most trusted leader at the helm. 
This demonstrated again the primacy of trusted and effective leadership. 
Key themes in the Strategic Development Plan
Since 2007, a conflict-free nation-state has been evolving. Ideas are maturing and 
governance capacity grows. The nation’s very first Strategic Development Plan 
became the official long-term plan of the country. It envisages that by 2030 Timor-
Leste will have a population that is healthy, well educated and prosperous, with 
a mature and diversified private sector supported by productive infrastructure, 
including a national road network, an extensive electricity generation and 
distribution system, and efficient ports and airports. Our strategic aim is to have 
a broad and large middle class by 2030. Some question its attainability, but if 
we do not set these goals, we shall never realise them. The key themes for the 
government in 2014 were: 
• implementation of the Strategic Development Plan
• decentralisation of governance
• implementation and socialisation of law. 
The latter two themes are key to sustainable development. 
Development of Timor-Leste’s institutions of law and order, defence, 
governance, pillars of sovereignty, and civil society are of paramount importance. 
These are integral to the successful implementation of the Strategic Development 
Plan. The state, as a juridical entity, needs to be equipped with the necessary 
capacity to safeguard the country’s sovereignty—a nation-state’s primary duty. 
Institutional capacity-building becomes, therefore, the central focus of nation-
state building. 
We were told by the international community that we must decentralise 
and we agreed, but we first needed to strengthen the centre before we could 
competently do this. At an international decentralisation conference, sponsored 
by the Timor-Leste Government and held in Dili in 2013, Prime Minister Xanana 
Gusmão, during his keynote presentation and reflections during the conference, 
stated that social, economic and political components vary from country to 
country and that ‘all theories are good; but the only one that is useful, is the 
one that fits the reality of our country’ (Gusmão and Soares 2013). 
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Australia, Cabo Verde and other nations took part in this conference, sharing 
their experiences of successes and challenges in the building of local power. 
Lessons learned were presented along with the benefits and constraints for 
Timor-Leste if the decentralisation models of other countries were to be adopted 
without taking into account the importance of specific local realities. We also 
learned from presentations during the conference that the process of setting up 
local government and of creating and developing municipalities to make local 
power work effectively takes considerable time, and, in some cases, has taken 
more than 100 years. 
During this same conference we laid out our decentralisation plans and sought 
constructive support, yet we were criticised by some of our development 
partners for not devolving sooner. The question we faced was ‘which structures 
to devolve and to whom?’. We knew that decentralisation was for the benefit 
of people at local level, to enable them to receive services directly and to have a 
voice in decision-making. Yet we needed to develop structures and systems to 
deliver those services. That required some central core to work with and from. 
Without the machinery of government in place (and we started with none) this 
would be next to impossible. 
So what can be said now by way of an update? 
Timor-Leste’s leaders recognise that the most important indicators of 
development are the happiness and well-being of the people. In this context, 
our challenge effectively becomes implementing inclusionary policies leading 
towards an equitable sharing of all the nation has to offer. The leaders of Timor-
Leste are very conscious of this priority, and this in itself is already a major step 
forward towards successful nation-state building. 
As a good example, CNRT (Congresso Nacional para a Reconstrução de Timor-
Leste; National Congress for the Reconstruction of Timor-Leste) and FRETILIN 
(Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; Revolutionary Front for 
an Independent East Timor)—the two major political parties in Timor-Leste—
are working in consonance with national priorities. Liberal democracy is 
adversarial, but institutional solidarity is much needed to forge the mentality 
that democracy is positive; it can be a uniting force benefiting nation-state 
building and national sovereignty. 
In the Five-Year Program of the Fifth Constitutional Government, social inclusion 
features as an important strategic policy (RDTL 2012). This entails not only the 
need to support the elderly and the disabled, but also to support the veterans 
and the poor, while striving for full gender equality. The youth are also not 
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ignored. The government has a secretary of state solely dedicated to youth and 
sport. Having a majority young population, Timor-Leste needs to always build 
in the needs of the youth in national policies. 
Like any other country, Timor-Leste places employment generation on the 
list of top priorities. Timor-Leste also needs to constantly focus on generating 
employment for the young generation—the future leaders. That is why 
vocational training programs and employment policies and programs are also 
given such high priority. 
A country can only truly be happy if the most vulnerable of its population 
are cared for. A fund for human capital development has been established by 
law, which provides scholarships for Timorese to build their skills to match the 
needs of the country to achieve inclusive national development. 
Development is also about the economy. And the economy is also about industries 
and international relations. It is also about regional economic co-operation as 
we strive to become a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The complex, interconnected nature of development means that 
Timor-Leste requires sophisticated know-how and this, in turn, means that 
building adequate human capital is a determining factor for the success of 
national development. In addition, sustainability requires basic skills to build 
roads, schools and hospitals, and manage, install and fix electricity, plumbing, 
cars, computers, and more. 
A fund for infrastructure has also been established with the expectation that 
infrastructure development will enhance inclusiveness and offer opportunities 
for all, without neglecting the most disadvantaged. As a result, a national 
electricity grid, together with fibre-optic cables for internet access, is almost 
completed across the country. The range of benefits deriving from easy access 
to electricity for a developing country is immeasurable. Health, education, 
agriculture, business and economic progress draw their vigour and higher 
productivity from the power of electricity. 
Along with roads and bridges, which are a key part of the infrastructure fund’s 
priorities, one can say with a satisfactory level of confidence that Timor-Leste 
is heading in the right direction, on an inclusive and sustainable development 
path, guided by its Strategic Development Plan.  
Another key challenge is foreign investment. Although not a new challenge in 
developing nations, for Timor-Leste this means a stable legal framework, and 
a capable and internationally competitive labour force with salary levels and 
incentives that are competitive with similar countries in our region. Timor-Leste 
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enjoys national stability and peace, which can be a determining factor in 
attracting foreign investment. This peace and stability is promising and will be 
long-lasting. 
In due course, the development of human capital and infrastructure will reach 
a higher level and the attractiveness of the country for foreign investment will 
also be enhanced. There is no reason why Timor-Leste will not succeed in this 
path. We know we have to succeed. Our leadership, the business community, 
and civil society are all conscious of and committed to this. 
Ultimately, the challenge for any government is to create sufficient employment to 
respond to current and emerging needs. Foreign investment is also an important 
factor in providing jobs, as is infrastructure development. Successful diplomacy 
is yet another important factor. Smart politics, which is often underestimated 
by governments, has a vital if not overarching role. It is interesting that in the 
world of aid and development, political development is usually a low priority 
or does not rate. Yet without it, institutions do not develop. 
Those who choose to stay aside will perish. Those who embrace the challenges 
of competition within the rule of law, including international law, will survive. 
Those who, in spite of opting to be in the competition ring, choose to adopt 
dishonest and illegal means to defeat their adversaries will, sooner or later, pay 
a high price. It is imperative that the global competitive environment is strongly 
guided by the rule of international law, because this is where countries such as 
Timor-Leste, existing between two regional giants, identify fairness and legality 
as their own national interest. 
We are getting tired of being lectured about the need for good governance 
by some of our development partners, when the principles that underpin 
good governance—a commitment to the rule of law, accountability, and 
transparency—are sometimes lacking in our bilateral relations.
Setting new boundaries
Timor-Leste strives to work together with other countries to establish 
new boundaries. In our short history, we have had very positive bilateral 
relationships with our regional giant neighbours, Indonesia and Australia. In 
the case of Indonesia, we have demonstrated the importance of defining our 
relationship by looking forward rather than looking back. We do not and can 
never forget the past and we have a strong responsibility to care for our people 
who were traumatised. As a government, we cannot, however, be captive to 
our past. We now consider Indonesia one of our closest friends. We share more 
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than a land border (which is about to be finally settled following a respectful 
negotiation process). We share a history of colonisation and oppression and 
a striving for democracy. 
In the case of Australia, our bilateral relationship has also been positive. 
Australia led the International Force for East Timor military mission in 1999, with 
Sir Peter Cosgrove at the helm. Australia contributes more direct development 
assistance than any other development partner. However, there is one aspect 
of our relationship with Australia that has not been so positive: our efforts to 
negotiate a permanent maritime boundary in the Timor Sea. In the spirit of 
looking forward, and not back, this is something I hope can be resolved sooner 
rather than later. It will also provide certainty for our friends in the oil and gas 
industry, and an equitable outcome negotiated according to the principles of 
good governance and international law. 
Maritime boundary issues cannot be resolved without both parties entering 
into a structured engagement negotiations framework. This is very difficult 
considering that in 2002 Australia withdrew from the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice regarding the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in matters of the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries. This leaves no regular umpire to settle 
such matters, leaving it up to Timor-Leste and Australia to resolve the issues 
themselves. 
New boundaries are important in relationships as well, as there are times in 
which they should be reset. In our engagement with fragile states, including 
Timor-Leste’s leadership of the g7+, we have succeeded in forging the New 
Deal.1 What’s ‘new’ about this deal is that it focuses on promoting peace-
building and nation-state building as a foundation for sustainable development 
among g7+ countries. Timor-Leste was the architect of this New Deal and has 
been investing in setting the right pace towards transforming mindsets. There is 
a compelling need to set new boundaries in regards to the way states share 
information, such as the commitment already stated by the G20 in terms of 
collaboration beyond borders to counter corporations’ tax evasion. Setting new 
boundaries in terms of the delineation of national borders also needs to occur, 
with particular consideration to where they should fall, because this will allow 
for the enhancement of co-operation in trade, investment, regional stability and 
prosperity for all. It is also vital for a nation-state’s sovereignty. 
1  The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the New Deal) was advocated by the g7+ and developed 
through the forum of the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. It was presented at the 
fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, where it was widely endorsed.
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Timor-Leste is clear about its strategic national interest and is committed 
to promoting and protecting it. It builds the best possible relations with its 
neighbours and, within this realm, Australia and Indonesia occupy a very 
important place. Timor-Leste also sees its accession to ASEAN as part of its 
national interest. Strong relations with the countries of the Portuguese-speaking 
community, which includes Brazil, Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, 
São Tomé e Príncipe and Guinéa-Bissau, are also extremely important, due to 
the historical and cultural attachments between the governments and peoples of 
these countries that have been forged over many centuries. Such an alliance can 
also be very useful in the political power posturing that is played out at the UN. 
It was certainly one of the most important factors in our victory in the struggle 
against the illegal occupation of East Timor by Indonesia, which occurred with 
the full connivance of successive Australian governments. 
The way forward
Timor-Leste has recently completed the cycle of the budget debates within the 
parliamentary standing committees. The national parliament has now adopted 
the law pertaining to the state (national) budget that has become the 2014 
Budget. This is a process that sees the prime minister actively involved. He both 
provides oversight of early bids and reviews final ones from ministers before 
proceeding to the parliament to promote and defend the budget. In developing 
our budget, the government placed particular emphasis on the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). This includes funding the rehabilitation of schools 
and providing them with the equipment, security and minimum conditions 
necessary for the students to achieve what their intellectual potential allow 
them to. The MDGs, and improving the educational environment of the younger 
generation, will now fall under the direct responsibility of the prime minister.
Our nation has moved from an annual budget of under US$63.4 million in 2002 
to a current budget of US$1.6 billion. We have also moved from a situation in 
which our infrastructure was lacking or destroyed to one in which we now have 
basic infrastructure such as the national electricity network detailed above. 
Schools and health clinics are being built or repaired. We are moving at a faster 
pace to provide water and sanitation, and to grow a mature private sector to 
play a more effective role as a partner of the government.
We know that our citizens want a reliable power supply, safe roads, good 
education and employment opportunities, and we are working right now to 
realise them. These issues are central to the program of government and reflected 
in our Strategic Development Plan. 
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We have many positive indicators that are consolidating each year. Here are a few: 
• Economic growth has been high and non-oil growth averaged 11.9 per cent 
between 2007 and 2013.
• Agricultural output of major crops is on the up each season.
• The number of tourists in 2013 was 74 per cent higher than in 2012. 
• Timor-Leste has reached the 2015 MDGs target in reducing infant and 
maternal mortality.
• Timor-Leste joined other Southeast Asian nations in being officially certified 
polio free by the World Health Organization (WHO).
• WHO also declared Timor-Leste to be on target for more than a 75 per cent 
reduction in the incidence of Malaria cases. 
• Timor-Leste is one of the top six countries where life expectancy increased 
the most between 1990 and 2012 from 50 to 66 years. During that same 
period, Australia increased from 77 years to 83 years. (WHO 2014).
Australian politicians of all persuasions so often say that ‘Australia punches 
above it weight’. So does Timor-Leste, and our leadership has a unique and 
keen understanding of the UN and the international community. Timor-Leste 
has worked with both in ways that very few nations get to do, in order to garner 
support for our legal and just cause of self-determination, and in partnership 
to build our nation-state. Timor-Leste takes seriously its role as an international 
citizen and strives to be a good one, given our singular experience. 
On the international stage, our nation has landed a number of global governance 
roles. These include: 
• chairing the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (ESCAP) with its 62 member countries 
• chairing the g7+, which represents 20 conflict-affected countries and which 
Timor-Leste was instrumental in establishing
• representation on the board of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (Timor-Leste also being the third country in the world to achieve 
compliance status with it)
• presidency of the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa 
(Community of Portuguese Language Countries) 
• representation on the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women  
• joining ASEAN when the preparedness work is finalised to satisfy the 
criteria. 
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When we give it proper thought and consideration, we can comfortably 
state that much has been achieved since 1999. But we must also be frank in 
acknowledging that much still has to be accomplished before our people can 
be fully satisfied; before we can say that the sacrifices made during 24 years of 
conflict have been honoured with the transformation of our nation from being a 
victim to one where the international community praises our advanced progress 
in nation-state building in accordance with the rule of law. 
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Past, Present and Future:  
Why the Past Matters 
Fidelis Magalhães
 Future is past’s child, and has the father’s face.
This chapter presents my analysis of the current state of Timor-Leste’s 
development process. It is divided into the following sections. First, I discuss 
the tension between the theory and the realpolitik of state-building. 
Second, I discuss Timor-Leste as a country in the making. Third, I discuss the 
path to independence, the current Timorese leadership and the present political 
landscape. Fourth, I touch on the roles and the five-year plan of the president. 
Finally, I try to paint a picture of the future and identify challenges. 
The theory and the realpolitik of state-building
I hold the view that most of the contemporary analyses on the socioeconomic 
development of Timor-Leste suffer from a serious historical deficiency. It  is 
common for expert opinions to make claims about Timor-Leste’s current 
economic performance while seldom referring to the course on which the 
country has sailed. Like driving a car, one ought to have a rear mirror to look 
behind. If the mirror is too big the driver will be distracted; but without one, 
the car cannot be driven safely. 
Moreover, expert opinions seldom acknowledge that the development process 
is largely a political process. Beyond having the right economic theories 
and formulas, it is only through having strong political commitments and 
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sensitivities that a recently independent, economically underdeveloped country 
can progress. To succeed, it requires strong political will on the part of the 
leadership to build democratic governance based on the rule of law, yet at the 
same time ensure that the state is capable of creating consensus among main 
political forces that can otherwise be belligerent towards the state. The state 
needs to be creative in finding ways to ensure mid-term peace and stability so 
that attention can be given to building institutions and governance systems, and 
ensuring that services are delivered to its population. There is no development 
without peace and stability.
In fact, some of the inherent difficulties of state-building in Timor-Leste arises 
from the prescriptions of liberal democratic theory. It appears that interest 
groups, peace and stability, and electoral politics are interconnected. The 
question is how to ensure that the state maintains control over all the interest 
groups while not being hijacked by them. To only base our analytical approach 
on rent-seeking theories and to be overtly suspicious of the elites can be 
misleading. This is true since history has taught us that the elites and, of course, 
their political will, played an important role in most of the development success 
stories, inter alia, as in the case of South Korea and Singapore. 
Timor-Leste: a country in the making
Snapshots of Timor-Leste’s history can be divided into the following 
periods: pre-colonial, Portuguese colonial, Indonesian occupation, and 
post-independence. Not much can be said about the precolonial period. In fact, 
more archaeological and historical work is needed in order to establish accounts 
of that period. The Portuguese established their first trading post in 1562. 
However, it was not until the 1700s that more efficient commercial exploration 
of resources began. Primary cash crops such as sugar cane and coffee were 
introduced circa 1815 after the depletion of sandalwood, and an imposto (head 
tax) was introduced in the 19th century for all adult males between 18 and 60 
years old. In general, during the period of Portuguese colonialism, Timor-Leste 
remained a backwater colony. Portuguese colonialism was not conducive to 
growth and had little impact on technological advancement. There was a serious 
lack of investment in both infrastructure and human development. The literacy 
rate at the end of the Portuguese rule in Timor-Leste was at 10 per cent (Saldanha 
1994). School enrolment rates were low, despite having increased during the last 
several years of Portuguese occupation, after the Viqueque Rebellion in 1959. 
In the 1960s, the number of students enrolled in primary education climbed 
from less than 5,000 to 27,000 and, in the first half of the 1970s, reached a peak 
of 57,500 students (Saldanha 1994). Literacy rates in Timor at the end of the 
Portuguese presence reflect a very limited effort by the Portuguese dictatorial 
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regime of Salazar to provide education to the population of Timor. Salazar was 
the founder of Estado Novo (New State)—the regime established after the 1926 
military coup d’état—and ruled from 1932 to 1968. Measured by these results, 
his policies represented a serious neglect of the interests of the Timorese people. 
The neglect and abandonment of the interests of the population is a typical 
characteristic of colonial policies.
Comparatively, in Indonesia for example, the impressive progress in literacy rates 
between 1945 and 1971 was a result of the radical change of state priorities—in 
contrast with the priorities of the Dutch colonial administration. This change 
was only possible with independence and with the establishment of a national 
government. What I am attempting to draw by comparing Timor-Leste’s literacy 
rate and that of Indonesia during the first decades of its independence is that the 
lack of qualified human resources is due to colonial disinvestment in the sector. 
As a consequence, postcolonial governments struggle to build their countries 
with scarce human resources and at the same time invest in the education of the 
current generation. 
To conclude this brief reflection on the past, I will focus on the insufficiencies 
of the development policies of the governments led by Indonesian dictator 
Suharto. Suharto was the founder of New Order—the regime established after 
the 1965 coup, and presided over by the Indonesian government between 1967 
and 1998. The development policy of Jakarta for Timor was accelerated from the 
mid-1980s, in the final 15 years of occupation.
I will not expand further on this, but will instead focus only on education 
as a measure of development: the policies of Suharto were characterised by a 
strong investment in equipment and infrastructure. These investments partially 
benefited the population and partially benefited the military leaders. 
In 1985, there was already one primary school in each village, with a total of 
497 schools (for 442 villages). By 1996—three years before the UN referendum 
for the self-determination of Timor-Leste—there were 736 primary schools. In 
1996, there were also 112 junior high schools, 37 senior high schools and 16 
secondary education vocational schools. There were seven universities, with the 
first one—Universitas Timor-Timur—having been established in 1986. In 1990, 
adult literacy had reached 33 per cent (Jones 2003: 41).
Throughout this period, the number of university students in Timor-Leste and 
Indonesia and the number of university graduates grew exponentially, although 
starting from a very small baseline. Those youths who were educated in 
Indonesia became a powerful force of resistance to the Indonesian occupation. 
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The growth in the number of schools was accompanied by the construction 
and opening of public facilities, from health to infrastructure and other sectors 
of public administration. Nevertheless, despite this progress, the country’s 
human resources continued to be undervalued by the foreign administration 
throughout the entire period of the occupation. The paradox can be explained 
by the convergence of two factors. In both, consideration for the interests of the 
Timorese people was absent.
First, developmentalism was used by the Suharto regime for propaganda 
purposes. Consequently, the numbers quickly gained a life of their own, with 
statistics being more valued than the quality of the results on the ground. 
Second, the jobs created in Timor by the investment in public services were 
often used by Jakarta to reassign Indonesian teachers and other professionals 
and staff. Once again, the preparedness of East Timorese senior staff to take 
on positions of increasing responsibility was neglected, as a matter of policy. 
This translated into another serious negligence. 
Therefore, when the Indonesian administration withdrew in 1999, the 
destruction did not only affect the public and private buildings and equipment. 
That withdrawal left the country bereft of teachers, engineers, doctors, and other 
senior officers, who had been primarily Indonesian. The public administration 
in Timor-Leste was not only left without physical facilities (destroyed by arson), 
it was bereft of experienced officers and emptied of structures.
The path to independence and the present 
political landscape
I have discussed how underdeveloped Timor-Leste had been throughout foreign 
occupations. In fact, it was a planned underdevelopment of the country for 
centuries. Against this backdrop, many of our current development challenges 
cannot be solved overnight. Our challenges remain large. We became independent 
with little qualified human and financial resources, and our institutions were 
almost non-existent. Our society had never previously been democratic.
What was it that made our path to independence different from other countries 
that underwent similar experiences? First, we became independent under the 
auspices of the UN in the new millennium. Upon independence, we were thrust 
into a new and more demanding reality. We were expected to ascribe to all the 
existing international norms and conventions and to uphold liberal democracy 
without the know-how and existing institutions. What’s more, this was at a time 
when the majority of the electorates were illiterate and heavily traumatised by 
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past violations. Our population became more oriented towards the attainment of 
individual rights and completely ignored their collective duty. This was difficult 
to manage, especially when mixed with the post-conflict sense of entitlements, 
or with the narrative of terus (suffering). In short, an essential part of nation-
state building in the post-conflict context was to manage people’s expectations.
We were fortunate, however. We were fortunate because we had individuals 
with a real sense of purpose at the helm—the running of the state. They tried 
(though not without episodes of near despair) and succeeded in sticking to 
democratic ideals while guiding the country through the first decade of self-rule. 
Even in the darkest periods of the krize (crisis) in 2006, and the assassination 
attempts against both the president and the prime minister, in which the 
president was seriously wounded, constitutional order prevailed. We opted 
to follow constitutional arrangements without creating negative precedents. 
Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2007 according to the 
electoral calendar, and with almost 75 per cent voter turnout. 
The leadership has changed over the years since 2002. The elections in 2012 
resulted in Taur Matan Ruak becoming president of the Republic. Even though 
occupying an important role in the Resistance as deputy commander of Forças 
Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL; Armed Forces for 
the National Liberation of East Timor), Taur Matan Ruak does not belong to the 
’75 Generation. He joined FALINTIL when he was 18 years old and ascended 
through the ranks. 
The top leadership roles are now occupied by Taur Matan Ruak, Xanana 
Gusmão and Mari Alkatiri. José Ramos-Horta, although no longer occupying 
a formal role, still holds an important political influence. Taur Matan Ruak 
plays an important role as the bridge between the ’75 Generation and the 
younger generation. Most political parties, including major parties such as the 
CNRT (Congresso Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor; National Congress for the 
Reconstruction of Timor-Leste) and FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-
Leste Independente; Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), give 
more prominence to younger leaders. Most government ministers belong to the 
Jerasaun Foun (New Generation) and the president’s team is composed mostly 
of young people. 
In terms of the contemporary political landscape, we are enjoying a very solid 
relationship among the leaders. This positively contributes to peace and stability. 
The president holds weekly meetings with the prime minister. Moreover, the 
relationship between the prime minister and the leader of the opposition has 
never been so solid. Rather than political posturing, the opposition has opted 
for constructive engagement in which it supports programs it considers good 
and continues to challenge those that it considers unsound. This new form 
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of political manoeuvring is not without its critics. There are many who argue 
that while the current CNRT–FRETILIN relationship is good for national unity, 
it  significantly weakens democracy because it deprives the parliament from 
having a real opposition. However, this view has to be carefully weighed against 
many factors. I do think that at this stage of our nation- and state-building 
process, it is essential to build a broad consensus. During parliamentary debates, 
the opposition continues to be critical of government programs with which it 
disagrees, while at the same time offering more measured comments on those 
policies and plans with which it disagrees. I think we are simply becoming 
a mature democracy, where consensus building and conflict resolution is an 
integral part of the democratic exercise. This is in contrast to past practices 
where the parliament used to be a chamber for personal attacks. 
Looking beyond current political culture, it would be a mistake to brand all 
radical political manoeuvres as anti-democratic. For example, mechanisms such 
as grand coalitions between major parties are not completely alien to political 
scientists. While I do not have a personal opinion on the subject, I nevertheless 
think it is important to keep it within the realm of what is possible and not 
dismiss it out of hand as anti-democratic. 
Roles and the five-year plan of the president 
of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 
Having discussed broadly the changes in relationships among political leaders 
and institutions, I now would like to discuss in a more in-depth way the roles 
of the president of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. I will frame this 
discussion within the context of institutional relations. 
The president plays an important role in using his soft power to build political 
consensus. In Timor-Leste, we informally refer to this type of power in the words 
of one of our nation’s founders, Dr Roque Rodrigues, as poder da influenciação 
(the power of influencing) and galvanisador (galvanising force). The fact 
that the president acquires his legitimacy from the following sources gives 
additional strength to his authority. First, the president is elected by popular 
vote. Second, more than holding a symbolic role constitutionally, the president 
himself is the symbol of national unity, the head of state, and the guarantor of 
the healthy functioning of state institutions. Third, also in accordance with the 
constitution, the government reports to both the president and parliament. 
In practical terms, we are witnessing a solid co-ordination between all 
constitutional pillars. In fact, the relationship between the president and the 
opposition has now evolved into a much stronger one. The president holds regular 
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meetings with the prime minister, government ministers, and parliamentarians. 
Meetings with the opposition are held periodically. All these initiatives have 
cemented mutual trust and respect among political leaders. 
The following list of goals shows how, with the existing mutual trust and close 
institutional collaboration, the president has managed to push some of his own 
priorities ahead. President Taur Matan Ruak’s five-year plan, produced at the 
beginning of his mandate, included the following priorities: 
1. generational transition
2. regional integration/strategic partnership 
3. economic diversification/reduction of economic dependency 
4. nutrition and food security 
5. good governance 
6. rural development 
7. land and property issues.
Many of his plans have received positive responses from the government, 
parliament and civil society organisations. In fact, many have been translated 
into government policies. As I have outlined, much of the progress is the result 
of the president’s use of poder da influenciação. President Taur Matan Ruak also 
calls for a strategic partnership with Australia, and our membership in the 
Commonwealth of Nations.
But of the many achievable goals in the short term, there are those that still 
require persistent hard work. Although all state institutions are working hard 
to achieve results, they require both time and improved administrative skills. 
For example, the public administration must continue to develop its capabilities 
to respond to national needs. Public services are still concentrated in Dili, 
whereas 80 per cent of the population live in the districts where the quality and 
reach of public services are insufficient. 
The president of the republic has called for the introduction of rules for 
performance assessment that would guide career advancement and remuneration 
for civil servants. 
The quality of public tenders and of public works also still needs improvement. 
In many cases, the state’s ability to supervise contracted work is poor or non-
existent. Sometimes, money is spent on works that deteriorate almost as quickly 
as the time it took to build them. 
Another challenge that we need to overcome is legal uncertainty. I will not 
expand on this subject except to mention the land law because of its importance 
from the point of view of the community and of investors. 
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Land ownership continues to be a source of conflict and, again, this is a lingering 
issue. Two land law proposals have been presented in recent years: the first 
proposal was approved by the national parliament, having been vetoed by 
the then President José Ramos-Horta; a new, modified proposal is now under 
review. This is a priority for President Taur Matan Ruak. 
Finally, yet another important issue is the integration of our youth in the 
economy and in the construction of a country that will be theirs to run soon. 
This topic on its own would require a full seminar. There have been calls 
recently for the creation of some civic and national service to give the younger 
generation a sense of duty towards the country and a new sense of purpose. 
We  are currently gathering ideas and we hope to kick-start a nationwide 
discussion in the near future. 
The future 
In general, we are optimistic about the future. We hope to become an upper 
middle-income country by 2030. While monetarily it should not be too 
difficult to achieve, socially the challenges remain enormous. According to our 
Strategic Development Plan, development is categorised into four pillars: social 
capital, infrastructure development, economic development, and institutional 
framework. 
Now we face the following real challenges: 
1. High youth unemployment. Around 70 per cent of Timor-Leste’s population 
is under 30 and 54 per cent is of productive age. Of those belonging to the 
productive age category, only around 30 per cent are employed. At the 
moment, around 27,000 youths enter into the job market every year, while 
only a handful of job opportunities are being created yearly. 
2. High incidence of malnutrition and undernourishment: 45 per cent of 
children are underweight, with 33 per cent stunting and 19 per cent wasting. 
(This requires a national consensus. Any government would need to pledge 
to put an end to malnutrition and undernourishment.)
3. Poor-quality education and poorly trained human resources. Many children 
who have been through schooling continue to be illiterate and do not possess 
even elementary maths skills. 
4. Veteran issues/cash transfers. In 2012, public transfers were US$233.7 million, 
or approximately 12.6 per cent of the annual state budget. For 2013, this 
figure was about US$239 million, or 17.3 per cent of the annual state budget. 
Of the overall figure for cash transfers, around US$84 million is designated 
for veterans alone (the rest to support poor families through the Bolsa da Mae 
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(Mother’s Purse) program, subsidies to the elderly, and public transfers to 
civil society organisations). While cash transfers are an important tool to 
achieve short-term peace dividends, we shall, however, establish a fund that 
would lead to the reduction of dependency on the state. The president has 
been calling for veterans to establish a nationwide initiative where they fund 
health services and scholarships to their children using a portion of their 
monthly state subsidy. It is hoped that in the future the fund can also invest 
in various portfolios.
To conclude, the state’s expenditure is more likely to continue to grow, especially 
the recurrent expenditure. This is a serious challenge when we are facing a more 
than US$1 billion non-oil fiscal deficit every year. The non-oil revenue remains 
bleak with only US$146 million in revenue for the last year. 
Conclusion
Timor-Leste is a country in the making that has many potential and specific 
challenges. While it is true that many of our problems cannot be solved 
instantly, a great number of them are the result of our history. We have achieved 
a great deal since the restoration of independence in 2002, but we are aware 
that challenges remain. Our development process has been arduous, yet I am 
confident in saying that we are on the right track. We may have to make 
concessions, and engage in political manoeuvres and consensus-building along 
the way. These strategies are, nevertheless, short-term in nature and designed to 
achieve a specific end goal. Despite all these challenges, the foundations of our 
society are unshakeable. We continue to see democracy as both a means and an 
end. We do not believe economic development justifies the suspension of civic 
rights and participation. This option—the democratic option—may make the 
road bumpier but the result will certainly be more long-lasting. 
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The Politics of History in Timor‑Leste
Michael Leach
National history remains an important concern of East Timorese public life. 
While surveys demonstrate high levels of popular pride in East Timorese history 
(Leach 2012), the very centrality of the Resistance to East Timorese nationalism 
has resulted in considerable political conflict over the symbolic ownership 
of that history: over who is included, excluded, or recognised in the central 
narrative of funu (struggle; see Ramos-Horta 1987), and, also, how younger 
people can feel part of the national story. Major episodes of civil unrest since 
independence (the 2002 riots, the 2005 Catholic Church protests over voluntary 
religious education, the 2006 political-military crisis, tensions with veterans’ 
groups) have normally contained a strong element of demand for recognition of 
contributions to the achievement of independence. This has been a prominent 
theme in post-independence electoral contests as well. As was evident in the 
2012 elections, participation in the resistance to the Indonesian occupation 
remains a powerful source of political legitimacy, and debates over and inclusion 
or exclusion of certain actors from the narrative of national liberation have been 
tools in electoral campaigning and public discourse (Powles 2012).
Since independence, formerly suppressed political tensions within the modern 
nationalist movement have also posed notable difficulties for writing the 
national history curriculum for schools. Following the replacement of the 
former Indonesian history curriculum, interim curricula have typically covered 
history up to 1974 more thoroughly than the critical and difficult years that 
followed. The legacies of divisions within East Timorese society and political 
elites from the 1974–75 civil war era, the 1999 referendum, and the political-
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military crisis of 2006 have posed difficulties for drafting a national history 
curriculum, with some areas still considered politically difficult or ‘too hot to 
handle’ (Leach 2007, 2010). 
There are, however, some recent signs of rapprochement in these post-
independence ‘history wars’, and a moderation of political conflict since the 
2012 elections. This chapter briefly examines some of these divisions since 
independence, and the way these can be seen in part as symbolic struggles for 
recognition (Honneth 1995). It examines how history is deployed in national 
politics, recent developments in the drafting of national history curricula in 
schools, and the ongoing process of filling in the gaps of resistance history. 
It then focuses on the way these tensions have been reconfigured in recent years.
The history wars: fault lines and constituencies
As with other postcolonial nations, previously suppressed political divisions 
within the independence movement emerged in the wake of national liberation. 
With deep divisions within its small political elite dating to the late colonial 
era, a range of interconnected ‘history wars’ have created ongoing challenges for 
writing a history curriculum since independence, with different internal divisions 
stemming from events of 1974–75, 1999, and 2006 (Leach 2007, 2009). For some 
East Timorese, writing the national history is still too controversial a task, with 
tensions over the divisive civil war period, divisions within the independence 
movement, and the collaboration of segments of an occupied civilian population 
still close at hand. As numerous commentators have noted, reconciliation 
between the parties in the short-lived but bitter civil war in 1975—FRETILIN 
(Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor) and UDT (União Democrática Timorense; Timorese 
Democratic Union)—is incomplete, despite the formation of the more inclusive 
united front Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere (National Council of the 
Maubere Resistance) in 1986 (transformed into the CNRT (Conselho Nacional de 
Resistência Timorense; National Council of Timorese Resistance) in 1998) and 
the efforts of the Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor 
Leste (CAVR; Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) 
to facilitate this process. As one East Timorese teacher noted in 2005:
Where to start? It will be necessary to be diplomatic with Portugal and Indonesia. 
When it comes to the civil war in 1975, the parties still exist. And some of the 
Balibo parties—UDT, Apodeti, Kota, Trabalhista—I don’t know why you’d give 
them an opportunity as they brought East Timor to a terrible time. But this is 
part of democracy, so fine. It will be a controversial issue, very sensitive. So when 
you start talking history, you come to a sensitive issue (see Leach 2006: 233).
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There is also the long-running process of reconciliation between the majority 
of independence supporters, and the pro-integration minority, arising from the 
dramatic and violent separation from Indonesia in 1999. While this generates 
less public heat, owing to the priority of good relations with Indonesia, 
there are bitter and unresolved legacies of the 1999 referendum just below 
the surface of East Timorese society, with a largely unaddressed history of 
violence—including crimes against humanity committed during the Indonesian 
occupation. Though  these issues enjoy little elite support, they rear up as 
marginal voices, normally from victims’ groups protesting the lack of justice for 
crimes committed during the occupation (Kent 2012). 
Other fault lines appeared after the nation’s independence during the period 
of the first constitutional government from 2002–06. Backgrounded by unmet 
material expectations, a range of political, cultural and intergenerational tensions 
emerged, including political divisions between the government and president in 
the freshly minted semi-presidential system. There were also growing fissures 
between a largely secular government and the powerful Catholic Church. 
These wider fault lines were catalysed by tensions between the security forces 
allied to different elite political factions, and exploded in the political-military 
crisis of 2006. Though the crisis was triggered by claims inside the military that 
those from ‘eastern’ districts had contributed more to the resistance, and from 
junior ‘western’ officers claiming discrimination in promotions, a wide range 
social tensions contributed to the 2006 crisis.
Some of these fault lines were strongly related to the history of the Timorese 
Resistance. Primary among these issues were intra-elite conflicts between 
FRETILIN and non-FRETILIN members of the former ‘united front’ of the 
CNRT (Leach 2006: 233), and, notably, ongoing tensions between FRETILIN 
and former CNRT figures over the symbolic ‘ownership’ of the Resistance, its 
powerful narrative of national liberation, and the fruits of post-independence 
political power. In the early years of independence, some Timorese felt that 
FRETILIN’s self-styling as the inheritor of the independence struggle was too 
narrow and excluded too many. On the other hand, other political actors felt 
that the importance of FRETILIN resistance in the late 1970s and early 1980s has 
been neglected in favour of a more unifying and politically palatable emphasis 
on the subsequent CNRT ‘united front’ years. Some of these tensions between 
FRETILIN and the reconstituted political party CNRT (Congresso Nacional para 
a Reconstrução de Timor; National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) can 
be traced to internal conflict within FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação 
Nacional de Timor-Leste; Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East 
Timor) itself during the late Resistance era (Niner 2009).
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Notably, despite the so-called ‘east–west’ regional conflict that flared violently 
in 2006 and left 150,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Dili, there were 
no examples of ‘separatist’ discourses at any point of the crisis. Even at the peak 
of these short-lived but intense conflicts, none of the protagonists sought to 
deny a common historical bond, nor the view that all East Timorese should form 
a single nation—even if, as Kammen (2003) has observed, the nationalist/traitor 
trope is frequently employed in a range of social conflicts. As such, the crisis 
and other precursor conflicts are perhaps best viewed, using Axel Honneth’s 
(1995) term, as ‘struggles for recognition’: they seek to secure acknowledgement 
of contributions to the valued common project of East Timorese nationalism; or, 
at times, to secure recognition of other identities that remain important to these 
actors, including local and ‘traditional’ forms of identity. 
Broadly speaking, a recognition approach examines the way distorted or 
inadequate forms of recognition may become important sources of motivation 
for political mobilisation and resistance (Honneth 1995: 138–39). Perceived 
‘disrespect’ to a group’s sense of self, to its traditions and values, or a perceived 
‘misrecognition’ of its contribution to shared and valued social goals, such as 
national independence, may create the conditions for political conflict (Honneth 
1995: 121–43). A ‘recognition’ dynamic was evident in other political divisions 
since independence, such as those between ‘diaspora’ and ‘local’ independence 
movement figures, with widely reported popular resentment against exiled 
political leaders ‘taking over’ post-independence politics, having been in the 
diaspora during the Indonesian occupation. 
The return of a largely secular leadership also saw tensions with the Catholic 
Church, which had played a key role in the Resistance. Others noted a growing 
gap between elite and popular values. For Trindade and Castro (2007: 14), 
for example, a widely held view across Timor-Leste was that ‘the nation-state 
seems to benefit only the political elites … which in turn come mainly from 
the eastern region that claimed to have fought more in the resistance and from 
the returned Timorese diaspora’. In sum, the 2006 crisis high lighted the way 
the nation-building process had been greatly complicated by ‘recognition’ 
style struggles over the relative contributions of various political actors to the 
achievement of East Timorese independence, or the apparent misrecognition by 
the new state of key popular values. Some aspects of intergenerational tensions 
have also assumed the character of ‘recognition’ struggles. These included the 
obvious issue of language policy, especially in the early post-2002 years, but also 
wider conflicts over the political and cultural dominance of older nationalists 
in post-independence political settlements. These tensions extended to the 
comparative neglect of the youth-dominated civilian resistance in the national 
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memorial landscape, compared with the greater public valorisation of armed 
combatants of FALINTIL and senior FRETILIN and CNRT ‘national heroes’ 
(Babo-Soares 2003; Leach 2009). 
Against the backdrop of these fault lines, a range of constituencies have been 
making recognition-style claims against the East Timorese state. At various 
times, these constituencies have included veterans and military petitioners; 
IDPs during the crisis of 2006–07; the former clandestine resistance; youth; 
traditionalists favouring a greater role for customary law; the Catholic Church; 
victims groups; and others.1 It is worth noting that when taken together, 
FALINTIL veterans, youth, traditionalists (including liurai—traditional rulers), 
and victims of violence from 1974–99 potentially represent a substantial 
percentage of the population, which has at times expressed dissent at their 
perceived exclusion from forms of institutional and symbolic recognition by the 
state. In addition, key veterans groups such as the Committee for the Popular 
Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL) and Sagrada 
Familia have explicitly denied recognition of the 2002 constitution, questioning 
the wider political settlement as a whole. 
The politics of demanding recognition of contributions to the Resistance, 
or acknowledgement of suffering during the occupation, has been the basis of 
many political claims on the state. Indeed, it might be argued that there is not 
only a politics of recognition, but also a political economy of recognition. In 2013, 
there were some 37,000 registered veterans, receiving annual pensions worth 
US$67 million, along with one-off payments worth US$62 million (La’o Hamutuk 
2013). Veterans are also frequently recipients of contracts under infrastructure 
and referendum funds; emergency projects to veterans totalled US$78 million in 
2010–12—a figure set to increase by 4 per cent annually (La’o Hamutuk 2013). 
These programs represented a substantial feature of the 2013 budget at 5.8 
per cent, exceeding both security sector and health expenditure.2 While veterans 
payments enjoy a high level of popular legitimacy, in part because they are 
considered due recognition, some types of payments to veterans have drawn 
criticism.3 It is also true that other groups perceived to be less deserving than 
veterans have also benefited from large infrastructure contracts. Timor-Leste has 
witnessed more malicious attempts to mimic recognition claims, from criminal 
gangs and conflict entrepreneurs leveraging threats of unrest and conflict as a 
means of rent-seeking (Scambary 2009; ICG 2013). 
1  See for example, Traube (2007) on the notion of ‘unpaid wages’, and popular claims for compensation for 
sacrifices made during the independence struggle.
2  These figures do not include the civilian clandestine list, former military petitioners, and a range of other 
important new pensions, including payments to the elderly and single mothers. 
3  La’o Hamutuk (2013) noted that some of the largest payments distributed in June 2012 before the 
parliamentary elections were directed to ‘these warriors, genuine heroes of our independence, (who) deserve 
attention from the state, but we worry when this rectification is used to pay for party political promises’.
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Finally, these patterns of recognition and misrecognition have also been evident 
in state-sanctioned forms of ‘official’ history, including the cultural heritage and 
memorial landscape (Leach 2009). For example, the critical contributions of the 
youth-dominated clandestine resistance have taken a long time to be recognised 
in both the history curriculum and the memorial landscape of the independent 
state. While 12 November is a national public holiday, and there is a system to 
award medals to veterans of the clandestine resistance, it was only in 2012 that 
a monument was built to remember the victims of the Santa Cruz massacre—an 
event widely regarded as a turning point in the campaign for independence. 
Publicly, the extent of the juventude’s (youth) contribution tends to be neglected 
in post-independence politics, with military veterans’ issues and histories 
strongly dominant. In a parallel feature, as Fernandes (2011:  125) notes, the 
civilian clandestine resistance has been relatively neglected by historians.4 
As he argues, the history of the clandestine front movements and their ‘vital 
yet often unacknowledged role’ in the independence struggle is yet to be 
fully documented. It is also true that women’s contribution to the Resistance 
remain an area of enquiry to be more fully explored, despite some notable 
pioneering contributions (Amal 2006; Conway 2010), and the more recent, as 
yet unreleased, work of the Secretarido da Comissão de Pesquisa e Elaboração da 
História da Luta da Mulher Timor (Secretariat for the Commission for Research 
and Development of the History of the Timorese Women’s Struggle). Women’s 
contribution to the Resistance is also notably absent in official commemoration 
and memorial landscapes. 
Recent developments
Debates over history have taken on a new flavour in recent years. With Xanana 
Gusmão reviving the name of the former united front for independence 
(CNRT) as a political party in 2007, leadership credentials in the military wing 
of the resistance proved a strong theme in both the 2007 and 2012 election 
campaigns, highlighting the political legitimacy still associated with these 
attributes. In 2012, Gusmão campaigned again as Lider Maximo (top leader) of 
the Resistance, with a high-profile media campaign, including photos of himself 
in uniform, which gave full exposure to his role as leader of the resistance era. 
Likewise, the 2012 presidential election campaign heavily featured references 
to the past in Taur Matan Ruak’s campaign slogan ‘Together with you in the 
past, our blood intertwined towards our independence. Together again with 
you today, we toil towards a better future’ (Powles 2012). The labelling of a 
4  Exceptions include Chega! (CAVR 2006, Chapter 5: Resistance Structure and Strategy); Fernandes (2011); 
Babo-Soares (2003); and Nicholson (2001).
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small pro-CNRT breakaway group from the main opposition party FRETILIN as 
‘FRETILIN Resistencia’ highlighted the way these ideas were deployed as an 
electoral strategy to delegitimise the major opposition party. 
Since 2012, however, there have been clear signs of public rapprochement 
between the two key figures of Prime Minister Gusmão and the opposition 
FRETILIN leader and former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. Following the 
coalition-building among non-FRETILIN forces from 2007, the profound nature 
of CNRT’s 2012 victory seems to have reduced political conflict between the 
elites, with a new political settlement or consensus politics emerging. This has 
reflected Gusmão’s successful and long-term strategy of using political victories 
as a basis for coalition and unity-building, though these developments have also 
been driven in part by FRETILIN’s continuing support among voters from the 
eastern districts. The influence of President Taur Matan Ruak is also seen to be 
a factor in the new working truce between the two leaders. 
This new style of politics was evident in FRETILIN’s unprecedented support 
for annual budget votes in parliament, and in the appointment of Alkatiri as the 
head of a major project to develop the exclave of Oecusse as a special economic 
zone (Suara Timor Lorosa’e 2013). It was also reflected in Gusmao’s overtures 
to the 2014 FRETILIN conference, at which he acknowledged its key role in 
the Resistance. Conversely, Alkatiri publicly acknowledged Gusmão as a former 
FRETILIN leader himself, and was vocal in encouraging him not to retire early. 
His party also conspicuously dropped the label ‘de facto government’ it had used 
after the 2007 election, when the CNRT had won fewer seats than FRETILIN. 
The two leaders were frequently seen travelling together, showing an external 
unity to the world. In the wake of departing international peacekeeping forces, 
these developments were critical, and led to wider interpretations within the 
political elite. Most notably, Minister of State and President of the Council of 
Ministers, Agio Pereira (2014) wrote of these developments as a ‘new politics 
of national consensus’ to overcome failed state syndrome, seeing them as an 
example to other developing post-conflict countries of ‘transforming belligerent 
democracy into consensus democracy’. On FRETILIN’s part, it made references 
to a new ‘pact with the regime’ (Lusa News Agency 2014), which it sees as a 
‘necessary consensus for state-building’.
The remarkable culmination of this trend occurred in early 2015 with the 
formation of a new government, dominated by CNRT ministers, but led by 
FRETILIN’s Rui Araujo as Prime Minister. With Gusmão stepping down from the 
prime minister’s office to become the Minister for Planning and Development, the 
new power-sharing executive, involving the two major parties, also represented 
a major intergenerational shift in the political leadership (Leach 2015). The move 
toward a semi-formalised government of national unity was important as this 
generational handover (signalled in 2013, then delayed at the CNRT party 
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congress in 2014) was always likely to be a watch point for political stability. 
There were clear signs that the ‘history wars’ were cooling as Gusmão prepared 
to depart the centre of the political stage, with Alkariti already installed as 
the head of a new body charged with promoting development in the exclave 
of Oecusse. These developments answered some of the questions about what 
to do with the katuas—the senior leadership of the 1975 era, including José 
Ramos-Horta—beyond their departure from formal political life. The rumour 
mill had entertained various speculations as to how their historic role would be 
preserved, ranging from proposals of a Lee Kwan Yew–style ‘senior ministry’, to 
a more probable, and perhaps inevitable, role as an informal ‘council of elders’. 
This new moderation of political conflict also saw the state seek to tackle anti-
system actors including the CPD-RDTL, with significant developments across 
2013 and 2014. Throughout 2013, increased activity and political conflict was 
evident from disaffected veterans groups, including an extended CPD-RDTL 
confrontation with police in Manufahi. Late in 2013, calls by a former FALINTIL 
commander Paulino ‘Mauk Morak’ Gama, for a ‘revolution against poverty 
and early elections’5 brought older divisions within the former FALINTIL 
military resistance to the fore. This raised heated debates in the country, to 
the extent that a special forum of political leaders had to be convened, with 
the president himself offering to mediate.6 This conflict has deeper origins in 
Gusmão’s reformation of the FALINTIL resistance in the 1980s, taking it from 
the armed wing of the pro-independence party FRETILIN to a non-partisan 
military force representing all nationalists. This move toward a policy of 
apartidismo (non-partisanship) ultimately led to the creation of the CNRT—a 
broad nationalist front representing all East Timorese nationalists, with no 
ideological goals other than national liberation, and with FALINTIL as its 
military.7 At the time of the initial split in 1984, Mauk Moruk was among a small 
group of disaffected FALINTIL officers who rejected the strategy and attempted 
an internal coup against Gusmão’s leadership. 
This episode amply demonstrated the ongoing power of history in East 
Timorese political life. Moruk is now associated with Sagrada Familia—a former 
clandestine group during the occupation—who, like CPD-RDTL, remains 
outside the mainstream of post-independence politics. Many in Dili expressed 
relief that all major parties, including FRETILIN, supported Prime Minister 
Gusmão in the special forum, which Moruk did not attend. Moruk and his 
veteran-dominated group, the Konseilu Revolusionariu Maubere (KRM; Maubere 
5  Timor Post 21/10/2013.
6  Suara Timor Lorosa’e 11/11/2013.
7  See Niner (2009: 105–06) for historical background to these events.
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Revolutionary Council), later called for protests on 28 November 2013—the 
38th anniversary of Timor-Leste’s unilateral declaration of independence in 
1975, but these actions ultimately did not proceed.
In March 2014, the parliament moved to proscribe CPD-RDTL and KRM, after 
members wearing uniforms had conducted military exercises in the Baucau 
district. Following a reported shoot-out between KRM and police, Moruk and 
CPD-RDTL leader Aitahan Matak were detained in Dili, and Moruk’s brother 
and Sagrada Familia leader Cornelio ‘L7’ Gama were placed under house arrest. 
Moruk surrendered to police but warned that ‘all of Dili would burn’ at his 
command. This threat was followed by Moruk visiting the attorney-general 
with a military escort, and reported attempts to register as a legal organisation. 
Local security NGO Fundasaun Mahein (2014) subsequently expressed concerns 
that despite the government’s new resolve, veterans groups operating outside 
the law may bring the government to the bargaining table over registration. 
While  new forms of elite unity were evident in the face of ongoing sources 
of historical division, as other commentators have noted, beneath the new 
confidence of a more united elite lie ongoing tensions, with parallels to those 
that lay behind the 2006 crisis (Powles and Sousa Santos 2013):
The standoff between Gusmao and Mauk Moruk reflects a potentially dangerous 
schism between two groups: on the one hand, Gusmao, the former clandestine 
groups allied to him and the national police; and on the other hand, the Gama 
brothers, Sagrada Familia, and the national military whose Chief, General Lere 
Anan, publicly stated his support and membership of Sagrada Familia during the 
resistance struggle.
While Moruk’s challenge was met with a firm and unified response from the 
elite, to the relief of many in the country, there were also fears that popular 
disaffection with the slow progress of development may yet assist these groups’ 
message, and in mobilising potential supporters. As Mattheos Messakh (cited 
in Gonçalves 2014) argues, the wider question is whether disaffected veterans 
groups are capable of becoming a lightning rod for those who feel left out of 
progress and economic patronage:
It is likely that Mauk Moruk’s strategy is to captivate young people who feel 
increasingly marginalized and who can be easily taken advantage of … to fill a 
void left by the prohibition of martial arts groups created during the clandestine 
resistance and involved in the violence of 2006.
By mid-2014, tensions surrounding disaffected veterans groups appeared to 
calm considerably, only to flare up again in January 2015 in a standoff between 
the PNTL (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste; National Police of Timor-Leste) and 
the KRM in Laga. Though the government’s resolve remained firm, and the 
KRM’s popular support base was uncertain, these developments also showed 
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that so long as participation in the military resistance remains a keystone of 
political legitimacy, historical divisions and associated claims for recognition 
would continue to prompt powerful reactions. While the present government 
can win these symbolic battles on the same ground of veteran credentials, future 
governments will need to establish alternative criteria for legitimacy.
Thinking about post-conflict history 
It should first be noted that difficulties in writing the national history in Timor-
Leste are common to post-conflict societies. As in Bosnia and Kosovo, Timor-Leste 
is not alone in having to replace the history component of otherwise retained 
textbooks, following national independence (Höpken 2001: 3). Similarly, 
several post-conflict societies have delayed history education in favour of a less 
controversial and general focus on human rights education and civics curricula 
(Cole and Barsalou 2006: 12). This pattern, evident in Rwanda and Bosnia, has 
been apparent in Timor-Leste, with civic education curricula development 
far in advance of history curriculum development through the early years of 
independence (see Leach 2007, 2010). Some post-conflict countries have gone 
further, and chosen to ignore the recent past of violent conflict in newly 
developed national history textbooks (including Mozambique and Cambodia), 
or have openly postponed inclusion (Rwanda) (see Höpken 2001: 2).
A key issue in post-conflict societies is how the role of the history curriculum 
is conceived. As Höpken (2001: 12) notes, peace-building and reconciliation 
will not necessarily be promoted by curricula primarily designed to promote 
officially sanctioned versions of national identity and foster loyalty to the state. 
Equally, teaching students core historical methods of critical inquiry, such as 
the capacity to evaluate the merits of competing historical claims, may not be 
compatible with the goals of official histories that seek to inculcate ‘national 
values’ and loyalty. This is a critical issue for Timor-Leste, particularly as it seeks 
to move on from the authoritarian epistemology of the New Order (Indonesian 
regime 1967–98) approach to national history as a single, authorised, pan-
archipelagic narrative. Indeed, understanding historical knowledge as a process 
of evaluating competing historical claims, and teaching students the processes 
of gathering evidence to test them, are essential skills of democratic citizenship. 
As Cole and Barsalou (2006: 1) note teaching these skills of critical inquiry may 
be a more effective focus in resource-poor environments than developing new 
history textbooks. Yet this focus can also attract opposition from new ruling 
elites and policymakers, as ‘few post-conflict societies are ready to accept an 
approach that promotes critical thinking, since it is often perceived as flying 
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in the face of traditions that respect expertise, seniority, and authority and 
promote group honour as more important than any forensic truth’ (Cole and 
Barsalou 2006: 10). 
In Timor-Leste, the link between history curriculum development and 
transitional justice is also a critical one. Certainly, the failure to implement 
the recommendations of the CAVR report strongly parallels the challenges in 
writing the national history. Thorny and highly politicised debates over justice 
and reconciliation, along with questions of how to deal with legacies of internal 
division, and the relationship with Indonesia, are common to both challenges. 
Both point to a present lack of political will and a working consensus to deal 
with the complex and divisive issues of historical justice. While the CAVR has 
produced an essential range of educational materials, as the Secretariado Tecnico 
Pos-CAVR (Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat) itself notes (CAVR 2008: 39), Chega! 
was not written directly for the classroom and still needs to be ‘re-presented … 
appropriately for different levels and subject areas’. This is an important caveat, 
as the ‘socialisation’ of CAVR findings can only truly take place at a national level 
through their reproduction as curricula. At present, CAVR materials are left 
to the discretion of individual teachers to incorporate into classroom practice. 
This is regrettable, as representative personal stories—of the sort employed by 
the CAVR report—are considered to be very helpful methodologies for dealing 
with complex issues of historical justice in school curricula (Cole and Barsalou 
2006: 10). 
The role of a history curriculum development in nation-building is also a critical 
one. Compulsory schooling is, of course, a key site of integration around national 
values and identities. Gellner even goes so far as to argue that ‘the monopoly 
of legitimate education: is more important than the classic Weberian monopoly 
of legitimate violence’ (Gellner 1983; Tawil and Harley 2004: 9–10). A key issue 
is how to promote a social cohesion that is respectful of diversity (Tawil and 
Harley 2004: 4) without exacerbating social tensions. As was abundantly clear 
in the 2006 crisis, Timor-Leste’s past can easily be recruited to the purposes of 
creating discord; highlighting the urgent need to promote social cohesion.
Finally, compulsory education is also a key site for promoting a postcolonial 
cultural identity in the wake of colonialism and civil conflict. As Tawil and 
Harley argue (2004: 20), Mozambique is a good example of a society seeking to 
assert a post-independence national identity that also accommodates a diverse 
multilingual, multicultural society. However, as Rønning notes (cited in Tawil 
and Harley 2004: 20), accommodating multiple languages and local identities 
may be seen by some nationalists as a form of tribalism that questions the project 
of national unity. In Timor-Leste, the ‘Mother Tongue’ Multilingual Education 
Program has certainly faced criticisms of this type, despite the strong evidence 
base suggesting its effectiveness in promoting literacy. Key questions in the 
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process of promoting an inclusive national identity via compulsory education 
include who is consulted about these issues, how non-elite voices are heard, 
and the ways conflict is dealt with (Tawil and Harley 2004: 19). Where there are 
ongoing divisive issues, there may be a clear role for outsiders in the process of 
curriculum development; indeed, this was the ‘circuit-breaker’ in reforming the 
national curriculum after the conflict in Rwanda (Cole and Barsalou 2006: 7).
History in progress
Major developments have occurred in the national history curriculum in 
recent years. The most significant of these is the redevelopment of the year 1–9 
primary curricula, with a major effort to ‘indigenise’ a range of curricula for 
primary schools. This includes a stand-alone history curriculum at primary 
level for the first time, replacing the previous syllabus (Leach 2007), which 
saw primary school history covered under the general subject of ‘Estudo do 
Meio’ or ‘Environment’. Units will have a strong early focus on pre-colonial 
history, to encourage an understanding of Timorese cultures and identity as the 
products of societies pre-dating the colonial era, before examining the impacts 
of colonialism (Reforma Curricula de Ensino Básico—Curriculum Reform 
for Ensino Basico project team; interview with author 2014).8 East Timorese 
curriculum developers are the primary writers for the first time, supported by 
international consultant teams, with the additional involvement of teachers and 
the teacher training college. Importantly, the Ministério da Educação (Ministry 
of Education) curriculum development team is also working with teachers to 
develop lesson plans—something that was previously relegated to the school 
or teacher level (see Leach 2007)—and a mentoring scheme for new teachers. 
In terms of pedagogical approach, lesson plans include a strong focus on asking 
questions—a seemingly straightforward approach, but one that challenges 
previous schooling cultures in a profound way, and may take considerable time 
to implement. Importantly, the curriculum seeks to encourage the development 
of critical reasoning skills and basic research techniques, including oral 
history projects at 4th and 5th grades; encountering the idea of stereotypes; 
understanding different perspectives on historical issues; and introducing 
students to different types of historical evidence at 5th and 6th grades. Taken 
together, these approaches represent a significant departure from the former 
curriculum. The influence of a very active vice-minister for primary education 
is widely acknowledged as a key factor in these changes. At the secondary level 
of years 10–12 the approach is more standard, with curriculum development 
8  Interview with Curriculum Reform for Ensino Basico project team, Dili, 18 August 2014. At this point, 
the reformed curriculum covers the first and second cycle only (years 1–6). 
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teams from Portuguese universities working on the upper history curriculum. 
The strong base in national culture at primary level, and a more generic ‘national 
and world history’ approach at secondary school may prove complementary, 
although it remains to be seen how more controversial episodes and periods 
of conflict in East Timorese history will be dealt with in the upper years of 
schooling. 
Other neglected elements of East Timorese history are also starting to receive 
due attention. The women’s history project Secretarido da Comissão de Pesquisa e 
Elaboração da História da Luta da Mulher Timor (Secretariat for the Commission 
for Research and Development of the History of the Timorese Women’s Struggle) 
is researching the role of East Timorese women in the Resistance. This work 
is well in progress and the project expects to launch their report in 2015. The 
history of the clandestine movements is also expanding slowly, though there is 
considerable work to do in this area. As noted above, in recent years the relative 
lack of recognition of the clandestine resistance is starting to be addressed by 
both historians and formal state memorialisation. There is, however, also some 
controversy attached to the new Santa Cruz monument at Motael, which was 
installed without consultation with the 12 November committee led by Gregorio 
Saldanha (da Silva 2012); and there is still no progress on a memorial at Santa 
Cruz itself, despite a government-announced design competition co-sponsored 
by the 12 November committee in 2010 (RDTL 2010). Slow but steady progress 
on the history of the clandestine resistance is also evident in some newer 
publications, most substantially in Fernandes’s The Independence of East Timor: 
Multi-Dimensional Perspectives (2011). It is to be hoped that a new generation 
of East Timorese historians will build on—and perhaps revise—early attempts 
made by external historians, and the relatively few East Timorese accounts 
made following independence (de Araujo 2003; Babo-Soares 2003; Pereira 2009). 
In terms of documentation, the national archive still requires support to fully 
catalogue and digitise its materials, and a formal legislative framework to define 
its responsibilities. The Arquivo & Museu da Resistência (Archives & Museum 
of East Timorese Resistance) in Dili is strongly supported by government, and 
also performs some of these archival functions. Outside the country, CHART 
(Clearing House for Archival Records on Timor) is being funded by the East 
Timorese Government and other donors to preserve and digitise the archives of 
the Timorese diaspora in Australia9. 
9  See timorarchives.wordpress.com/chart/.
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Conclusion
International experience suggests that certain pre-conditions must be met before 
compulsory history education can be seen as a resource to foster reconciliation 
and peace-building. These pre-conditions include a favourable post-conflict 
environment where violence has ended, a strong commitment to peace-building 
from political elites, a sense of common national values, and a general social 
consensus for reconciliation (see Höpken 2001: 5–8). Until recently in Timor-
Leste, many of these basic issues were still unsettled, with a highly fractious 
political elite, divisive legacies of the 2006 crisis, and a small but influential 
cohort of anti-system groups that routinely questioned the state’s monopoly 
on legitimate force. The 2006 military-political crisis was a clear setback to the 
peace-building process, as are the still divisive debates over reconciliation, 
forgiveness and justice.
However, recent developments in political stability raise grounds for greater 
optimism. In the wake of the rapprochement between fractions of the political 
elite, are conditions favourable for dealing with more controversial issues in the 
national history in upper levels of schooling? While there are grounds for positive 
assessments, including a strong political commitment from relevant ministers to 
producing culturally relevant education, some caveats are clear. First, there is 
little political will to deal with internationally sensitive issues arising from the 
Indonesian occupation, the violence of 1999, and the unresolved grievances of 
victims groups. While much of the tension from 2006 has been worked through, 
and post-independence relations between the political elite are at a high point, 
events associated with the 2006 crisis are still sensitive, and attempts at writing 
their history may prove challenging. Another caveat concerns the extent to 
which these welcome developments should be understood as transformations 
within the political elite alone, or whether they are subject to more popular 
consensus. Behind the elite political rapprochement, victims groups still feel 
marginalised, and an uncomfortable level of popular support can be sensed 
around some of the disaffected veterans groups’ criticisms, particularly when 
they speak of those who have missed out on the fruits of development or 
economic patronage.
Equally, with the departure of Xanana Gusmão from the prime minister’s office 
in early 2015, other questions attend the new moderation in political conflict. 
Will the new consensus continue in a post-Gusmão electoral environment after 
the 2017 elections? How will the emergence of the post-’75 Generation alter 
these inter-party dynamics? Can a new generation address divisive social issues 
with the same sort of historical legitimacy as the katuas? Or, indeed, will a new 
generation more easily transcend these divisions associated with the leaders 
of the ’75 Generation? More broadly, questions remain about the role of the 
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military. Will the army stay out of politics once senior civilian leaders are no 
longer former FALINTIL commanders, whose political control ensures the close 
ear of government (see Feijo in this collection). If recognition-style claims from 
former veterans groups continue to catalyse some popular economic discontent, 
the combination of high unemployment and a growing youth population could 
again reveal a latent potential for significant social unrest. It remains to be seen 
if claims from victims groups can be addressed with cash transfers and pensions, 
in the absence of meeting more difficult demands for justice. Time will tell if the 
‘history wars’ are cooling, or simply in abeyance in formal elite politics. 
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CHAPTER 5
Challenges to the  
Consolidation of Democracy 
Rui Graça Feijó
Introduction
On 1 January 2013, Timor-Leste initiated a march on its own feet. The United 
Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)—the last of the special 
missions that started back in 1999—as well as the International Stabilisation 
Force convened in the wake of the 2006 crisis, departed then, heralding a new 
phase in this new nation’s political life. So far, the country has responded 
positively to this change and maintains a stable political situation. The fact that 
in 2012 Timor-Leste organised presidential and legislative elections considered 
free and fair complying with international standards, reinforced the country’s 
legitimacy to fully dispose of political autonomy, which it is now enjoying.
Both the majority of authors writing on Timor-Leste (for example, Kingsbury 
2009; Molnar 2011; Leach and Kingsbury 2012) and international organisations 
who elaborate indices of democratic performance (for example, Freedom House, 
Polity IV, The Economist Intelligence Unit) agree that Timor-Leste has achieved 
the status of a democratic polity. Freedom House has long considered Timor-
Leste an ‘electoral democracy’ and a ‘partly free’ country, rating it 3.5 points 
on a scale in which those who have less than 3 points are free and those scoring 
above 5 are not free. The overall figure combines a score of 3 for political 
rights and 4 for civil liberties. Among the factors that prevent a more positive 
evaluation, this organisation ranks problems with freedom of the press, which 
is deemed to exercise self-censorship in the context of the existing defamation 
laws; limits to the freedom of association; weak rule of law and a culture of 
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impunity associated with episodes of violence perpetrated by the police forces; 
the status of refugees; and gender discrimination sustained by customary law.1 
Polity IV uses a classification ranging from –10 to +10, in which countries scored 
6 to 9 are considered as democracies (and those scoring 10 are full democracies). 
Timor-Leste has been consistently classified in recent years with 7  points, 
that is, as a clearly democratic country. All three sub-criteria receive the same 
classification.2 Finally, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 
ranks Timor-Leste as the 43rd country in the world in terms of its democratic 
performance. The country is regarded as a ‘flawed democracy’ (a category that 
comprises countries with marks between 6 and 7.99, and encompasses most of 
the European Union members) and is rated at 7.16. This overall figure is the 
result of five independent indices, and there Timor-Leste receives high marks 
for its political process and pluralism (8.67, in line with a ‘full democracy’) and 
civil liberties (7.94), and lower for political participation (only 5.56). Both the 
functioning of government (6.79) and political culture (6.88) are in line with the 
overall classification.3 
These three examples reveal that a consensus exists as to the classification of 
Timor-Leste as a functioning and apparently stable democracy. As Damien 
Kingsbury has noted, meaningful elections capable of producing alterations in 
the orientation of the country (peaceful replacement of two presidents, change 
of parliamentary majority, and substantial alteration in the composition of the 
government basis of support) seem to have been incorporated in the popular 
culture and became equated with lulik (sacred) rituals (Kingsbury 2014). A clear 
symbol of this evolution can be grasped in the vivid images of citizens emerging 
from the polling booths and proudly exhibiting their ink-marked fingers as 
proof of their participation in the electoral process, discharging a community 
service. However, the apparent stability of the country in the recent past cannot 
be equated with the consolidation of democracy or the absence of serious 
challenges to the way the political regime responds to popular demands and 
delivers tangible outcomes. As Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup put it, Timor-
Leste enjoys a stable but not yet consolidated democratic regime (Elgie  and 
Moestrup 2011). 
In this brief essay, I will consider, among the myriad pertinent challenges to 
democratic consolidation and the improvement of its performance, three aspects 
that I regard as critical: the generational turnover, the relationship between 
prosperity and democracy, and the mandatory constitutional reform supposed 
to produce a decentralised state administration.
1  See www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/east-timor-0#.U5x9DCjJ4UU. 
2  See www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
3  See portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=1034.
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Generational turnover
The presidential elections in 2012 offered a glimpse into the ongoing 
generational  turnover. The incumbent president, a leading member of the 
’75  Generation, was eliminated in the first round, leaving the second round 
to be contested by two candidates who were in their teens or just beyond in 
1975. This highlights the onset of a process of generational turnover, as the 
most relevant political positions have consistently remained in the hands of the 
elder generation. The recent decision of Gusmão to step down from his prime 
ministership and pave the way for a new incumbent from the Gerasaun Foun 
(New Generation) further stresses the importance of this process.
Timor-Leste is a complex and paradoxical case. The typical case of generational 
turnover associated with transitions from authoritarianism considers that when 
the generation who negotiated the political change gives way to a new one, the 
latter emerges fully socialised in democratic politics and formatted to operate 
within the system—not to challenge or discuss its merits once again. This 
generally means that democracy has been consolidated and in most cases has 
become ‘the only game in town’. In Timor-Leste, a country in which different 
notions of political legitimacy (in the classical sense of Max Weber’s 1947 
work) concur to create a complex landscape, a critical element in the rooting of 
democracy, was the espousal of democratic principles by a strong charismatic 
leader. Charismatic and legal-rational legitimacy merged to produce a democratic 
polity. Now that the charismatic leader has stepped aside, what will become 
of his legacy? The question is further amplified by the fact that the members 
of the generation of which Gusmão is a leading and persuasive member, and 
which broadly accommodated his vision, are rapidly coming to the end of their 
politically active lives: Ramos-Horta has been performing international duties 
for the UN; Mário Carrascalão no longer leads his PSD (Partido Social Democrata; 
Social Democratic Party); and the replacement of Alkatiri as leader of FRETILIN 
(Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor) is expected to take place in the next congress before 
the general elections.
In parallel with those who espouse the current democratic system, worrying signs 
are discernible in Dili. First, several ‘siren songs’ can be heard—some along the 
path of ‘Asian values’; others putting specific emphasis on ‘Timorese values’—
that are supposed to diverge from the standard democratic ethos. The defeat of 
Ramos-Horta in the first round of the 2012 presidential election has been read 
as a signal of the Timorese fatigue with an internationally driven agenda, and 
the two candidates that made it to the final round converged in praising the 
Timorese own values and the need to bring them to a more prominent place 
in the political arena. The fact that both of them had long experience in the 
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home fronts of the Resistance suggests that this factor remains a major element 
in the recruitment of new political leaders—some of which are already in very 
high positions, epitomised by Fernando Lasama de Araújo, another offspring 
of the Gerasaun Foun that emerged during the Resistance period—and offers a 
basis for some form of continuity. But the emphasis on genuine national values 
can be read to imply a critique of the ‘imported’ institutions associated with 
international co-operation. The odds are that democratic institutions prove to 
be sufficiently plastic to accommodate emerging trends, although they may need 
to be reconfigured. In this light, the possibility of revising the constitution—a 
possibility contemplated in its provisions—may be contemplated, if not during 
the current legislature, most likely after the next round of elections, in which 
competing actors may formally present some ideas that have been floating 
around for some time.
Second, the role of the military in political life is open to question. It should 
be recalled here that the military claims a strong line of continuity from the 
clandestine guerrilla struggle—which was critical in keeping the flame of 
the Resistance alive and creating the conditions that eventually led to the 
proclamation of independence—to the military (and political) foundations of 
the new nation. In a sense, the military is vested with ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ 
derived from its important role in the liberation struggle, in which it kept a 
united front that combined with the emergence of different (and rival) political 
forces. The overwhelming value of national unity, which the military claim to 
interpret better than anyone else, is a critical element in this scenario. For this 
reason, the discourse of national unity that often goes hand in hand with the 
recrimination of politicians for artificially dividing the people and pursuing 
particular interests can easily be amplified when a towering figure the size of 
Gusmão steps aside. 
So far, the will of the military to intervene in the political arena has been confined 
within the limits of the constitutional order, as the 2012 election of Brigadier 
General Taur Matan Ruak as president shows. But some signs suggest that among 
the military there are aspirations to a more prominent role. On the one hand, 
with the rise in prosperity derived from the exploration of natural resources, 
the military has been eager to claim a larger share of the budget, including a 
substantial increase that would result from the introduction of general military 
conscription for all youth, as advocated by President Taur Matan Ruak. On the 
other hand, it has been rapid to respond to what is perceived as a lack of capacity 
of the civilian authorities to deal with security issues. For instance, in the wake 
of street disturbances that marked the aftermath of the legislative elections in 
2012, the military commander did not hesitate to appear on national television 
63
5. Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy
and set the terms for the restoration of peace—threatening the intervention of 
the armed forces. This move was widely regarded as a high-profile intervention 
on the brink of conflict with the government.
Will the military’s appetite for an increased role in the political arena be 
circumscribed by the constitutional provisions? Or will it lay claim to a new 
role that has marred some other developing countries, as we have witnessed in 
Africa or in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s?
Prosperity and democracy
Timor-Leste, while remaining the poorest country in Southeast Asia (according 
to the World Bank), is endowed with natural resources that have been translated 
in the very rapid growth of its Petroleum Fund. However, the rise of nominal 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is not a panacea, and the relationships 
between prosperity and democracy are far from universally positive. Literature 
on economic development is rich on the issue of what has been labelled the 
‘resources curse’, which is an expression of the paradox of plenty—countries 
and regions with an abundance of natural resources, especially non-renewables, 
tend to have worse development outcomes than countries with more balanced 
resource structures.4 It is often the case that an internal conflict grows, in which 
different groups compete for their share of revenues, increasing social pressure 
on governments to function effectively, as well as generating new opportunities 
for the level of corruption to grow and a tendency for a capture of the state 
administration by private interests to surface. The relationship of this problem 
to the adoption of a democratic regime is evident from available indices. If some 
assumptions of the modernisation theory imply that an increase in the level of 
economic development generally translates to the establishment of democratic 
polities, examples abound of less positive paths. In their listings of the wealthiest 
countries of the world measured by their GDP per capita (in purchasing power 
parities), both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have in 
the top places countries that are long-established democracies (Luxemburg, 
Norway, USA), alongside countries that derive a great deal of their wealth from 
non-renewable natural resources and have authoritarian regimes, such as Qatar 
or Brunei. A glimpse at the political regimes of the OPEC (Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries also reveals that oil-producing nations 
tend to have worse ratings in the Freedom House index than Timor-Leste. 
4  See Scheiner in this collection.
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A major challenge for the new nation is thus to manage its wealth in line with 
democratic precepts. Two key aspects of this endeavour are the fight against 
poverty with the construction of a welfare state—which has been pursued by 
the generous funding of the ministries of education and health, as well as by the 
creation of the ministry for solidarity and the expansion of pension schemes—
and the development of an ‘economic civil society’. Both processes will impact 
the regime’s capacity to strengthen its own basis and solidify democracy.
In order to implement this program, two polar conceptions may be adopted. 
Timor-Leste may choose clearly defined procedures, institutionally framed, 
and validated through the rule of law. This would promote equity and equal 
opportunities, and the state would be regarded as a moral figure. An opposite 
choice could be made to rely on ad hoc policies, and individual negotiation 
between the state and private agents, privileging personal ties over institutional 
norms. Such an approach would create confusion as to the role of the state, 
generate dependency on social and economic actors vis à vis those in power, 
and foster clientele more than satisfy social needs. Neopatrimonialism and 
corruption would be the inevitable conclusion of this path.
One example that comes to mind is that of the veterans and the generous pension 
scheme that the government has implemented. In the state budget for 2013, no 
less than US$96 million was allocated to this purpose, the fastest growing item 
in public spending, outperforming both health and education—two areas in 
which the country needs to make serious investments if it is to overcome the 
dire needs revealed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Human Development Index—and, therefore, having a major impact on the 
relationship between the state and its citizens, since it touches tens of thousands 
of families (La’o Hamutuk 2013). A few problems are raised by this scheme, one 
of which is the transparency in the determination of those entitled to benefit 
from its provisions. The actual process of ascertaining those who participated 
in the 25-year struggle, and acknowledging the degree of their involvement—
which is the basis for their entitlement—is rumoured to be prone to abuses and 
manipulations. This is easy to understand when political rivalries are vividly 
present and pertain to the very history of the Resistance movement, lacking the 
existence of a clearly defined set of upheld legal procedures.
Another example of generous use of financial resources is the ambitious program 
of decentralised investments, which has been implemented in recent years. One 
of those schemes was the 2009 Pakote Referendum (Referendum Package), which 
absorbed US$70 million destined to provide investment in infrastructures mostly 
in the country’s rural districts; it has been replicated in subsequent years in much 
the same vein. Instead of basing contracts on a widely publicised public tender 
scheme, the government opted for an ad hoc management of those contracts, 
arguing with the need to address the needs of national companies that might 
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face difficulties in an open competition, with the result considered ‘a glaring 
example of wasteful, uncontrolled, impetus spending’ (La’o Hamutuk 2009). 
Political patronage seems to have been the main force behind the distribution 
of contracts. Similar schemes are said to have been in operation in the case of 
the construction of the Garden of Heroes in Metinaro, and in the district-based 
smaller-scale replicas of this national cemetery destined to honour those who 
fell for their country.
At present, Timor-Leste seems to be at the crossroads. In a greatly unfavourable 
regional and historical context, the perception of corruption is not improving. 
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for 2014 rates 
Timor-Leste at 28 points (in this index, 0 represents the most corrupt, 100 the 
least so)—down from 33 in 2012 and 30 in 2013; in line with Indonesia, rated at 
32 points.5 If it is undeniable that the Anti-Corruption Commission is operating 
and the judicial system passes condemnations, the frequency of cases brought 
by the public suggests an unacceptably high level of endemic corruption. 
The casuistic dependency of society in relation to those who happen to be in 
power, rather that the deployment of sound rules, is venom for a healthy civil 
society that democracy requires to thrive. The recent upgrade of the Court of 
Auditors, with the ensuing increased capacity to uphold clearly defined and 
institutionalised procedures, is a step in the right direction. However, it still 
must compete with a political culture that is permeable to ways of performing 
public duties that conflict with the rule of law. It is not uncommon to hear 
voices saying ‘We have won the elections and this is the time for us to do things 
our way, and to pay our supporters. When others win the general elections, 
it will be their time.’6 Comments such as these suggest a candid justification 
of patronage as the basic language in the relations between government and 
civil society. 
Grassroots democracy: building a decentralised state
The third challenge to the consolidation of democracy in Timor-Leste is the 
process of building a decentralised state. The relevance of this endeavour has 
recently been recognised by Xanana Gusmão, who spoke of it as ‘the second 
Maubere miracle’—one that will be spread over a long period of time and may 
go beyond one generation (Pereira 2014).
5  See www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.
6  Interview with a businessman supporter of the current majority, May 2013.
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Two independent reasons concur to render the decentralisation reform 
critical to the fate of Timorese democracy. On the one hand, there is a clear 
constitutional mandate to build a decentralised administration including 
institutions of local power. These state organs that need to be established all 
over the territory are bound by a constitutional provision stipulating that state 
organs ‘in their reciprocal relationships and exercise of their functions shall 
observe the principle of separation and interdependence of powers’.7 As such, 
the constitutional architecture is conceived as being formed by several pillars 
entertaining ‘interdependent’ relations in such a way that the overall stability 
of the institutions rests upon the converging contribution of each one of them—
including the organs of local power. In other words, the full scope of horizontal 
accountability will only be completed when the organs of local power are fully 
established and operational. 
The constitutional mandate, embodied in a number of its sections (directly in 
sections 5, 63, 71, 72; indirectly in sections 2, 69 and 137, see Amaral 2013) entails 
a vision that goes beyond a mere administrative construction, and conveys the 
need to establish and develop a social contract between society at large and the 
institutions of governance. Without this, one might end up building a hollow 
or phantom state whose governing institutions might be endowed with material 
resources but lack the necessary social legitimation (Lemay-Hebert 2012).
On the other hand, ever since the First Constitutional Government of Mari 
Alkatiri produced the first official documents stating the goals of this reform, 
three goals have emerged in prominent position: to promote the institutions of a 
strong, legitimate and stable state across the territory; to promote opportunities 
for local democratic participation by citizens; and to promote more effective, 
efficient and equitable public service delivery (RDTL 2002). This makes it clear 
that a close relationship exists between the proposed administrative reform 
and the consolidation of democracy, both by enlarging the scope of political 
institutions that are governed by democratic principles and by offering 
increased opportunities for citizens to participate in the decision-making 
process, namely in matters pertaining to their local communities. In brief, this 
reform is supposed to contribute to make democracy both more representative 
and more participatory.
Decentralisation reform has been on the Timorese political agenda since 
independence, but so far only the most timid of steps have been taken. Back in 
2003, a major study was presented, entitled the Local Government Options 
Study (RDTL 2003), by a team under the auspices of the Ministry for State 
Administration and Territorial Management. It contains a thorough analysis of 
7  Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, section 69.
67
5. Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy
six alternative paths, which remain to this day the fundamental options on the 
table for the ‘optimal sub-national configuration’. They include the delineation 
of the levels of the administrative hierarchy from central government down 
to the community level that will ‘facilitate cost effective and efficient service 
delivery and enhance community initiative and participation’ (RDTL 2003). 
Two points of clarification should be inserted at this stage. First, decentralisation 
reforms have been defended on different grounds, namely on the basis of an 
alleged greater effectiveness of public administration, and on account of the 
increased political legitimacy that it is supposed to generate. In this brief 
essay, only the latter sort of reasons will be considered. Second, the concept of 
decentralisation covers a vast array of practical situations that can be summarised 
in the following three models: 
• Deconcentration—occurring when the central government disperses 
responsibilities for certain services to its regional branches without involving 
any transfer of authority to the lower levels. 
• Delegation—taking place when the central authority transfers responsibilities 
for decision-making and the administration of public functions to local 
governments or semi-autonomous organisations that are not wholly controlled 
by the transferring authority, but which remain ultimately accountable to it. 
• Devolution—referring to those situations in which the central authorities 
transfer authority to lower level units that normally dispose of clear 
geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within 
which they perform public functions, and whose members are accountable 
to their citizens. Devolution is theoretically justified by the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ developed by the Catholic theologian Oswald van Nell-
Breuning and embodied in the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931), 
which posits that matters of societal organisation and administration be 
conceived in a bottom-up manner, and ought to be handled at the lowest 
possible level of authority that is capable of solving the problem in an 
efficient manner. In terms of the impact of a decentralisation process upon 
democratic performance, devolution is by far the most heavily charged of 
all those variants, thus it is the one we might expect to see emerging in 
Timor-Leste.
The seminal Local Government Options Study presented six fundamental 
options. Looking at the current situation in the country, inherited directly 
from the UN administration but with deeper historical thickness dating back 
to earlier periods, it considered three main layers of governance: districts, 
subdistricts, and sukus (villages). In all six options, the ‘perennial sukus’—‘the 
only institution that has remained more or less intact during the history of the 
territory’ (RDTL  2003:  76)—were contemplated as an unavoidable territorial 
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unit with profound resonance in the Timorese populations. Only  the sixth 
option, however, would treat the sukus as a formal state organ; all others 
acknowledging their role as forms of local self-organisation that would not bind 
the state. As for districts and subdistricts, several hypotheses were discussed, 
with all of them implying that it would be relatively easy to redefine their status 
and their boundaries. In fact, no substantial anchorage of these units in the 
autochthonous system of political legitimacy or self-organisation was observed, 
thus facilitating the rational bureaucratic manipulation required to install 
a novel administration.
In the course of the years since independence, different solutions have been 
adopted regarding sukus and the other sub-national units. From 2004, elections 
have been staged for what has been labelled lideranças comunitárias (community 
leadership) (2004–05, 2009). Rules have been designed and revised to frame the 
electoral process, and a substantial step in the direction of allocating village 
chiefs and konsellus suku community council] has been taken by the 2009 Bill. 
However, the most salient feature of village politics is that these institutions 
remain outside the reach of the state, being merely recognised as organs of 
self-rule destined to accomplish customary functions. In this light, it is not 
surprising that no allocation of state funds has been made on a regular basis, 
only grants decided at higher levels being at the disposal of local leaders for 
small investments.
As for the mid-level institutions, from 2003 Alkatiri’s government opted for a 
model that would transform subdistricts into the main units, under the aegis 
of a few ‘provinces’. The number of municipalities would be reduced from the 
current 65 subdistricts to between 30 and 35—implying a substantial alteration 
of the composition of the new units. The Fourth Constitutional Government 
of Xanana Gusmão revised this option and became inclined to transform the 
existing 13 districts into the novel municipalities, eliminating the subdistrict 
level. Curiously, the district level is the one that fewer Timorese regard as a 
significant unit of identification, and has little more than administrative 
significance devoid of any articulation with autochthonous systems of legitimacy 
(that to a certain extent are still visible in the subdistricts, which are the heirs 
of historical reinos (kingdoms) (Leach et al. 2013)). This  option was coupled 
with the idea of holding elections in 2009, later moved to 2010, before being 
postponed for sometime after the legislative polls of 2012. The program of the 
Fifth Constitutional Government promised that a pilot experience be developed 
in three to five municipalities before the end of the legislature in 2017.
Of more importance seems to be the intention to proceed with what has been called 
the ‘pre-deconcentration’ program. The formulation of this program is recent, 
and was thoroughly exposed by Gusmão early in 2014. The main suggestion 
arising out of this new approach is that the decentralisation reform that has been 
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in the making for so long will be conceived in conservative terms emphasising 
deconcentration over any other meaning—namely devolution—and that the 
time frame for its deployment has increased ‘up to one hundred years’ (Pereira 
2014). A critical new figure is the ‘district manager’, who  represents central 
government at district level, is empowered with substantial competences, 
is recruited as a public servant in view of his CV, and forfeits any relation to 
locally held notions of political legitimacy. If this vision becomes the blueprint 
for the reform, a very modest process of decentralisation will surface. Little or 
no devolution will be implied in the process, and its impact on democratic 
performance cannot be expected to be high. In the meantime, as a district 
administrator put it in an interview with Tanja Hohe (2004), ‘the  national 
government has a roof, but no roots’. The next few chapters in the politics of 
Timor-Leste will revolve around these issues.
Conclusion
Challenges to democratic consolidation and the improvement of its performance 
in Timor-Leste come from many different sources, including the ongoing process 
of state-building (decentralisation), which requires commitment of the ruling 
elite to a major reform, and the need to adopt an adequate choice of policies in a 
context where democratic norms suffer the competition of alternative narratives 
that may subvert the main tenets of the constitutional ethos. Stability, which has 
marked Timor-Leste’s development in recent years, cannot, therefore, be totally 
equated with the consolidation of democracy. The performance of the regime 
also needs to improve in order to secure a firm rooting of democratic governance 
in the political landscape at all levels. Particular attention should be devoted 
to the plasticity of democratic institutions, and their capacity to adapt to the 
emerging social forces in the country. If democracy is equated with empowering 
citizens to take the fundamental decisions regarding the development of their 
communities and to possess the ultimate control over those who momentarily 
hold power, it must combine in balanced proportions to the adherence to 
international standards and recognised procedures with greater responsiveness 
to local values and forms of political legitimation.
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Can the Petroleum Fund Exorcise the 
Resource Curse from Timor-Leste?1
Charles Scheiner
Introduction
Oil and gas comprised 76.4 per cent of Timor-Leste’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2013 (RDTL GDS 2015) and provided more than 93 per cent of state 
revenues in 2014.2 Most of the money from selling off non-renewable petroleum 
wealth has been saved in the Petroleum Fund—a sovereign wealth fund 
containing US$17 billion. People expect the Fund to finance state activities after 
the oil and gas fields are exhausted, which could happen within five years, but 
the Fund may be empty by 2025. Timor-Leste has about a decade to use its finite 
oil resources to underpin long-term prosperity and development.
This chapter gives an overview of the consequences of Timor-Leste’s reliance 
on its limited oil and gas reserves, focusing on its impacts on economics and 
decision-making. It explores how effectively Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund, 
established in 2005 with extensive guidance from international agencies, can 
prevent or ameliorate some of the most serious consequences of the resource 
curse—the negative impacts of non-renewable resource wealth on citizens of 
most countries that depend on exporting petroleum and mineral wealth.
1  An abridged version of this chapter was published as SSGM In Brief 2014/29.
2  During 2014, Timor-Leste received US$1.817 billion from oil and gas revenues and US$502 million from 
investing the Petroleum Fund, including unrealised stock price changes (CBTL 2015). Non-oil state income 
totalled US$184 million, of which a significant portion was paid by the state to itself (RDTL MoF 2014; 2015a). 
Oil revenues dropped 49 per cent from 2012 to 2014, and therefore comprise a smaller percentage of the 
shrinking total of state revenues (La’o Hamutuk 2015c).
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
74
I draw on research and analysis by the Timor-Leste Institute for Development 
Monitoring and Analysis, also known as La’o Hamutuk. La’o Hamutuk is an 
independent Timorese civil society organisation founded in 2000 to support 
the country’s political and economic sovereignty, from the perspective of social 
and economic justice. It analyses reports and proposals from government, 
international agencies and other sources, compares them with observations and 
other data, and uses its findings to enhance public and leaders’ understanding 
of the context and likely consequences of policy options. In addition to 
using published documents, La’o Hamutuk consults with officials, experts, 
practitioners and researchers. It also advocates for policies and programs that 
will equitably benefit Timor-Leste citizens both now and in the future.
Published statistics and international comparisons involving Timor-Leste 
are often inaccurate or inconsistent, frequently confusing total GDP with 
non-oil GDP, even though it is four times larger (La’o Hamutuk 2014b; cf. 
RDTL GDS 2013, 2014a and 2015d). This makes it challenging to understand 
whether contradictions and retroactive revisions come from improved data or 
methodology, political motivation, or agencies’ reluctance to differ with the 
government.3 
Oil swamps the economy
Timor-Leste relies on its petroleum exports more than every nation except South 
Sudan, Libya, and, perhaps, Equatorial Guinea. However, this dependency 
is not due to vast oil and gas reserves or high production rates, but because 
the non-petroleum economy, which scarcely existed when independence was 
restored in 2002, is still very small. 
Although 23.6 per cent of Timor-Leste’s US$5.6 billion GDP has been 
categorised as ‘non-oil’, about half of this is generated by state spending for 
public administration, procurement, and infrastructure construction. Since 
oil money provides the lion’s share of state revenues, this will evaporate when 
the wells dry up. The private sector and consumer-driven portions of the 
economy—agriculture, manufacturing, and local commerce for businesses and 
individuals—average less than US$2 per citizen per day, although most citizens 
make do with far less than the average.
3  For example, in December 2013 the IMF estimated that Timor-Leste’s total GDP increased by 5.7 per cent 
between 2011 and 2012 (IMF 2013). Eight months later, however, Timor-Leste Government statistics stated 
that it had declined by 10.4 per cent (RDTL GDS 2014a), and in June 2015, the Government reported that 
the 2012 GDP increased by 5.5 per cent over 2011 (RDTL GDS 2015d). During 2014, UNDP and the World 
Bank also published misleading or incorrect data on Timor-Leste (UNDP 2014, 2014a), and the government 
prevented the IMF from publishing its annual Article IV report on the country because of disagreement over 
the report’s content.
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Table 6.1 Gross Domestic Product in 2013.4
(million USD)
Total GDP $5,596
GDP from Petroleum Sector $4,276 76 per cent
Non-oil GDP $1,319 24 per cent
Of which: Productive GDP (agriculture and manufacturing) $265 5 per cent
Source: RDTL GDS 2015d .
Government officials have been proud that the non-oil GDP is growing at 
‘double-digit rates’ (RDTL Prime Minister 1/4/2014: 3; La’o Hamutuk 2014b; 
Global Insight 2014: 6), but virtually all of this growth represented rising 
state spending. When state spending slowed in 2013, non-oil GDP growth 
virtually stopped. The productive parts of the economy—agriculture and 
manufacturing—are only 4.7 per cent of total GDP. After adjusting for global 
inflation and population, these sectors shrank by 13 per cent from 2007 to 2013 
(RDTL GDS 2015d). By comparison, public administration and construction 
(largely paid for with public money) increased 90 per cent and 347 per cent 
during the same six years (RDTL GDS 2015d).
Figure 6.1 Sectoral contributions to Timor-Leste’s ‘non-oil’ GDP per capita 
in 2013.
Source: RDTL GDS 2015d .
4  Total GDP per capita declined 16.7 per cent in 2013 (RDTL GDS 2015d) because oil production and 
revenues began to drop. As non-oil GDP was essentially unchanged in 2013, the percentage of total GDP from 
petroleum is declining.
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
76
Nevertheless, state agencies and the small middle and upper classes have money 
to spend, and the absence of convenient local products leads them to purchase 
goods and services from overseas, as shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Balance of external trade, 2013.
(million USD)
Goods  (excluding petroleum sector) –$497
Imports $519 96 per cent
Exports $22 4 per cent
Services –$1,458
Imports $1,536 95 per cent
Exports $78 5 per cent
Total trade deficit $1,955
Source: RDTL GDS 2015d .
Unfortunately, trade is less diverse and more import-heavy than the numbers 
show. Most of the exported non-oil goods are coffee, whose value fluctuates 
with the weather and the global market. More than half of exported services are 
‘travel’—tickets on foreign airlines sold in Timor-Leste. 
Prioritising short-term purchases over sustainable national development results 
in extreme import dependency. About half of state spending immediately goes 
abroad, and individuals make little effort to spend in the local economy. Chickens 
are imported from Brazil, rice from Vietnam, eggs and beer from Singapore, fruit 
juice from Cyprus, onions from Holland, garlic from China, milk from Australia, 
and so on. In 2014, more than US$116 million went to Indonesian suppliers for 
a variety of goods including water, candles, cigarettes, instant noodles, sugary 
drinks, and canned fish. Although a few agencies advocate ‘local content’, 
almost nobody weighs economic sovereignty when deciding what to buy. 
Current and pending free-trade policies make it even harder to cultivate local 
production. As oil and gas revenues tail off, there will be little cash to pay to 
foreign suppliers, and imports will become unaffordable. Without local food 
production, people will starve.
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Figure 6.2 What do Timorese people do for work?
Sources: RDTL MF 2015a; RDTL GDS 2013b; 2015b; 2015c; La’o Hamutuk research and estimates .
Counting people rather than dollars tells a different story. Timor-Leste is an 
agricultural country, and most households live mainly by subsistence farming. 
The formal economy, both public and private, employs less than a third of the 
working-age population. Only 9 per cent of the working-age population works 
for companies, and less than one-fiftieth of those jobs are in the petroleum 
industry. As the International Monetary Fund (IMF) explains, ‘The  oil and 
gas sector is the mainstay of the economy … However … the sector directly 
accounts for virtually no on-shore employment. Its economic impact is 
entirely via government spending’ (IMF 2013).5 During 2013, total private 
sector employment declined because of reduced government spending on 
infrastructure, although the number of working-age people increased by about 
18,000 (RDTL GDS 2015b; 2015c).
5  In February 2015, the Business Activities Survey of 2013 (GDS 2015b) reported that the number of private 
sector jobs had dropped 4.1 per cent since the previous year, which was confirmed by the Labour Force 
Survey (GDS 2015c). Female workers disproportionately lost their jobs.
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Oil fuels the state machinery
As Table 6.3 shows, more than 90 per cent of Timor-Leste’s government revenues 
are from oil.
Table 6.3: Sources of income in the 2015 General State Budget.
(million USD)
Projected revenues (including those deposited into the Petroleum Fund) $2,461
Revenue from oil and gas exportsa $1,374 56 per cent
Return on Petroleum Fund investments $916 37 per cent
Non-petroleum (domestic) revenue sources $170 7 per cent
Budgeted sources for financing state expenditures $1,570
Withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund during 2015 $1,327 85 per cent
New loans (to be repaid mostly with petroleum money, if it still exists) $70 4 per cent
Non-petroleum (domestic) revenues $170 11 per cent
a . This projection is too high . World prices for Brent crude oil fell by more than 50 per cent between 
mid-2014 (when the 2015 Budget was prepared) and the beginning of 2015 . La’o Hamutuk (2015, 
2015b) suggested that this should be incorporated in the revision of the 2015 Budget but the Ministry 
decided not to . Nevertheless, the 2016 budget will incorporate these developments (RDTL MoF 2015b) .
Source: RDTL MoF 2015 .
About US$25 million of the US$170 million in ‘domestic revenues’ will come 
from taxes paid by the state to itself (such as import taxes paid by companies 
working on state-financed projects). Another US$19 million will be the gross 
receipts of the highly subsidised public electricity system, which recovers only 
20 per cent of its operational costs from users and uses oil income to cover its 
operating deficit and capital outlays. 
Policies neglect other domestic revenues: a 2008 ‘tax reform’ slashed import, 
wage, and business taxes in hopes that this would encourage foreign investment 
and reduce prices to consumers. As a result, Timor-Leste has the third-lowest 
total tax rate in the world—one-quarter of the global average (World Bank/
PWC 2014).
The sovereign wealth fund saves petroleum revenues
Almost all of Timor-Leste’s oil and gas income is deposited into the Petroleum 
Fund, which serves as a buffer between this income and annual expenditure. 
This allows the state Budget to respond to public needs, rather than oil price 
and production fluctuations. Forty per cent of the Fund is invested in the global 
stock market, with the balance in bonds, mostly from the US Government. 
Returns from these investments are redeposited into the Petroleum Fund. 
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When the Fund was being created in 2004–05, designers intended that these 
earnings would replace oil revenues after the fields run dry (CBTL 2015; La’o 
Hamutuk 2013).
Figure 6.3 Timor-Leste’s petroleum revenue streams.
Sources: CBTL 2015; RDTL MoF 2013; 2014; Santos 2014; ANP 2015 .
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Every year, the Ministry of Finance calculates an estimated sustainable income 
(ESI) benchmark, equal to 3 per cent of the current Petroleum Fund balance 
added to the net present value of expected future revenues from oil and gas 
fields with approved development plans.6 The ESI informs the decision of how 
much to withdraw from the Petroleum Fund each year to finance the state 
Budget, although it was exceeded every year from 2008 to 2012, and again from 
2014 onwards (RDTL MoF 2014b).
The ESI does not reflect population growth. It was designed to spend more per 
person now than later, investing in Timor-Leste’s future and being supplemented 
by other revenues over time. If future oil revenues and investment returns 
follow ESI’s prudent projections, the ESI would be the same amount every 
year, regardless of population, local inflation (which has exceeded global rates), 
improved state services, or growing expectations. Unfortunately, overspending 
ESI has lowered the balance in the Petroleum Fund, reducing its future investment 
earnings. In fact, the Fund’s goal of using return from investments to finance state 
activities for decades after the oil and gas are gone is unlikely to be achieved, 
due  to transfers above ESI, rapid budget escalation, revision of the Petroleum 
Fund Law, less prudent price projections, and lower oil production and income.
Figure 6.4 State revenues and expenditures.
Sources: RDTL MoF 2013b; 2014a; 2015a; and state budget books for prior years .
Figure 6.4 shows how much money Timor-Leste’s state Budget has received and 
spent since the restoration of independence in 2002. The narrow bars show 
actual revenues through 2014 and budgeted revenues during 2015. The lowest 
6  At present, these are the Bayu-Undan and Kitan fields in the Joint Petroleum Development Area, from 
which Australia takes 10 per cent of the revenue. The Greater Sunrise project has no approved development 
plan, so it is not part of the ESI.
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two segments (solid pink and purple) represent withdrawals from the Petroleum 
Fund, while the upper segment (stippled blue) is the balance carried over from 
excess withdrawals from the Fund in prior years. However, the blue (carryover) 
and yellow/red (borrowing, which started in 2014) segments also mainly come 
from the Fund in the past and the future. 
Large oil revenues began in 2006; they have been declining since 2012. They pay 
for virtually all state expenditures, which grew more than 25 per cent per year 
from 2008 to 2012—faster than every nation except Zimbabwe.
The principal source of income is the Bayu-Undan oil and gas field, operated 
by US oil giant ConocoPhillips. In 2013, the company downgraded its estimate 
of future revenues to Timor-Leste by 49 per cent, with production to end four 
years earlier than previously estimated (RDTL MoF 2014a). The Government 
responded by withdrawing less than the parliamentary limit (which had been 
set at ESI) from the Petroleum Fund for the first time ever, and financed its 
operations with the cash balance transferred from the Fund in prior years.7 
During 2014, oil revenues to Timor-Leste dropped 42 per cent, primarily because 
production fell 24 per cent as the fields near the end of their profitable lives.
Figure 6.5 Oil and gas income peaked in 2012 and continues to fall.
Sources: US EIA 2015; RDTL MoF 2015; 2015a; 2015b; ANP 2015; La’o Hamutuk 2015c .
Figure 6.5 shows how oil and gas revenues to Timor-Leste (double green line) 
reflect global prices (red thin line) and local production (thick black line). 
After 2014, the graph shows price projections used by the Ministry of Finance 
for the 2015 budget (dashed brown line), and more recent US government 
7  The 2013 budget authorised US$787 million to be withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund, equal to the 
Estimated Sustainable Income, but the Timor-Leste Government withdrew only US$730 million because much 
more had been withdrawn during 2012 than the government could spend (La’o Hamutuk 2013a). Nevertheless, 
2013 ended with US$634 million in the Treasury account—more than triple the cushion the government says 
it needs. During 2014, the Treasury again paid for increased spending. However, the balance had been drawn 
down to US$181 million by year end, leaving little to be rolled over into 2015. 
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projections (dotted red line). As a result of the price drop, future revenues may 
be less than the dotted green line, as it does not incorporate likely decreases in 
production.
The 2014 budget allowed withdrawal of up to US$903 million from the Petroleum 
Fund—well above the US$632 million ESI, which La’o Hamutuk and parliament’s 
Committee on Public Finances had agreed was unnecessary (La’o Hamutuk 
2013b; RDTL National Parliament 2013). By the end of the year, US$732 million 
had been withdrawn—US$100 million more than ESI. The 2015 budget limits 
Petroleum Fund withdrawals to US$1.327 billion, and it is likely to be used 
because the carried-over balance that had supplemented lower transfers during 
2013–14 no longer exists. The government transferred US$140 million from the 
Petroleum Fund in January and February 2015—the first time a transfer has 
ever been done during the first two months of a fiscal year.
Spending grows quickly, but not always wisely
State expenditures are shown as the wider bars in Figure 6.4, with the tan 
upper segment representing donor contributions, which are not included in 
the state Budget. The next two (red) segments represent physical infrastructure. 
Infrastructure construction absorbed half of state expenditures while the 
electricity system was being built in 2011, and it still absorbs more than a third 
of the Budget. Although spending on large projects has slowed due to delays, it 
will resurge if projects on the drawing board—including Dili airport, Tibar Port, 
the Oecusse Special Economic Zone, and the Tasi Mane petroleum infrastructure 
project —are built. 
Figure 6.6 Budgeted, executed and recurrent spending year by year.
Sources: RDTL MoF 2014; 2015a .
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Spending on recurrent costs (salaries, goods, services, public grants) continues 
to increase about 20 per cent per year, even though total appropriations went 
down after 2012. 
Timor-Leste continues to under-invest in health and education, spending merely 
14 per cent of its budget on these human resources, compared with more than 
30 per cent in well-managed developing countries (UNDP 2011). Most children 
born during the post-1999 ‘baby boom’ are not getting adequate nutrition or 
education, which will have severe, long-term consequences for the nation’s future. 
Figure 6.7 Allocation of the revised 2015 State Budget (US$1.570 billion).
Source: RDTL MoF 2015a .
Agriculture, which sustains most Timorese households, receives only 2 per cent 
of 2015 state spending (La’o Hamutuk 2014).
The resource curse has many faces
Timor-Leste’s economy and politics are typical of the resource curse 
(Neves 2013)—a set of conditions, choices and consequences that almost always 
makes citizens of extractive export-dependent countries worse off than people 
in countries with little oil or mineral wealth. In general, the resource curse 
results from easy access to non-renewable wealth, which is seen as a windfall 
that can be freely spent on short-term desires rather than strategic longer term 
development. Since there are few taxpayers demanding that their money be 
used wisely, corruption, conflict and opacity often occur, although Timor-Leste 
has taken some steps to avert them. At the end of the day, when all the mineral 
wealth has been converted to cash and spent, the opportunity to develop a 
sustainable, self-sufficient economy may also have been squandered. 
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Available wealth attracts shady characters
A cash-rich government with limited experience and safeguards is a tempting 
target for scammers, tax-evaders, thieves and opportunists from all over the 
world, as shown by these examples (La’o Hamutuk 2012b) .
In 2009, Malaysian Datuk Edward Ong promised to build the Pelican 
Paradise luxury resort just west of Dili . Ong then asked the Minister of Finance 
to deposit US$1 .2 billion from Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund in a blocked 
bank account controlled by Asian Champ Investment, Ltd, promising to pay 
7 .5 per cent interest and to return the money in one year . His proposal was 
taken seriously, and the Minister travelled to London with the President of 
Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund Investment Advisory Board (PFIAB) for further 
discussions . In the end, prudence prevailed, and Timor-Leste declined to 
give the apparently fictional company $1 billion . The PFIAB noted that 
‘worldwide there have been a number of reported cases where institutional 
investors have fallen prey to fraudulent schemes under arrangements involving 
apparently secure deposits in “blocked accounts” at reputable banks, higher 
than market interest rates, a rapid decision-making process, and little if any 
documentation concerning the parties making the offer’ (RDTL PFIAB 2009; 
La’o Hamutuk 2010) . Although Ong and Pelican Paradise were invisible 
after the attempted scam was exposed, they resurfaced in 2015 .
On 19 June 2014, US Federal agents arrested Nigerian-born US lawyer 
Bobby Boye, who worked in Timor-Leste from 2010–13, advising the 
Ministry of Finance on petroleum tax collection (La’o Hamutuk 2014f) . 
US prosecutors charged Boye with wire fraud, alleging that he created a 
fake company, Opus & Best, and used his influence to have the Timor-
Leste government pay O&B US$3 .5 million . In April 2015, Boye pled guilty 
and could be sentenced to four to 20 years in prison . However, many 
suspect that others were involved in his crimes, either through conspiracy or 
negligence . It is clear that both the Norwegian aid program, which initially 
hired him, and the Ministry of Finance, which extended his employment and 
awarded contracts to O&B, failed to exercise due diligence (La’o Hamutuk 
2014e), as Boye has a long record of criminal and financial malfeasance 
(Aftenposten 2014; La’o Hamutuk 2014j) .
Timor-Leste’s state-owned petroleum company, TimorGAP, has spent tens of 
millions of dollars and signed contracts for billions during its three years 
of operation, but it has not generated any income . In August 2014, La’o 
Hamutuk suggested that the Court of Appeals audit their finances, as 
Parliament and the public know very little about the obligations they have 
incurred on behalf of the state (La’o Hamutuk 2014h) .
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The resource curse is not magic or metaphysical. It occurs in almost every 
impoverished nation whose economy is dominated by exporting non-renewable 
resources, including Nigeria, Ecuador, the USSR, Libya, Gabon, Iraq, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Papua New Guinea, and Nauru. Oil and gas exporters are 
the most vulnerable, due to the volatility of the international market, avarice of 
the petroleum industry, and the industrialised world’s addiction to petroleum. 
With most wealth deriving from extractives and state spending, rent-seeking—
working to get a piece of this money, rather than to produce something—becomes 
dominant. Although one form of this is corruption, most resource curse–driven 
behaviour is legal and accepted, albeit more fundamental and widespread.
Timor-Leste protected itself against one consequence of the resource curse by 
using an international currency—the US dollar safeguards against runaway 
inflation and ‘Dutch disease’.8 However, inflation in Timor-Leste has been higher 
than in its trading partners, due to the lack of local productive capacity and the 
supply of money exceeding the supply of imports. 
Furthermore, the international oil market is priced in US dollars, so when a 
rising dollar makes oil and commodity prices fall, state revenues also drop. 
During 2014, the US dollar rose and oil prices fell, lowering inflation but sharply 
reducing state revenues and the value of Petroleum Fund investments in other 
currencies (La’o Hamutuk 2015, 2015b).
Some structural elements of the resource curse are nearly impossible to control, 
such as the ruthlessness and amorality of huge international oil companies, 
global and local environmental damage, invasions and civil wars, and the 
capital-intensive, high-skill nature of the petroleum industry. Others, however, 
can be overcome, although it is rare to find political leaders in any country with 
the far-sightedness, wisdom and courage to make the best decisions for their 
people’s future.
Timor-Leste’s history and geography make the resource curse more severe than 
it would be from petroleum dependency alone, including these factors:
• Extreme poverty and underdevelopment: Portugal did little to develop 
economic production or human resources, while Indonesia destroyed 
infrastructure and discouraged individual initiative or self-reliance. Only a 
small fraction of Timor-Leste’s 1.2 million people have had access to good 
education, entrepreneurial skills or managerial experience.
8  ‘Dutch disease’ results when mineral rents cause a large inflow of foreign currency, distorting foreign 
exchange rates and making exports less competitive. By not printing its own money, Timor-Leste has reduced 
this damaging impact. 
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
86
• Emergence from foreign rule: Until 2002, leaders and citizens never 
lived under democratic self-government by rule of law. Administrative and 
legal structures must be built from scratch, overcoming the bad habits civil 
servants learned while working in and/or resisting inefficient, illegal and 
corrupt Indonesian and Portuguese administrations. Citizens and leaders 
alike are learning how to effectively participate in a peaceful, transparent, 
accountable, stable, democratic society, where government with citizen 
consent and participation serves the public interest (La’o Hamutuk 2015a).
• Recovery from prolonged war: Many people are traumatised. Repeated 
unpredictable, uncontrollable interruptions to people’s lives has taught them 
not to plan for or invest in the future. Leaders who excelled at struggling 
against foreign occupation lack the skills for peacetime democratic, 
consultative governance. Around the world, struggles over oil and minerals 
often lead to war and conflict, but Timor-Leste hopes that that phase of its 
history is over.
• Self-interested neighbours: Although both Australia and Indonesia claim 
to support the new nation, their thirst for oil and insistence on impunity 
belie their good will. Australia continues to occupy about 40 per cent of 
the oil and gas reserves that should belong to Timor-Leste under current 
international law (La’o Hamutuk 2014a).
This toxic combination makes it almost impossible to develop a sustainable, 
equitable economy. PowerPoint presentations substitute for plans; the Strategic 
Development Plan 2011–2030 (RDTL 2011) is an enticing, impossible dream. 
In search of showy, quick solutions, planning neglects the unglamorous but 
essential tasks of alleviating poverty, replacing imports, and working toward 
food sovereignty.
The cash-flush government has hardly any taxpayer-voters demanding 
financial accountability. The elite and some constituencies believe that they 
are entitled to a disproportionate share of public resources—a pattern set by 
rewarding heroes of the liberation struggle and ‘buying peace’ to neutralise 
potentially troublesome groups or political opponents. Instead of the give-
and-take that constrains state spending in ‘normal’ countries, the whims of 
politicians and promises of salesmen are using up Timor-Leste’s finite oil wealth. 
The appointment of Dr Rui Maria Araujo as Prime Minister in February 2015 
has  prompted optimism that these patterns may change, but former Prime 
Minister Xanana Gusmão continues in a major role, with responsibility for 
planning, investment, infrastructure, procurement and other key sectors.
Multi-billion dollar, multi-year infrastructure projects such as the Tasi Mane 
south coast petroleum infrastructure project and the Special Economic and 
Social Market Zone in Oecusse are initiated without realistic estimates of their 
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total cost, competitive advantage or economic viability (La’o Hamutuk 2013d, 
2014g, 2015b, 2015e). Adding to the risk, loans from foreign institutions 
(sometimes disguised as Public–Private Partnerships) incur hundreds of millions 
of dollars in debt, which will have to be repaid after the oil and gas are gone 
(La’o Hamutuk 2013c, 2014d).
When a decision-maker has access to money, it seems like the solution to every 
problem. It’s easier to buy a scholarship than to build a quality university—
the budget for overseas scholarships is far higher than the appropriation for 
the National University of Timor-Leste, which educates four times as many 
students as will receive the scholarships (RDTL MoF 2014a, 2015). Similarly, the 
state pays for a few well-connected people to fly to overseas hospitals, but most 
citizens cannot access decent health care. Roads and bridges in the capital used 
by VIP visitors are repaved frequently, with street vendors and neighbourhood 
markets moved out of sight, while rural communities struggle with impassable 
tracks and rivers. Airport and highway construction could consume a billion 
dollars, yet very few Timorese people will ever fly or own a car. Hundreds of 
millions more may pay to construct a container port that can handle an eight-
fold increase in imports, but without oil money, how will Timor-Leste pay for 
the imports or guarantee the investor’s expected return?
More ominous, petroleum dominates planning, diverting attention from 
sustainable, equitable, realisable development paths. Because oil is where the 
action is today, the most persuasive, creative and ambitious people choose 
to work in petroleum regulatory agencies, oil corporations and TimorGAP 
(the state-owned oil company). They persuade budgeters to award millions of 
dollars for concept studies, preliminary designs and promotional presentations. 
When the resulting proposals are compared with those for agriculture, tourism, 
or import-substituting manufacturing, the playing field is tilted. 
Similarly, the best and brightest university students major in petroleum 
engineering, similar to the rent-seeking that led many in the West to become 
stockbrokers and lawyers during the bubble before the 2007 financial crisis 
(Stiglitz 2014: ch. 2), but few jobs exist for inexperienced graduates in the capital-
intensive petroleum industry (Rigzone 2015). As a result, less glamorous but 
more necessary fields like civil engineering, education, business development, 
management, water supply, sanitation, nutrition, and health care are deprived 
of both financial and human resources (Neves 2014).
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This petro-state doesn’t have much petrol
If Timor-Leste’s oil reserves were as large as Brunei’s or Saudi Arabia’s, these 
problems could be drowned in dollars. Unfortunately, geology has not been 
that generous to this new nation. Even if the Greater Sunrise field is developed 
with an LNG plant in Timor-Leste and Australia takes only half of the upstream 
revenues, total expected oil and gas revenues are not even enough to support 
one (current) dollar per person per day of public spending over the next four 
decades. This would be less than one-third of the 2015 state budget, which 
pays for a level of services that nobody would consider adequate over the long 
term. If the balance in the Petroleum Fund goes up and the stock market booms, 
additional revenue from investments could help a little, but recent patterns 
make this improbable (Scheiner 2014; La’o Hamutuk 2015d).
Oil revenues peaked in 2012, and Timor-Leste has already received more than 
three-fourths of the expected income from its only two producing oil and gas 
fields. Kitan production will end in 2016 and Bayu-Undan by 2020 (RDTL MoF 
2015; La’o Hamutuk 2014c, 2015c). By comparison, Australia is richer in 
petroleum than Timor-Leste, with larger future potential. Indonesian reserves 
are smaller for its population, but they are being pumped more slowly than 
Timor-Leste’s.
Table 6.4 Oil and gas reserves in nearby countries.
Timor-Leste Australia Indonesia Brunei

































How long reserves 
will last at 2014 
production rates
16 years 4 .3 years 51 years 50 years 27 years 23 years
Sources: La’o Hamutuk estimates and ANP 2014 for Timor-Leste; BP 2015 for other countries .
Timor-Leste’s petroleum officials have faith that Timor-Leste has large 
undiscovered oil and gas deposits, and that the companies’ projections are too 
pessimistic (Timor Post 2014).9 During the discussion of a preliminary version 
of this chapter in November 2013, Autoridade Nacional do Petróleo’s (ANP) 
(National Petroleum Authority) President Gualdino da Silva said: 
9  In 2007, Timor-Leste tried to continue oil production from the Elang-Kakatua field after ConocoPhillips 
decided it was no longer worth operating. They were unable to attract another company.
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[Timor-Leste] is a proven petroliferous zone. It is also a new frontier; we need more 
production, we need more discoveries. How could one believe in a conclusion 
based only on the two production fields? The country is still in an early stage, 
in its infancy, of researching and discovering more oil and gas. It is too early to 
reach that conclusion (ANU 2013). 
After oil prices crashed in 2014, ANP’s director of exploration continued to 
promote a new bidding round: 
We have 85 percent open acreage offshore in [Timor-Leste’s undisputed area] 
and we still [have] more than 65 percent open acreage in the Joint Petroleum 
Development Area. We haven’t any onshore blocks [that have been offered for 
exploration] … This is [a] very new frontier (Rigzone 2015). 
The director’s comment ignores industry-wide retrenchment and the fact that 
oil companies already explored or declined all open offshore acreage during 
more profitable times. 
Although anything is possible, the country’s small and constrained land and 
sea area, geological structures, and 120-year history of oil exploration make 
significant additional reserves unlikely. The first Sunrise test well was drilled 
in 1974, Kitan is the only commercial field discovered since the flurry of 
exploration after the 1991 Timor Gap Treaty, and more than a dozen test wells 
have been drilled since the Indonesian occupation ended in 1999, with Kitan the 
only commercially viable discovery. During Timor-Leste’s most recent offshore 
licensing rounds in 2006, no company that had previously explored the area 
submitted a bid. Since then, about 90 per cent of the contract areas awarded 
in 2006 turned out be commercially unviable, and the contract holders have 
relinquished them (La’o Hamutuk 2014i). The next bidding round, which could 
take place in 2015, has been repeatedly delayed since 2010.
There isn’t much time
Timor-Leste does not have enough oil and gas to sustain the country for very 
long. If the non-oil economy hasn’t developed when the last well runs dry in 
five years, many more people will join the growing majority struggling to live 
under the poverty line. When state revenues can no longer cover expenses, 
Timor-Leste will fall into austerity, with drastic implications for the state and 
its citizens. 
Combined with good planning, Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund could help 
support sustainability. Although documents and officials often refer to inter-
generational equity, suggestions for more serious efforts to develop alternatives 
to petroleum (UNDP 2011; Scheiner 2011; La’o Hamutuk 2012; Petroleum 
Economist 2013) were rebuffed (RDTL Spokesperson 10/5/2011, 21/3/2013) 
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until recently (RDTL  MoF 2011, 2013c, 2014b). Nevertheless, Timor-Leste’s 
government continues to boast about its strong, growing, inclusive economy 
(Global Insight 2014; Straits Times 2014), although it is unclear whether 
policymakers believe their own advertising. After ANU published a two-page 
summary of this chapter (Scheiner 2014a), the Ministry of Finance responded 
with an eight-page Briefing Note (RDTL MoF 2014c), narrowly redefining the 
resource curse and ignoring the main points in the chapter.
However, others are beginning to understand the urgency. After years of 
echoing the government’s petroleum-dominated priorities, the World Bank 
highlighted the need for non-petroleum economic development in its 2013–17 
Country Partnership Strategy (World Bank 2013). When President Taur Matan 
Ruak promulgated the 2014 state budget, he wrote to parliament: 
Once again, I am concerned about the excessive dependency of government 
revenue on the Petroleum Fund. I am absolutely convinced that it is urgent to 
correct this situation … I believe that it is necessary to adopt active policies to 
diversify economic development … (RDTL President 3/2/2014).
Minutes after being sworn into office in February 2015, Prime Minister Dr Rui 
Araújo hedged his bets:
[W]e know that these petroleum reserves are not renewable and, in the worst 
case scenario, may even run out in the years to come. While on the one hand we 
are fortunate to still have untapped resources, on the other hand we are one of 
the countries with the greatest petroleum dependency in the world. As such, 
we must invest in a responsible and sustainable manner (RDTL Prime Minister 
16/2/2015).
La’o Hamutuk and others in civil society have encouraged a sustainable course 
for more than a decade (La’o Hamutuk 2002, 2005a, 2015; Scheiner 2011, 2013; 
FONGTIL 2013, 2014). In 2012, we began to estimate Timor-Leste’s future 
state revenues and expenditures based on current trends, external factors and 
anticipated policy choices (La’o Hamutuk 2012, 2012a). The spreadsheet model 
is online as part of an ongoing effort to encourage evidence-based decision-
making (Scheiner 2014; La’o Hamutuk 2015d, 2015f).
The model uses an engineering approach, based on causality and Timor-Leste’s 
history, rather than correlations with other countries. It does not try to simulate 
the macro economy and therefore does not estimate GDP, inflation, poverty or 
trade. Rather, it projects how much the state will receive and spend, based on 
oil and gas receipts, investment returns, domestic revenues, and policy decisions 
about recurrent spending, megaprojects, borrowing, Sunrise development, and 
other factors. 
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The model uses data and estimates from a variety of sources, including state 
budgets and executed expenditures (RDTL MoF 2013, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 
2014a, 2015a), population projections (RDTL GDS 2013b), oil price projections 
(US EIA 2015), and La’o Hamutuk’s calculations of oil and gas production 
and debt repayments based on information from oil companies and lenders.10 
Detailed descriptions of the model’s outputs and suggestions of what should be 
cut after Timor-Leste runs out of money are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Figure 6.8 Base case scenario from sustainability model.
Source: La’o Hamutuk 2015f .
Figure 6.8 shows the model’s baseline scenario, which is based on ‘best-guess’, 
mid-2015 assumptions of what is likely to happen, and is too optimistic for 
prudent planning. It uses higher oil prices than the Ministry of Finance uses to 
calculate the ESI and assumes a better return on Petroleum Fund investments 
than they earned in 2012–14. It also assumes that much less will be spent to 
build the Oecusse Special Zone and the Tasi Mane Project than is currently 
being discussed (La’o Hamutuk 2015). 
10  At the time of writing in June 2015, long-term oil price predictions are tentative, and Timor-Leste’s 
future plans and budgets are being reviewed. Updates will be posted at www.laohamutuk.org/econ/
model/13PFSustainability.htm.  
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With these rosy assumptions, spending exceeds oil and interest income in 2017, 
and the Petroleum Fund begins to shrink. By 2026, before today’s infants finish 
secondary school, the Fund will be used up, and state spending will have to 
be slashed by more than two-thirds from desired levels, as shown by the red 
shaded background. 
This scenario assumes that the Greater Sunrise project goes ahead soon with 
an LNG plant in Beaçu, so that austerity cuts are ‘only’ 71 per cent. If the 
companies prevail and they build a floating LNG plant, austerity will be 75 per 
cent—a little harsher. 
In February 2015, Sunrise operator Woodside Petroleum announced that it will 
‘shelve’ the Sunrise project. CEO Peter Coleman told reporters, 
We have exhausted all activities … it’s very difficult [for us] to spend any material 
amount of money [on Sunrise]. We don’t know what the regulatory regime is, 
[and] we don’t know what the fiscal regime is (West Australian 2015).
If the Sunrise project remains stalled, the model shows that Timor-Leste will 
have to cut expenditures 87 per cent after 2025, closing even more schools, 
clinics, offices and police stations. 
Changes in other assumptions can bring on bankruptcy and austerity up to 
three years earlier or seven years later. However, without a dramatic redirection 
of policy approaches, Timor-Leste’s petroleum reserves and petroleum wealth 
will not be able to finance the state for longer than 15 years, even if the country’s 
wishes for Sunrise development, investment returns and global oil market prices 
are granted.
Although reducing expenditure and increasing non-oil revenue could delay 
austerity for a few years, it is inevitable that escalating budgets, increasing 
population and greater expectations will exhaust the country’s finite petroleum 
wealth in less than a generation. This can only be ameliorated with a rapid, 
radical shift of direction toward increasing food production, reducing imports, 
cutting wasteful spending and cancelling unprofitable megaprojects. 
Timor-Leste must fortify its strongest resource—its people—by investing 
in education, nutrition, health care, and rural water and sanitation. It must 
develop agriculture, the sector that employs most of its workers, to meet basic 
necessities and reduce the need for imports. Timorese people of all economic 
classes, genders, regions and generations will have to work together to defeat 
the resource curse by creating an equitable, sustainable economy. 
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The Timorese people proved their unity and persistence through their difficult, 
long struggle to achieve political sovereignty over the Indonesian occupation. 
Achieving economic sovereignty by overcoming the petroleum occupation may 
be even more difficult. It will require diverse approaches, building on Timor-
Leste’s strengths and prioritising medium- and long-term sustainability. 
Timor-Leste has about 10 years before the only ship that can take the nation 
away from poverty—its remaining petroleum wealth—will have sailed. If the 
nation has not built a solid foundation for its non-petroleum economy, the 
Petroleum Fund safeguards will have failed to avert the resource curse. Sadly, 
the Petroleum Fund may have been only a delusion of economic security that 
enabled Timor-Leste’s officials, advisors and donors to delay difficult decisions 
and avoid challenging tasks. 
References 
Many documents are referenced on both La’o Hamutuk and RDTL Government 
websites, as the government sites don’t always work. All were accessed between 
December 2013 and June 2015. 
Aftenposten [Evening Post] 23/8/2014. ‘Finansdepartementet sendte svindler for 
å hjelpe Øst-Timor’ [Finance department sends swindler to aid Timor-Leste]. 
www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/Finansdepartementet-sendte-svindler-for-
a-hjelpe-Ost-Timor-7677639.html; English version at www.aftenposten.
no/okonomi/Convicted-embezzler-money-launderer-hired-by-Norways-
government-7679817.html.
ANP (Autoridade Nacional do Petróleo; National Petroleum Authority) 2015. 
JPDA production data. www.anp-tl.org/webs/anptlweb.nsf/pgLafaekReport. 
ANU (The Australian National University) 2013. ‘Trends in Economic 
Development’. Podcast from Timor-Leste Update conference, 28/11/2013, 
Canberra. ips.cap.anu.edu.au/news-events/podcasts/series/2013-timor-leste-
update-podcast-series. 
Barma, N.H. 2014. The Rentier State at Work: Comparative Experiences of the 
Resource Curse in East Asia and the Pacific. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 
1:257–272. Canberra: Wiley Publishing. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced/
doi/10.1002/app5.26. 
BP 2015. Statistical Review of World Energy 2015. www.bp.com/en/global/
corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.
html. 
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
94
CBTL (Central Bank of Timor-Leste) 2014. Balance of Payments 2006–2013. 
Dili:  CBTL. bancocentral.tl/Download/Publications/BoP/Excel/BOP%20
2006-2013.xlsx. 
CBTL 2015. Petroleum Fund quarterly and monthly reports. Dili: CBTL. 
www.bancocentral.tl/PF/Reports.asp.
FONGTIL (Forum ONG Timor-Leste) 2013. Civil Society Statement on the Economic 
Sector to Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting, 19 June, Dili. 
www.laohamutuk.org/econ/13TLDPM/FongtilTLDPMEcon19Jun2013en.pdf.
FONGTIL 2014. Civil Society Statement on the Economic Sector to Timor-
Leste and Development Partners Meeting, 25 July. www.laohamutuk.org/
econ/14TLDPM/14TLDPMEconEn.htm.
Global Insight 2014. Timor-Leste advertising insert in Japan Times, 2 May. info.
japantimes.co.jp/international-reports/pdf/20140502-GI-TIMOR-LESTE.pdf 
or www.laohamutuk.org/misc/promotion/TLPromoJapanTimes2May2014.pdf.
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 2013. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: 
Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation. Washington DC: IMF. www.
imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41079.0 or www.laohamutuk.
org/econ/IMF/IMFArtIVTL2013ReportDec2013.pdf.
IMF 22/10/2014. IMF Executive Board Concludes 2014 Article IV 
Consultation with Timor-Leste. Press release. www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pr/2014/pr14478.htm or www.laohamutuk.org/econ/IMF/
IMFPR14478ExecBdArt4TL22Oct2014.htm. 
La’o Hamutuk 2002. With Money, Oil Also Brings Problems. La’o Hamutuk 
Bulletin 3(5) July. www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/Jul/lhv3n5en.pdf.
La’o Hamutuk 2005. Public Consultation and Enactment of Timor-Leste Petroleum 
Fund Act. www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/Act/05FundActConsult.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2005a. Timor-Leste Will Be One of the Most Oil-Dependent Countries 
in the World. La’o Hamutuk Bulletin 6(4) November. www.laohamutuk.org/
Bulletin/2005/Nov/LHBv6n4en.pdf. 
La’o Hamutuk 2010. Trying to Scam a Billion from the Petroleum Fund. 
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/ACI/10AsianChampInvestment.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2012. Timor-Leste is going for broke. laohamutuk.blogspot.
com/2012/03/timor-leste-is-going-for-broke.html. 
95
6. Can the Petroleum Fund Exorcise the Resource Curse from Timor-Leste?
La’o Hamutuk 2012a. How Timor-Leste Got Ten Billion Dollars … and How 
Quickly We Will Spend It All. laohamutuk.blogspot.com/2012/05/how-
timor-leste-got-ten-billion-dollars.html.
La’o Hamutuk 2012b. Ten Billion Dollars is a Tempting Target. laohamutuk.
blogspot.com/2012/07/ten-billion-dollars-is-tempting-target.html.
La’o Hamutuk 2013h. [Operation of] Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund. 
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/05PFIndex.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2013a. 2013 General State Budget. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/
OGE13/12OGE13.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2013b. Letter to Parliament on the 2014 General State 
Budget, 8 November 2013, 3. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE14/
LHKartaOGE14PN8Nov2013en.pdf. 
La’o Hamutuk 2013c. Timor-Leste is Going into Debt. www.laohamutuk.org/
econ/debt/12Borrowing.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2013d. South Coast Petroleum Infrastructure Project. 
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/TasiMane/11TasiMane.htm. 
La’o Hamutuk 2014. 2014 General State Budget. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/
OGE14/13OGE14.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2014a. Information about the Treaty between Australia 
and Timor-Leste on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea. 
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/Boundary/CMATSindex.htm. 
La’o Hamutuk 2014b. The Double Digit Disappears. laohamutuk.blogspot.
com/2014/04/the-double-digit-disappears.html.
La’o Hamutuk 2014c. Oil Production Inevitably Declines. laohamutuk.blogspot.
com/2014/03/oil-production-inevitably-declines.html.
La’o Hamutuk 2014d. Public-Private Partnerships to Build Grandiose 
Infrastructure Projects. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/PPP/PPPIndex.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2014e. Timor-Leste Has Been Robbed! laohamutuk.blogspot.
com/2014/06/timor-leste-has-been-robbed.html.
La’o Hamutuk 2014f. Making the Oil Companies Pay What They Owe. 
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/tax/10BackTaxes.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2014g. Special Economic Zone in Oecusse. www.laohamutuk.org/
econ/Oecussi/ZEESMIndex.htm.
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
96
La’o Hamutuk 2014h. La’o Hamutuk Asks the RDTL Court of Appeals Please 
audit TimorGAP [Open letter to the Court of Appeals]. www.laohamutuk.
org/Oil/TimorGAP/14LHTRTimorGAPaudit5Aug14.htm.
La’o Hamutuk  2014i. Petroleum Production Sharing Contracts. 
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PSCs/10PSCs.htm.
La’o Hamutuk  2014j. Bobby Boye: Convict, Advisor and Fraud. 
www.laohamutuk.org/econ/corruption/Boye/14BoyeCase.htm.
La’o Hamutuk 2015. PM Araujo, Recognize Falling State Revenues When 
Revising the 2015 Budget. laohamutuk.blogspot.com/2015/02/pm-araujo-
recognize-falling-state.html.
La’o Hamutuk 2015a. It Takes More Than Money to Achieve Development. 
laohamutuk.blogspot.com/2015/02/it-takes-more-than-money-to-achieve.
html.
La’o Hamutuk 2015b. Submission to Committee C, National Parliament, regarding 
the Proposed Rectification of 2015 State Budget. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/
OGE15/OR/LHSubOR15-31Mar2015en.pdf.
La’o Hamutuk 2015c. Timor-Leste’s Oil and Gas are Going Fast. www.laohamutuk.
org/Oil/curse/2015/OilGoingFast15Apr2015en.pdf.
La’o Hamutuk 2015d. Update: How Long Will Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund 
Last? www.laohamutuk.org/econ/model/OilSustain2June2015.pdf.
La’o Hamutuk 2015e. Civil Society Comment to the 2015 Timor-Leste 
Development Partners Meeting on the Economic Sector. laohamutuk.
blogspot.com/2015/06/civil-society-to-development-partners.html.
La’o Hamutuk 2015f. How Long Will the Petroleum Fund Carry Timor-Leste? 
www.laohamutuk.org/econ/model/13PFSustainability.htm. 
Neves, G. 2013. Rentier State, Statism, and Socio-Political and Socio-Economic 




Neves, G. 2014. Is Timor-Leste a Failed State? Life at Aitarak Laran (blog of 
the office of the Presidency of Timor-Leste), September. aitaraklaranlive.
wordpress.com/2014/09/15/is-timor-leste-a-failed-state/.
97
6. Can the Petroleum Fund Exorcise the Resource Curse from Timor-Leste?




RDTL (República Democrática de Timor Leste; Democratic Republic of Timor-




RDTL GDS (General Directorate of Statistics) 2013. Timor-Leste National 
Accounts 2000–2011. Table 1.1. Dili: RDTL. www.statistics.gov.tl/
wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TL-NA_2011_Final_Publishable.pdf or 
www.laohamutuk.org/DVD/DGS/NatlAccts2011May2013en.pdf.
RDTL GDS 2013a. External Trade Statistics, Annual Reports 2012. Dili: RDTL. 
www.statistics.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/External_Trade_2012.
pdf or www.laohamutuk.org/DVD/DGS/DGETrade2012.pdf. 
RDTL GDS 2013b. Timor-Leste Census 2010 Volume 8: Population Projection. Dili: 
RDTL. www.statistics.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/PPJ_Monograph.
pdf or www.laohamutuk.org/DVD/DGS/Cens10/8Projections.pdf.
RDTL GDS 2014a. Timor-Leste National Accounts 2000-2012. Tables 1.1 
and 3.1. Dili: RDTL. www.statistics.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/
National-Account-2012.pdf or www.laohamutuk.org/DVD/DGS/
NatlAccts2012July2014en.pdf.




RDTL GDS 2015. External Trade Statistics, Monthly Reports. www.statistics.gov.
tl/category/survey-indicators/external-trade-statistics/monthly-reports/.
RDTL GDS 2015a, Consumer Price Index Reports. www.statistics.gov.tl/
category/survey-indicators/consumer-price-index/-lang=en.




A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
98
RDTL GDS 2015c. Timor-Leste Labour Force Survey 2013: April 2015. 
www.statistics.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/LFS_2013_ENGLISH_
VERSION.pdf or www.laohamutuk.org/DVD/DGS/LFS2013en.pdf.
RDTL GDS 2015d. Timor-Leste National Accounts 2000-2013. Dili: RDTL. 
www.statistics.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/A4-NA-2014-OK.pdf 
or www.laohamutuk.org/DVD/DGS/NatlAccts2013Jun2015en.pdf.
RDTL MoF (Ministry of Finance) 2011. Analysis of Fiscal Sustainability in 
Timor-Leste. www.mof.gov.tl/analysis-of-fiscal-sustainability-in-timor-leste.
RDTL MoF 2013. Petroleum Fund 2012 Annual Report. Dili: RDTL. 
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/Reports/PFAR12En.pdf or www.mof.
gov.tl/petroleum-fund-annual-report-2012. 
RDTL MoF 2013a. Fundo Consolidado de Timor-Leste, Declarações Consolidadas 
Anuais Ano Fiscal de 2012 [Consolidated Fund of Timor-Leste, Annual 
Financial Statements for Fiscal Year 2012]. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OR12/
CFET_Financial_Statement_2012.pdf.
RDTL MoF 2013b. State Budget 2013: Budget Overview (Book 1), tables 2.5.3.1.1 
and 2.5.3.1.2. Dili: RDTL. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE13/BksApr2013/
OGE13Bk1en.pdf. 
RDTL MoF 2013c. Yellow Road workshop 9–10 May, Dili. Presentations available 
from La’o Hamutuk at www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE14/13OGE14.
htm#yrw or www.mof.gov.tl/2013-yellow-road-workshop/?lang=en. 
RDTL MoF 2014. Budget Transparency Portal. www.budgettransparency.gov.tl/
public/index?&lang=en. Also www.transparency.gov.tl/english.html.
RDTL MoF 2014a. General State Budget 2014. All six budget volumes are 
available at www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE14/13OGE14.htm#docs.
RDTL MoF 2014b. Yellow Road Workshop 29-30 May, Dili. Presentations. www.
mof.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Yellow_Road_Workshop_2014.pdf.
RDTL MoF 2014c. Briefing Note to Respond to ‘The Resource Curse in Timor-




RDTL MoF 2015. 2015 General State Budget documents. www.laohamutuk.org/
econ/OGE15/14OGE15.htm#docs. 
99
6. Can the Petroleum Fund Exorcise the Resource Curse from Timor-Leste?
RDTL MoF 2015a. 2015 Rectification budget papers and related documents. 
www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE15/14OGE15.htm#docs. 
RDTL MoF 2015b, Jornada Orsamental workshop 14 May 2015, Dili. Presentations. 
www.mof.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Jornada_Orcamental.pdf or 
www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE16/yrw/JornadaOrsamental14May2015.pdf.
RDTL National Parliament 2013, Comissão de Finanças Públicas. Relatório e 
Parecer Sobre a Apreciação Inicial da Proposta de Lei N.º 10/III (2ª)—Orçamento 
do Estado para 2014 [Report and Opinion on the Initial Proposed Law No. 
10/III(2), State Budget for 2014]. Dili: RDTL, 19. www.laohamutuk.org/
econ/OGE14/CommCReport3Dec2013pt.pdf; unofficial English translation at 
www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE14/ComCRecomOGE14LHEditen.pdf. 
RDTL PFIAB (Petroleum Fund Investment Advisory Board) 2009. Letter to 
Minister of Finance responding to ‘Request for an advice on depositing 
part of the Petroleum Fund in cash’, 18 September. Included in Annex X 
to the 2009 Petroleum Fund Annual Report, available at www.mof.gov.tl\
wp-content\uploads\2011\09\Petroleum_Fund_Annual_Report_2009_
English.zip, Part 4, page 23 or www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/ACI/
IABAsianChamp18Sep09En.pdf.
RDTL President 3/2/2014. Mensagem ao Parlamento Nacional na Promulgação 
do Orçamento Geral do Estado para 2014 [Message to the National Parliament 
on Promulgation of the General State Budget for 2014]. www.laohamutuk.
org/econ/OGE14/PR-OGE3Feb2014en.pdf or Portuguese original at www.
laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE14/PR-OGE3Feb2014pt.pdf.
RDTL Prime Minister 1/4/2014. Address by His Excellency the Prime Minister 
of the Democratic Republic Of Timor-Leste Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão at the 




RDTL Prime Minister 16/2/2015. Speech by His Excellency the Prime Minister 
Dr Rui Maria De Araújo on the Occasion of the Swearing-In of the Sixth 
Constitutional Government. timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
Swearing-in-of-the-Sixth-Constitutional-Government-16.2.20151.pdf.
RDTL Spokesperson 10/5/2011. Transparency and the UNDP Timor-Leste Human 
Development Report 2011. Press release. timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=5018&lang=en 
or www.laohamutuk.org/econ/HDI10/SSComNHDR10May2011En.pdf.
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
100
RDTL Spokesperson 21/3/2013. Correction of Inconsistencies in 
International Media Regarding Oil and Gas. Press release. timor-leste.gov.
tl/?p=7901&lang=en.
Rigzone 5/2/2015. Timor-Leste Reviews Investment Rules, Plans New Bid 
Round. www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/137061 or www.laohamutuk.org/
oil/curse/2015/RigzoneBid5Feb2015.pdf.
Santos 2014. Annual Reports for 2012–2014. www.santos.com/share-price-
performance/company-reporting/annual-reports.aspx.  
Scheiner, C. 3/5/2011. Timor-Leste Must Win Independence from 
Petroleum. Presentation at launch of UNDP 2011 Human Development 
Report. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/HDI10/11NHDREn.htm.
Scheiner, C. 18/4/2013. Comments at the launch of the 2013 Economic and 
Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/ESCAP/
ESCAPScheiner18Apr2013en.pdf.
Scheiner, C. 2014. How Long Will the Petroleum Fund Carry Timor-Leste? 
In Understanding Timor-Leste: Proceedings of the 2013 Timor-Leste 
Studies Association conference. tlstudies.org/tlsa_confpro2013.html or 
www.laohamutuk.org/econ/model/ScheinerPetrolFund17Feb2014en.
pdf with additional information at www.laohamutuk.org/econ/
model/13PFSustainability.htm. 
Scheiner, C. 2014a. The Resource Curse in Timor-Leste. SSGM In Brief 2014/29. 
Canberra: ANU. ips.cap.anu.edu.au/publications/%E2%80%98resource-
curse%E2%80%99-timor-leste-0.
Stiglitz, J.E. 2014. The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers 
Our Future New York: W.W. Norton.
Straits Times 31/8/2014. 15th Anniversary Timor-Leste Independence 
Referendum advertising supplement. Singapore. www.laohamutuk.org/
misc/promotion/TLAdSingapore31Aug14.pdf or znx.cc/st/2014/08/31.pdf.
Timor Post 21/5/2014. Timor Gap Preparadu Explorasa Bayu Undang, 11. 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) 2011. Managing Natural 
Resources for Human Development: Timor-Leste National Human 
Development Report. New York: UNDP. www.laohamutuk.org/econ/HDI10/
TLHDR2011En.pdf.
101
6. Can the Petroleum Fund Exorcise the Resource Curse from Timor-Leste?
UNDP 2014. Human Development Report: Sustaining Human Progress: 
Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience. hdr.undp.org/en/2014-
report/download.
UNDP 2014a. Timor-Leste Country Explanatory Note for Human Development 
Report. hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/TLS.pdf.
US EIA (Energy Information Administration) 2015. Annual Energy Outlook 2015: 
With Projections to 2040. Also see associated statistical tables. www.eia.gov/
forecasts/aeo/. 
West Australian. 18/2/2015. Woodside to Cut Jobs, Shelve Sunrise. 
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/Sunrise/2015/WAWoodsideSunrise18Feb2015.pdf. 
World Bank 2013. Timor-Leste Country Partnership Strategy for the Period 
FY2013–2017. Washington DC: World Bank. documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/2013/02/17493182/timor-leste-country-partnership-strategy-
period-fy2013-2017.











Most basic infrastructure such as power, water, transport, telecommunications, 
office and school buildings built by Portuguese and Indonesian administrations 
in Timor-Leste were destroyed when the country was liberated in 1999. 
Almost everything needed to be rebuilt and the country faced a massive task in 
planning and executing a wholesale infrastructure investment program valued 
at more than US$10 billion. Eleven years later, while notable progress had been 
made in some sectors, Timor-Leste remains far behind its original investment 
targets. While the country possesses significant oil & gas resources to support 
infrastructure financing, its capacity for investment planning and implementation 
remain constrained (Darcy 2012: 1).
Prior to 2006, most public expenditure was funded by the international 
development community. However, with the creation of a dedicated 
Infrastructure Fund, Timor-Leste’s own resources are now funding around 
80 per cent of public expenditure. Operating within the framework provided 
by the Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030 (SDP), and the infrastructure 
1  The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views and 
policies of ADB or its Board of Governors, the governments they represent, or the Government of Timor-Leste.
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program of the Fifth Constitutional Government 2012–2017, the government 
hopes to better direct and measure Timor-Leste’s development performance in 
the infrastructure sector.
Owing to the inflow of funds from petroleum sales over the past few years, 
Timor-Leste’s government has dramatically expanded the level of resources 
invested in infrastructure development. Since 2007, the budget of the Ministry 
of Infrastructure (including projects funded under the Infrastructure Fund) 
has increased by more than an order of magnitude to almost US$200 million 
a year. In 2013, the country planned to spend about 15 per cent of its gross 
domestic product (GDP) on infrastructure development. This is an enormous 
figure by international standards, where developing countries spending 
6 per cent of their GDP on infrastructure are generally considered to be making 
a more than adequate contribution to their infrastructure development needs. 
Capital expenditure requirements are higher in post-conflict environments, 
where challenges are often greater in terms of the availability of skilled labour 
and expertise. Even taking this into account, Timor-Leste’s infrastructure 
expenditure targets are very ambitious.
However, the high and increasing budgetary allocations for infrastructure have 
added to the burden of implementing agencies, and while disbursement ratios 
have improved over recent years, the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) is still 
only able to disburse about two thirds of its budget. Large budgets, combined 
with the limited implementation capacity of the infrastructure ministries, lead 
to pressures to divert resources to pay for ad hoc ‘emergency projects’. Examples 
of these projects include the well-known Pakote Referendum (Referendum 
Package), which totalled US$70 million, for which funding was diverted from 
the National Electrification Project, and an emergency drainage project for 
which funding was diverted from a multi-year project for drainage. 
The current extent and state of Timor-Leste’s infrastructure requires substantial 
investment to meet the growing needs of the country. Therefore, proper 
prioritisation, effective and efficient implementation of selective infrastructure 
projects is crucial. Timor-Leste requires extensive and diverse infrastructure 
development, but in this chapter I limit discussion to issues of roads, electricity, 
water and sanitation, ports, and airport development. 
Targets in the Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030
Timor-Leste’s SDP sets an ambitious goal to achieve middle-income country 
status by 2030. This is a reachable goal if Timor-Leste can manage its resources 
properly and prudently to create a modern and productive economy. 
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The status of infrastructure remains inadequate and inefficient with increasing 
development demands. Infrastructure spending should, therefore, be directed 
towards building and maintaining the core and productive infrastructure 
needed to support the growth of the nation, increase productivity, create jobs, 
and support the development of national private sector. In doing so, the scale 
and cost implications are large and ongoing (RDTL 2011: 70–72). 
The relationship between infrastructure and economic development has 
been widely recognised. Empirical evidence demonstrates that shortfalls in 
infrastructure lead to declining productivity (Aschauer 1989a, 1989b, 1991). 
This relationship implies that public capital is an important input in the 
production function. Many targets set for infrastructure in the SDP should 
be seen in this context. Building Timor-Leste’s infrastructure is not an easy 
task, particularly where demand for infrastructure is pressing while the cost 
of supply is enormously high. There are no simple answers, but the targets set 
for key infrastructure, while ambitious, are tough choices the country has to 
make to overcome the constraints in socioeconomic development. The design 
and planning for infrastructure investment are, therefore, key preconditions for 
social and economic development. 
Does the SDP make the right choices for infrastructure spending to establish 
preconditions for state social services and to support economic growth? 
This question is hotly debated, but, in my view, the choice to invest in transport 
infrastructure such as ports, airports, roads and bridges is compelling. As Brooks 
has commented, 
Asia benefits from market-driven integration, where large trade and FDI [foreign 
direct investment] flows respond to infrastructure development … and efficient 
infrastructure services lower transaction costs, raise value-added and increase 
potential profitability for producers while increasing and expanding linkages to 
global supply chains and distribution networks (2009: 1). 
Conversely, inadequate infrastructure can cost an economy significant 
unrealised gain from trade, and lead to an ‘inability to transport goods and 
people efficiently, [while] an inadequate power supply to operate machines leads 
to microeconomic as well as macroeconomics bottlenecks … infrastructure can 
also yield positive externalities’ (Brooks 2008: 1). 
The plan for road network development is to deliver a comprehensive road 
maintenance program, to rehabilitate all existing roads, to construct new bridges, 
and to provide all-weather access on major routes within five years (RDTL 2011: 
75). In Timor-Leste, roads are categorised into national, district, rural, and urban. 
All national and district roads will be fully rehabilitated to an international 
standard by 2020. All rural roads are expected to be fully rehabilitated by 2015. 
A bridge construction program to construct and rehabilitate bridges that are in 
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
106
need of replacement or repair will also be undertaken. There are around 3,200 
linear metres of bridges throughout the nation. District roads have been the 
highest priority for repair. A national highway of two lanes in each direction 
capable of taking a full-length container at an average speed of 60 km per hour 
is planned to be built on the south coast, linking Suai in the western part and 
Beaco in the eastern part of the country. A ring road around the country has also 
been envisaged (RDTL 2011: 72–76). The SDP’s comprehensive, 10-year road-
building program will give certainty and ongoing opportunities to international 
and national road construction companies to encourage such business to 
invest and grow in Timor-Leste. This will improve Timor-Leste’s private-sector 
development and create jobs throughout the nation (RDTL 2011: 72). 
The plan for water and sanitation is to overcome the many challenges involved 
in providing improved access to clean water and sanitation across Timor-Leste. 
This includes the construction of a major sewerage collection system in Dili, 
providing a safe, 24-hour, piped water supply to households in 12  district 
centres, and installing water systems and community latrines in rural areas. 
The SDP sets a target that by 2030 all citizens of Timor-Leste will have access 
to clean water and improved sanitation. The target for urban districts is 
to provide 60  per  cent access to appropriate, improved sanitation facilities 
by 2015. Alongside sanitation facilities, the SDP also sets out to rehabilitate 
existing sewers, and separate sewage from stormwater drainage by building 
intercepting sewers, installing pilot toilet facilities in households and facilitating 
local treatment of sewerage. These initiatives include building appropriate 
treatment facilities in a staged way—connecting commercial properties first, 
then residential septic tank effluent, followed by all houses that have flush 
toilets. Other options include building a trunk sewer along the waterfront to 
take effluent from the intercepting sewers. The expectation is that by 2020 there 
will be appropriate, well-operated and maintained, sustainable infrastructure 
for the collection, treatment and disposal of sewage in Dili (RDTL 2011: 77–81). 
While this is an achievable goal, the works must be outsourced, and a proper, 
operational and detailed infrastructure plan put in place. 
‘Electricity is seen as a basic right and the foundation for our economic future.’ 
According to the SDP, by 2015 everyone in Timor-Leste will have access to 
reliable electricity for 24 hours a day. To achieve this, the government has 
commenced investment in new power plants, substations and transmission lines, 
as well as distribution systems. An expansion of renewable energy systems is 
also envisaged in the SDP. The establishment of two power plants for electricity 
generation, and the roll-out of most transmission and distribution systems have 
been accomplished. Apart from the national electricity grid, the government 
has also rolled out a rural electrification program aimed at improving the 
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living conditions of the majority of the population, including more remote 
communities. The SDP states that by 2020 at least half of Timor-Leste energy 
needs will be met from renewable energy sources (RDTL 2011: 85–92).
The international airport in Dili will be extended and a new terminal will be 
built. Rehabilitation of building airstrips for at least Suai, Oecusse/Ambeno, 
Lospalos, Maliana, Viqueque, Atauro and Same are being considered. While the 
plan for Baucau airport is for it to be an alternative airport to Dili, it will be also 
used as aero-military base (RDTL 2011: 97–98).
Two new seaports—one at Tibar near Dili and another in Suai—are envisaged. 
Construction of these two ports is expected to support the growing economy 
and meet future industry and freight demands (RDTL 2011: 94). The plan for 
Tibar port includes the construction of a wharf and onshore facilities, a new 
road from Dili to Tibar, dredging, and possible construction of a breakwater. 
These facilities will be built in phases in accordance with growing demand and 
funding availability. The Tibar Port Project has already commenced, and by 
2020 Timor-Leste is expected to have a new, fully operational and efficient major 
port. A logistics supply base for the petroleum sector will be established in Suai. 
This is expected to provide capacity for the south coast to develop a domestic 
petroleum sector along with related and supporting industries and businesses. 
The expectation is that when this port facility is in place it will attract investment 
and promote growth, and provide an international access point to Timor-Leste. 
Alongside these two major ports, regional ports construction will be undertaken 
over the next 10 years. Port facilities will be built, repaired or  substantially 
expanded (RDTL 2011: 93–96).
What is the progress to date?
Timor-Leste has an extensive system of national, district and rural roads that 
provide access to the rural parts of our nation where the majority of the population 
lives. The network is generally constructed to the Indonesian pavement standard 
of 4.5 metres width with lined masonry drains and two lane steel truss bridges. 
The Timor-Leste road network comprises national roads that link districts to 
each other, district roads that link district centres with sub-districts and rural 
roads that provide access to villages and the more remote areas. There are around 
1,426 km of national roads, 869 km of district roads and 3,025 km of rural roads 
(RDTL 2011: 70). 
The roads network development program is currently undergoing a significant 
expansion. Remarkable progress is being made on the national roads upgrade. 
According to the SDP, all national and district roads are to be fully rehabilitated 
to an international standard by 2020. All national roads will be upgraded to 
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a width of 6 metres plus a 1-metre shoulder on both sides, and will include 
drainage and slope protection works. From 2011, the Government of Timor-
Leste and development partners—namely the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the World 
Bank—are  co-financing this national roads network development program. 
The agreement is to upgrade about 600 kilometres out of approximately 
1,426 kilometres of the existing national roads by 2017. Percentage-wise, the 
government’s program is securing about 40 per cent of the total length of 
Timor-Leste’s national roads to be upgraded by 2017. Recently, the government 
and the ADB co-financed the upgrading of about 14 kilometres of Liquiça–
Maubara section. This section is part of the main road link between the Nusa 
Tenggara Timur Province of Indonesia and Dili was due to be completed by 
December 2013. The civil work contracts for the upgrading of Dili–Liquiça and 
Tibar–Gleno road sections were awarded earlier in 2014 and works have recently 
commenced. Heavy maintenance for the section from Batugade to Maliana has 
been ongoing since 2012. 
In 2012, the government and JICA signed a loan agreement to upgrade the 
Dili–Manatuto–Baucau road link. The following year the design was completed 
and put out to tender, and the construction of the Dili to Manatuto road was 
scheduled to commence in 2014, with the remaining section from Manatuto 
to Baucau to be completed by 2017. Subsequently, the government and the 
World Bank signed a loan agreement to upgrade the Dili–Ainaro road link. 
Works were scheduled to commence in 2014 with a completion schedule by 
2017. The  government has also signed with ADB a new loan to finance the 
construction of the Manatuto–Natarbora road link, including the design for 
the upgrading of the Baucau–Lospalos road, the Lautem–Com road link and the 
Baucau–Viqueque road. This project was also scheduled to commence in 2014 
and be completed by 2017.
Notable progress has also been made on rural road construction and rehabilitation. 
The government, in partnership with AusAID and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), has rehabilitated 90 kilometres of roadway, while an 
additional 150 kilometres is scheduled to be rehabilitated by the second half 
of 2013.2 Despite the fact that rural road rehabilitation has achieved just 240 
kilometres out of a total of 3,025 kilometres, to some extent this has been 
critically important as: 
2  de Sousa, Gastão 9/8/2013. Progress Made during the First Year of the V-Government. Presentation at the 
Retreat of V-Government, Dili.
109
7. Progress and Challenges of Infrastructure Spending in Timor‑Leste
over 70% of the population of Timor-Leste are living in rural areas and therefore 
any progress made will contribute to connect people and communities, encourage 
agricultural and natural resource development, increase rural incomes and allow 
for the effective delivery of government services including health care, education 
and security (RDTL 2011: 70).
Despite the highest priority being given to district roads, this category is 
recorded as receiving only limited attention, as by August 2013 there were just 
70 kilometres maintained. A number of projects for district road rehabilitation 
are proceeding, but it has been difficult to track progress due to the absence of 
a reliable data. Most of these works have been undertaken on an ad hoc basis, 
with improper preparation, and poor adherence to the design and processing 
requirements necessary to ensure that resources expended will result in the 
anticipated benefits. 
Water supply infrastructure is still recorded as lagging behind. The UN, 
the new government and its development partners have invested well over 
US$250  million in the Dili water supply system since 2000. Investments 
have focused on emergency repairs, operational capacity-building and major 
infrastructure. Water sources, treatment plants and transmission mains are now 
in generally good condition, and have sufficient capacity to meet Dili’s needs for 
several years (ADB 2007). An ongoing project for increased water supply for Dili 
is now progressing well. The project is covering three sub-zones within three 
different zones, supplying continuous potable water for about 1,600 households/
consumers. Works in two additional zones covering about 1,700 households are 
scheduled to commence in 2014. The Direcção Nacional de Água e Saneamento 
(DNSA; National Directorate for Water and Sanitation) has reintroduced water 
billing in Dili, particularly within the zones covered by the water supply project 
co-financed with the ADB. Another government project for Pante Makassar 
in Oecussi and Manatuto township is now at the procurement stage and is 
scheduled to commence construction in 2014. A  further co-financed project 
with the ADB to implement the urban water supply is planned in accordance 
with the SDP. 
A public–private partnership (PPP) pre-feasibility study was completed this 
year reviewing the tariff structure to ensure affordability for the urban poor and 
effective coverage of operational costs. It also assessed a realistic target date to 
meet the government’s planned level of service expectations and commitments of 
matching funding. A full feasibility study will be conducted to assess the merits 
and risks of a PPP before commencing any tender process (Evans & Peck 2013).
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There has been some good progress made in rural water and sanitation. One of 
the key players in this sector is the Be’e Saneamentu no Ijiene iha Komunidade 
or BESIK program (Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program), financed by 
AusAID. This program covers all 13 districts and provides access to clean water 
for over 80 remote villages in Timor-Leste.
Very significant progress has been made in electricity supply. Despite the large 
investment and achievements made by the recent two periods of government, 
electricity infrastructure continues to attract conflicting opinions. By June 2013, 
the government had:
• completed two new power plants with 250-megawatt capacity and nine 
substations
• connected 506 kilometres of transmission lines out of a planned total of 
603 kilometres 
• provided 106,072 households with access to electricity; 97,072 households 
were connected to the grid 
• provided 9,000 households with solar panels.3 
Timor-Leste is heavily dependent on a single national port in Dili for all general 
cargo imports and exports. The Port of Dili is struggling to cope with the 
volume of cargo and this situation is likely to worsen as the economy expands. 
Its limited capacity already results in a berthing backlog of between three and 
eight ships. To overcome this problem, a new multi-purpose port with a capacity 
of one million tonnes per year, and catering for commercial cargo and passenger 
needs will be constructed in Tibar, a few kilometres west of Dili (RDTL 2011: 
93–94). The project has reached procurement stage and it will be implemented 
through a PPP.
The challenges in delivering infrastructures 
in Timor-Leste
The SDP places state-led capital spending at the centre of its development 
strategy. To deliver infrastructure as targeted in the SDP would be extremely 
challenging should there be no change in the current system, procurement 
practices and institutional arrangements. Timor-Leste lacks capacity both 
in terms of human resources as well as institutions to deliver SDP targets. 
3  de Sousa, Gastão 2013. Minister of Public Works presentation at the Timor-Leste Development Partners 
meeting, Dili, 18–20 June. 
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The national private sector, particularly in relation to construction, design and 
supervision, remains low and underdeveloped. The infrastructure to support 
the development of physical infrastructures needed by the country is limited. 
State-led investment in infrastructure development requires the government to 
perform well in public investment management and public finance management. 
But this expectation is frequently not met given the continuing capacity 
constraints. 
In addition to limited public sector capacities and capabilities to deliver 
infrastructure, there are natural impediments for private sector involvement. 
Timor-Leste can be categorised as a relatively small market for private investment. 
Its remoteness can result in high costs for doing business. A number of structural 
factors also constrain private sector investment. These include the weak macro-
economic environment, poor governance, extensive state involvement coupled 
with weak regulation, underdeveloped financial markets, the poor legal and 
investment policy environment and sensitivity about instability. These combined 
factors have led to low returns on capital and need to be addressed to establish 
a reliable and conducive investment environment.
In the absence of private sector in investment, the government has almost no 
other choice but to stimulate investment directly. The National Electrification 
Project, the Tasi Mane Project, the Tibar Port Project and the National Road 
Network Development are major to mega projects selected within the framework 
to generate future investment while providing basic infrastructure and services. 
Developing this concept led to an environment in which political economy 
influences investment logics. 
The institutional arrangement for delivering infrastructure is also an issue. 
Over recent years, the government has established the Secretariado dos Grandes 
Projetos (Major Project Secretariat), the Agência de Desenvolvimento Nacional 
(National Development Agency) and the Comissão Nacional de Aprovisionamento 
(National Procurement Commission) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of infrastructure planning and delivery. The objective behind the establishment 
of these agencies is to improve the way in which agencies responsible for planning 
and implementation can work together to ensure that projects are aligned with 
SDP objectives, are economically and financially viable, are delivered on time 
and on budget, and are sustained by the implementation of adequate operation 
and maintenance arrangements. However, there are overlapping responsibilities 
between some agencies involved in the infrastructure planning and delivery 
processes, and there remains a risk that resources are not being used optimally 
to deliver infrastructure against the objectives set out in the SDP. The current 
system for prioritising investments is not working effectively, and risks wasting 
government resources on inappropriate or poorly designed investments. 
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Two key ministries responsible for implementing infrastructures are the MPW 
and the Ministry of Transport and Communications; however, with the creation 
of supporting agencies in the infrastructure sector, these government agencies 
have, to some extent, overlapping functions. For example, the MPW operates 
in an external environment of change, political uncertainty and political 
interference, and with multiple, changing and competing stakeholders. 
What is currently lacking in most areas are sector or sub-sector strategies 
and plans. These would provide an intermediate step between the overall 
socioeconomic goal and strategy set out in the SDP, and detailed lists of proposed 
project interventions or macro-level targets. Such strategies and plans would 
provide: 
1. a more fine-grained framework for sector and sub-sector development
2. a set of intermediate goals and sector or sub-sector development indicators 
that would allow planning and implementing agencies to better measure how 
individual project interventions are contributing to the realisation of overall 
sub-sector and sector outcomes. 
Realising these objectives will, in turn, contribute to the realisation of the SDP’s 
strategic socioeconomic goals.
The global experience of infrastructure development is that the achievement of 
efficient investment depends on a number of factors relating to the executing 
and implementing institutions and their relationships with each other, including 
clear plans and strategies.4 Many of these conditions are absent in Timor-Leste, 
and focusing on some of these areas could be helpful in improving the quality 
and efficiency of the country’s infrastructure investment. Following are some of 
the most important preconditions for cost-effective and efficient infrastructure 
investment. 
1. Close co-operation is required between all ministries and parastatal agencies 
involved with infrastructure.
2. There should be a clear separation of political and technical responsibilities. 
With policymakers setting aspirations and sector priorities, goals and targets, 
and technicians taking responsibility for deciding how to reach these goals, 
including determining whether to take in-house responsibility or to execute 
and evaluate, with delivery delegated to others under contract. Timor-Leste 
still has major issues in this area with frequent political interference in project 
selection and delivery.
4  Dobbs, R. et al. 2013. Infrastructure Productivity: How to Save $1 Trillion a Year. London: McKinsey 
Global Institute. 
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3. The government should engage the private sector where it can provide 
greatest value—including welcoming unsolicited proposals where 
appropriate. In reality, Timor-Leste is only at the first stage in this process, 
but understanding what capacity there is in the private sector to take on 
infrastructure and service delivery roles is an important step.
4. Trust-based stakeholder engagement should be supported by the development 
of transparent systems and provision of education (including to beneficiaries 
and stakeholders). This objective includes broad participation in the process, 
and compensation (or offsets) for those experiencing negative impacts. Again, 
Timor-Leste is at an early stage in this process, and gaining public trust is 
the first step.
5. Decisions on investment should be made based on robust and reliable 
information; this is crucial for sector and sub-sector strategies. Balance-sheet 
accounting on investments should be made public—to show spending and to 
promote equity. (Some progress is being made on this with the government’s 
transparency portals in areas such as budget, procurement, expenditure and 
results.)
6. There should be adequate investment to obtain the required skills—building 
strong capabilities across the infrastructure value-chain. This goal also 
highlights the value of focused delivery units—hand-picked teams with a 
single objective to realise major investments. 
Figure 7.1 National road upgrading project.
Source: Antonio Vitor .
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Conclusion
Timor-Leste’s infrastructure is inadequate and inefficient. The infrastructure 
built prior to 1999–2000 is deteriorating due in part to age, but largely due 
to lack of proper maintenance and rehabilitation over the previous decade 
and more. Most of the key infrastructure, such as ports, airports, major road 
networks and telecommunications, needs to be upgraded to suit the current and 
growing demands. There are conflicting views, however, around the selection 
priorities of infrastructure, given the widespread demand for improvements, 
and competing economic and political interests. Despite significant investment 
made so far, the results are yet to meet expectations. To date, the choice has 
been to invest in transport, telecommunication and the power sectors in order 
to meet basic infrastructure needs and establish a firm basis for socioeconomic 
development.
The challenges remain significant. The achievement of efficient infrastructure 
investment depends upon a number of factors that require effective co-ordination 
and planning, and the improved capacity of implementing agencies to fulfil 
their responsibilities and strategic plans. 
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Securing a New Ordering of 
Power in Timor‑Leste: The Role 
of Sub‑national Spending
Saku Akmeemana and Doug Porter1
A crucial aspect of Timor-Leste’s economic performance and political stability in 
the aftermath of the 2006 crisis has been the way the government has managed a 
five-fold increase in public spending, and an even more rapid increase in capital 
spending. While the country’s experience has been widely acknowledged as 
an exemplar of ‘buying the peace’, less well documented has been the range 
of unorthodox arrangements adopted by the government to manage this fiscal 
expansion and to re-order the local political landscape. Sub-national spending 
was pivotal, despite amounting to only around 3 per cent of the budget. 
Recent research undertaken by the World Bank,2 including a joint study with 
the Government of Timor-Leste of its sub-national development programs, 
provides empirically grounded insights into how public spending can be used 
to dynamically trade-off and balance competing technical, social and political 
priorities in the immediate aftermath of conflict. This chapter’s assessment of 
1  The authors are staff of the World Bank who worked on the study discussed in this chapter, Sub-national 
Spending in Timor-Leste: Lessons from Experience (World Bank, Justice for the Poor, 2014). documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/11/20426607/timor-leste-sub-national-spending-lessons-experience. 
However, the views expressed in this chapter are not to be attributed to the World Bank, but are the authors’ 
views, based on several years of engagement in Timor-Leste in different capacities. The authors are grateful for 
advice from Sue Ingram, Bjorn Dressel, Anthony Goldstone and Edio Guterres, and acknowledge comments by 
participants at seminars at which these findings have been discussed in Canberra (18/4/2013 and 28/11/2013), 
and Washington DC (25/11/2013 and 23/4/2014).
2  This includes studies of large infrastructure contracts; a political economy analysis of sub-national 
spending that draws from new qualitative research as well as synthesising existing literature; and a broader 
contemporary political economy analysis of the country, drawing from an analysis of its history.
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public spending provides a lens through which to understand the crafting 
of political settlements in contexts where securing stability is paramount. 
The nature of the emerging settlement, in turn, shapes spending outcomes. 
Introduction
In the initial post-independence period after 2002, Timor-Leste was heavily 
aid-dependent and its leaders had few resources through which to pursue 
policy aims. Over the subsequent years, an exclusivist political dynamic had 
developed, regional tensions began to run high, and unrealistic expectations 
fuelled a growing sense of grievance that culminated in the eruption of violence 
in 2006.3 The fiscal expansion since 2007 was financed through sharply rising 
petroleum revenues and utilised government systems to plan and budget, spend 
and account for results. Annual capital and development spending peaked 
around US$555 million in 2011 (World Bank 2014: 1). This contrasts with the 
annual average of US$55 million in the years prior to 2007, which was mostly 
donor-funded and managed under donor procedures.
This chapter examines one aspect of this fiscal expansion, namely sub-national 
capital spending. We view the arrangements for sub-national spending in two 
ways. In the first part of this chapter, we summarise the findings of a World 
Bank/Banco Mundial and Ministério das Finanças’ (Government of Timor-Leste 
Ministry of Finance) evaluation of how different sub-national spending programs 
performed in meeting immediate policy objectives: stimulating a domestic 
contractor sector, creating jobs, building infrastructure, avoiding a relapse of 
conflict in the near term. We then turn to reflect on how these mechanisms 
contributed to larger, although closely related, ‘strategic’ purposes, including 
the imperative to consolidate a new elite bargain by economically empowering 
previously disenfranchised social and political constituencies. This  spending 
was more than buying the peace in the short term; it was also about a re-ordering 
of Timor-Leste’s political economy that began with the advent of the Petroleum 
Fund in 2005, control of which has animated politics ever since (Rees 2013). 
3  The 2006 crisis was sparked by a group of petitioning soldiers (called the ‘petitioners’), predominantly 
from the country’s western districts, who charged their army superiors, who were predominantly easterners 
drawn from the Resistance armed forces, with discrimination in the national army. The subsequent sacking of 
nearly 600 petitioners by the government led to widespread unrest and violence. 
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Figure 8.1 Major infrastructure spending FY 2004 – FY 2013 (US$ millions).
Source: World Bank 2014: 1 .
Innovations in sub-national spending: the Pakote 
Referendum in brief
The Pakote Referendum (Referendum Package), named for the 10-year anniversary 
of the 1999 independence plebiscite, was announced by Prime Minister Gusmão 
in a supplementary budget speech in August 2009. In what had been dubbed 
‘the Year of Infrastructure’, the government was struggling to disburse the 
budget allocation for infrastructure. In August, it reallocated US$70 million 
of unspent funds to the Pakote Referendum. In doing so, it was responding to 
the demands of an evolving political economy, and the idea of delivering an 
‘independence dividend’ to Timor-Leste’s citizenry. The  Pakote Referendum 
handled only a modest share of national spending, but it represented a critical 
effort to address economic, social and political priorities in the aftermath of 
conflict. Its professed aims were to: 
1. create a local entrepreneurial class by capitalising Timorese contractors
2. generate employment
3. deliver quality infrastructure. 
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These policy priorities were often in tension, and the relative emphasis given 
to each has shifted over time as the Pakote Referendum was refined through 
subsequent iterations of the Programa Dezenvolvementu Decentralizado (PDD; 
District Development Program). Today they are known as ‘PDID projects’.4 
As a spending modality, the Pakote Referendum was risky but innovative. 
By creating a group known as the Associação Empresários Construção Civil e 
Obras Públicas (AECCOP; Entrepreneurs’ Association for Construction and 
Public Works) at national and district levels, the prime minister embarked on 
a radical decentralisation of power and authority at direct odds with the logic 
and prescriptions of ‘good governance’. Rather than devolve power to lower 
level government authorities, the Pakote Referendum created market entities 
and empowered them to handle public expenditure. AECCOP’s leadership, 
closely affiliated with and trusted by senior members of the government, was 
given responsibility for identifying some 700 small- to medium-sized projects, 
allocating the funds, awarding projects to their members, and supervising all 
project implementation. Moreover, during its initial roll-out in 2009, the entire 
process was not governed by any formal regulations. This bold move was 
unsurprisingly greeted by a chorus of concerns from the political opposition, civil 
society and donors about its fiscal sustainability, governance and accountability 
arrangements. Some donors threatened to pull out of a US$34 million World Bank 
public financial management reform program, but had yet to grasp that the surge 
in the country’s oil wealth had radically diminished their influence. 
The Pakote Referendum and its successor programs were part of a suite of measures 
introduced to respond to the political dynamics following the 2006 crisis. It has 
been widely acknowledged that Timor-Leste was fortunate in having established 
a sound architecture for fiscal management in the form of the Petroleum Fund and 
a reasonably well-defined public financial management system before the surge 
in oil revenues. Yet these arrangements also placed extraordinary pressure on 
the minority coalition government—the Aliança Maioria de Parlamentar (AMP; 
Alliance of the Parliamentary Majority)5—when it assumed office in August 
2007. Unusually for a post-conflict scenario, there were no off-budget rents for 
government to distribute in pursuit of near-term political and social stability. 
4  Planeamento de Dezenvolvimentu Integradu Distritál (Decree Law for Integrated District Development 
Planning or PDID) came into effect in January 2012 and now governs a number of different sub-national 
spending programs. 
5  FRETILIN, which had been in government since independence, found itself short of a majority in 
parliament and unable to secure a majority coalition. Three other parties – Conselho Nacional de Reconstrução 
de Timor (CNRT), Partido Democrático (PD) and Associação Social-Democrata Timorense-Partido Social 
Democrata (ASDT-PSD) – formed a majority coalition named the Aliança da Maioria Parlamentar (AMP); this 
was later joined by a further party, Unidade Nacional Democrática da Resistência Timorense (UNDERTIM). 
The durability of this coalition required considerable political and public spending compromises to maintain, 
many of which were seen in 2008. 
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Public spending through the existing, but in many respects untested, architecture 
provided the only means available to stabilise the country and shape the emerging 
elite bargain—by bringing political opponents and potential spoilers with the 
capacity to mobilise violence ‘into the tent’, reward party supporters and allies, 
and meet the demands for an ‘independence’ dividend from the broader populace. 
Public spending and post-conflict transition—
the larger story in Timor-Leste
The 2009 supplementary budget was the government’s fifth since August 2007; 
in rough terms, each of these budgets had doubled the outlays of the one before 
(Porter and Rab 2010). The government began entering into a wide range of 
agreements for large infrastructure projects (such as sea and air ports, power 
and transmission projects, and oil sector equity production arrangements), with 
the professed aim of increasing annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
beyond 8 per cent and diversifying the economy. To lift the rate of spending, 
the government opened many new spending lines; more spending powers were 
delegated to line ministries; and spending increased on goods and services, 
including subsidies on essential commodities. An expansive social protection 
scheme was introduced, including universal pensions for the elderly and 
people with disabilities, conditional cash transfers for school-going children in 
vulnerable households, support to veterans and survivor families, and ad hoc 
responses to internal displacement and natural disasters. The Pakote Referendum 
was part of this fiscal expansion. 
Figure 8.2 PR/PDD and PDL budgets (US$ millions).
Source: World Bank 2014: 4 .
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Seen through the lens of the post-conflict transitions literature, it could be 
argued that the government’s spending was sending what have been termed 
‘credible signals of change’ to the populace focused on three areas: security 
(of person and property, but also broader political stability and social order); 
justice (avoiding egregious exclusion in access to public wealth and economic 
opportunity); and jobs (a reasonable expectation of a dignified existence 
and the opportunity to accumulate wealth and assets) (World Bank 2011). 
The  government was signalling that citizens would be protected from the 
global food and commodity price crisis that emerged in 2008, and they would 
derive immediate benefits from the surge in oil wealth. Key was the economic 
empowerment of previously disenfranchised social and political constituencies, 
including the veterans of the Resistance struggle and their families, disaffected 
members of the military, and those from western regions of the country who 
were perceived to be excluded. 
Principal among these groups were veterans, particularly those who lived in 
rural areas, and were not part of the national political or economic discussion. 
Whether under the Portuguese colonial administration or the Indonesian 
occupation, the elite bargain was created and held together by a mix of force 
and incentive. Until 2002, participants in the bargain were few in number. 
There were few Timorese contractors in the country except for a handful that 
had collaborated with the Indonesian military, and none at the time with the 
capacity to execute large-scale contracts. In the post-independence democratic 
context, the accommodation of the large veterans constituency posed a critical 
challenge. Until the Petroleum Fund and the surge in oil wealth thereafter, 
government did not have the means to deal with this fractious and largely 
impoverished group. The Pakote Referendum, among other mechanisms, aimed 
to economically empower veterans by distributing public contracts to them, 
thus providing them with a real stake in the new political and economic order 
that was being constructed and ongoing incentives to participate and co-operate. 
The tactical and strategic purposes served by sub-national spending speak to 
an emerging consensus about what typically occurs in successful transitions 
out of conflict. Thematically, the World Bank’s 2011 survey of experience and 
scholarship contends that successful regimes need to send ‘credible signals’ 
of a break from the past. Longer term legitimacy derives from ‘institutional 
transformation’ whereby incentives are created to deliver services inclusively, 
rather than simply distributing resources to particular actors through forms 
of patronage that can corrode trust and ultimately exhaust available resources 
(World Bank 2011). This lens on post-conflict transitions provides one way to 
frame the challenges faced by the government soon after it came into office. 
The government had a fragile electoral coalition to consolidate—there was 
considerable political fluidity, high expectations, and a lively public debate, 
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including through parliament. There was also a palpable threat of instability 
(Engel and Hanley 2007). Around 150,000 internally displaced people were still 
in camps close to Dili. While there had been a dramatic economic recovery—8 per 
cent GDP growth in 2008, after negative 6 per cent GDP growth in 2006—
the private sector was stagnating, and private spending was contracting 
with the onset of the 2008 fuel and commodity crisis. An additional 16,000 
youth each year were looking for work and a reasonable expectation about the 
future. Anecdotal evidence was circulating that poverty and inequality were 
increasing.6 There was a sense of injustice among key political constituencies 
and perceptions of an ‘east–west’ regional divide. While government had 
announced a path from ‘stabilisation’ to ‘recovery’, its first task was to maintain 
social order and stability.
In the face of these multiple pressures, the government acted pragmatically. It was 
not convinced that existing mechanisms to spend public wealth would be able 
to move quickly enough or enable it to effectively reach key constituencies. This 
was especially the case with sub-national spending. A mechanism already existed 
in the form of the donor-supported Programa Dezenvolvimentu Lokal (PDL; 
Local Development Program).7 The PDL had been initiated in 2004 to respond 
to a medium-term policy priority of territorial decentralisation. The program 
was piloted under the aegis of the then Ministério da Administração Estatal 
(MAE; Ministry of State Administration), through building local capacities 
for administration and political representation, and was subsequently scaled 
up to all districts.8 The PDL’s approach comprised a system of annual formula-
driven allocation of block grants, participatory planning, and competitive 
procurement. Proposals were generated through consultations at the suku 
(village) level, prioritised by multi-stakeholder groups at subdistrict and district 
levels, and then implemented under competitive tenders and supervised entirely 
by subdistrict development committees and district representative assemblies 
(foreshadowing the potential future role of local government bodies in the form 
of municipalities). While this local development model had been tested in more 
than 25 countries,9 it was, at the time, perceived by government to fall short 
in several ways. It was believed that PDL’s exhaustive participatory planning, 
6  The issue was not just that one in three Timorese were living in poverty, but the results of the Survey 
of Living Standards revealed a sharp increase in poverty between 2001 and 2007 (World Bank 2008).
7  It was supported by the UN Capital Development Fund, through funding from the governments of Ireland 
and Norway.
8  This was not Timor-Leste’s first experience in decentralised spending. A prior experience in community-
driven development—the Community Empowerment Program (CEP)—had sought to ‘strengthen local-
level social capital to build institutions that reduce poverty and support inclusive patterns of growth’. 
As distinct from the citizen–state engagement attempted through the PDL, the CEP favoured community 
allocation decisions, and was distinct from any government administrative artifice. See further, World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2006. Implementation Completion Report Review: East Timor Community and 
Local Governance Project. 
9  www.uncdf.org/node/325.
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competitive tendering and elaborate expenditure controls would hinder the 
pace of spending and could not be scaled to a national operation as quickly 
as needed. It was also felt that competitive tendering would favour existing 
contractors, and weigh against the priority of favouring new entrants, such as 
the veterans. Finally, it was simply ‘too donor driven’, when the premium was 
on electoral claiming through a modality that was distinctively Timorese in 
conception and operation. 
When the Pakote Referendum was announced—two years after the AMP 
Government took office and within a year of attempts on the lives of the prime 
minister and president—its proponents argued it would have several advantages 
over the PDL arrangements. It would reduce time and cost, capitalise a new class 
of contractors, and quickly deliver infrastructure nationwide. The  political 
signalling could not have been clearer, although significant critiques of the 
Pakote Referendum’s efficacy continued. Whereas PDL had a total annual budget 
at the time of US$3 million, the Pakote Referendum was allocated US$70 million 
in 2009, and nearly US$150 million would be allocated over the next three years 
in its subsequent iterations. 
Figure 8.3 PDD and PDL budget compared to public overall and capital 
spending (US$ millions).
Source: World Bank 2014: 4 .
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Once the immediate purposes of Pakote Referendum had been served, 
the  government made a number of modifications to respond to criticisms 
about its governance arrangements and efficacy.10 In 2010, under PDD, new 
agencies were created at national and sub-national levels (most significantly 
the Agencia Nacional do Dezenvolvimento (National Development Agency)) and 
refinements were introduced to how projects were planned, and contractors 
selected and supervised. The Kommisaun Dezenvolvementu Distrital (District 
Development Commission)11 was made responsible for planning and contracting, 
and supervising contractor performance. Between 2009 and 2012, the rules 
governing sub-national spending changed frequently and rapidly—from 
the radical ‘market devolution’ of 2009, to a mix of centralised planning and 
decentralised implementation in 2010 and 2011, to some degree of decentralised 
planning but a greater degree of central control over implementation in 2012. 
Over this short period, there has also been a rapid consolidation of several sub-
national spending systems under the 2012 Planeamento de Dezenvolvimentu 
Integradu Distritál (PDID; Decree Law for Integrated District Development 
Planning), the  PDL, and a new community-driven development program 
called the Programa Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suku (PNDS; National Village 
Development Program). PDID ‘defines the rules and regulations applicable on 
competency, planning, implementation and financing of state projects at the 
district and sub-district levels’. 12
10  The Head of Parliamentary Committee G, Pedro da Costa of the ruling party, CNRT, was cited in Suara 
Timor Lorosae as saying the referendum projects lack quality and the committee therefore ‘has asked the 
government to establish a system of supervision, monitoring and oversight in order to guarantee good works 
result’. (Suara Timor Lorosae 22/12/2009. Referendum Package Lacks Quality.  www.etan.org/et2009/12dec
ember/31/22referendum.htm). Earlier, on 18/11/2009, the speaker of the national parliament was quoted in 
Jornal Nacional Diario (quoted in FRETILIN 18/11/2009. Gusmão’s Financial Management Questioned from 
Within. Media release. groups.yahoo.com/group/ETSA/message/9286). The main opposition party, FRETILIN, 
issued a media release in which the party’s Vice President, Arsenio Bano, called the package ‘a big disaster’ 
(FRETILIN 27/10/2009. Audit Reveals Gusmão Government’s Woeful Financial Management: Action Looms 
on Referendum Package. Media release. easttimorlegal.blogspot.com/2009/10/fretilin-media-release-audit-
reveals.html). The media release of FRETILIN cited all the criticisms of the package from AMP members of 
parliaments (MPs) and Timorese academics about project quality under the package. A local civil society 
organisation, La’o Hamutuk, states in its 2010 budget submission that Pakote Referendum was ‘opening up 
avenues for corruption, waste and poor quality, it prevents proper accountability and sustainability for 
public works infrastructure projects, which are definitely needed by our people’ (La’o Hamutuk 18 /11/ 2009. 
Gusmão’s Financial Management Questioned from Within. Media release. groups.yahoo.com/group/ETSA/
message/9286). 
11  Kommisaun Dezenvolvementu Distrital comprised the district administrator, subdistrict administrators, 
representatives of line ministries at the district, and suku chiefs.
12  PDID Decree Law, Art. 1(1).
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Figure 8.4 Sub-national spending in Timor—a chronology.
Source: World Bank 2014: 7 .
The sub-national spending study
The World Bank collaborated with several government ministries in 2012–13 
to undertake a comparative evaluation of sub-national spending programs. 
The prime purpose was to contribute to ongoing efforts to define sub-national 
spending systems and procedures. It was also intended to speak to political 
audiences (Timor’s parliament and executive, and the donor community) and 
spark a wider policy and academic discussion about the role of public finance in 
consolidating elite settlements in the aftermath of violent conflict. 
In essence, these policy and academic discourses raise two questions in common. 
First, in the aftermath of conflict, under what circumstances do elites invest in 
institutions to order power and what forms do these institutions take? Second, 
how do these choices to invest in particular forms of institutions impact on the 
durability, nature and legitimacy of political settlements? Two aspects of these 
choices appear to be particularly important in determining the scope, depth, 
and thus durability of a ‘successful transition’. One is the ability of elites to 
impose centralised arrangements to collect and distribute rents (Khan 2010; 
Slater 2010). Another aspect is the ‘ability of central actors and the modalities 
they use to project authority and distribute resources to places where people 
live, including them in the settlement by delivering public safety, services, 
livelihoods and other opportunities’ (Craig and Porter 2014). We believe Timor’s 
experience with sub-national spending could be helpful in thinking through 
these issues.
To address the study’s prime purpose, a multidisciplinary team of World Bank 
staff and consultants and Ministry of Finance officials adopted a ‘mixed methods’ 
approach. The team analysed databases on total spending through the PDL and 
Pakote Referendum/PDID mechanisms (2005–13); visited the districts of Baucau, 
Ermera, Bobonaro and Ainaro (and eight subdistricts); and closely examined 
a representative range of 22 projects. While chosen to be indicative of the 
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larger picture, the sample for detailed analysis is small, and the results should 
be approached with due caution. Wide-ranging consultations were held with 
district and subdistrict administration and line departments, sukus, contractors, 
users of the facilities, non-government organisations (NGOs), and  Dili-based 
government officials. The study provided a comparative analysis of PDD and 
PDL across five key dimensions: 
1. expenditure priorities (rates of budget execution, patterns of spending 
including links with poverty and geography, achievement of different policy 
priorities)
2. quality of the assets created (construction standards, durability, ‘useability’)
3. impact on employment (quantum, quality and equity of opportunity)
4. impact on local contractors and private sector (including short-term and likely 
medium-term benefits) 
5. governance (local stability, disputation, elite capture or inclusivity). 
Findings in summary
The full study (World Bank 2014) can only be summarised here. PDL and 
Pakote Referendum/PDD achieved similar results in expenditure priorities and 
job creation, but diverged considerably on other areas of comparison, such as 
the quality of infrastructure, the creation of new contractors, and governance-
related matters. This is not surprising; each of these mechanisms and the form 
they took at various times were designed to serve somewhat different priorities. 
These policy priorities were frequently in tension—at any point in time, one 
could be ascendant in the minds of policymakers depending on specific political 
economy considerations. 
Table 8.1 Budget execution rates of sub-national as compared to central 
government investment programs.
2009 2010 2011 2012
Sub-national programs
PR/PDD 67% 80% 94% 70%
PDL 93% 103% 98% 99%
Central government
Government—all capital dev’t 85% 86% 81% 46%
Education—capital dev’t n/a n/a 67% n/a
Health—capital dev’t n/a n/a 47% n/a
Roads—capital dev’t n/a n/a 27% n/a
Source: World Bank 2014: 9 .
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Figure 8.5 Budget execution measures, 2009–12.
Source: World Bank 2014: 10 .
Table 8.2: Investment sample—efficiency, quality and useability.
Total PDD PDL
Sample size (n) 19 13 6
Delivery time
Within year 13 7 6
Extended to next year 3 3 0
Still not completed 3 3 0
Constructed quality
Acceptable 11 6 5
Barely acceptable 5 4 1
Poor 3 3 0
Useability
Useable 11 6 5
Partly useable 3 3 0
Not useable 5 4 1
Source: World Bank 2014: 11 .
Compared with other government arrangements for capital spending, PDL 
and PDD both fared very well in terms of budget execution and performed 
considerably better than the rates of execution recorded before 2009—or even 
now—by most line ministries for infrastructure spending. Spending patterns 
were broadly (but not entirely) consistent with those for public services 
prioritised in the government’s Strategic Development Plan (education, water, 
health, and agriculture). 
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Geographical spending equity (measured in terms of dollars spent per capita) 
under the PDD varied greatly across districts, with the most favoured 
districts receiving between three to seven times more than the least favoured. 
No  relationship was found between spending patterns and relative need, as 
captured by poverty head counts—for instance, high per capita allocations 
were received by Lautem district (with a relatively low poverty rate), whereas 
low allocations were received by Ainaro (with a relatively high poverty rate).











Aileu 45,724 n/a 29 45 63 108
Ainaro 62,407 n/a 24 37 51 88
Baucau 113,748 20 25 18 34 52
Bobonaro 93,787 37 33 29 41 70
Covalima 62,764 51 n/a 63 66 129
Dili 212,469 31 16 24 29 53
Ermera 118,671 15 n/a 12 29 41
Lautem 65,349 33 36 86 45 132
Liquica 69,925 20 31 50 50 99
Manatuto 41,217 57 49 82 87 170
Manufahi 53,995 44 21 40 72 112
Oecusse 67,736 36 23 35 68 103
Viqueque 72,950 40 33 61 75 137
Totals/Means 1,080,742 35 29 39 48 86
Standard Deviation 12 .59 8 .58 22 .17 18 .01 36 .44
Highest x Lowest 2 .90 3 .00 7 .00 3 .00 4 .00
Source: World Bank 2014: 12 .
As might be anticipated, technical quality and project completion were more 
robust under PDL than PDD. With the previously mentioned caveats about the 
small sample size, the quality of PDD investments is mixed: just under half of 
projects are of acceptable standard and of benefit to users; three exhibit varying 
degrees of design, construction quality, and usability problems; and four are 
not usable for the intended purpose without additional investments. A follow-
up study of a larger sample was about to commence at the time of writing. 
While neither was a specialised labour creation program, the employment impact 
of both PDL and PDD was modest. Compared to the large public works rural 
investment programs in Asia—such as that established by the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act in India—the share of total investment costs going 
to unskilled and skilled labour payments under PDD and PDL are low at around 
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6.5 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively (specialised labour creation programs 
range between 50 and 75 per cent). The employment impact depends greatly 
on the type of infrastructure or investment scheme (for instance, buildings 
generally employ much less labour than irrigation schemes and erosion protection 
walls). The programs provided seasonal employment to an estimated 2.5 to 
10 per cent of the subdistrict workforce,13 and it was predominantly the rural 
underemployed who benefited. Significantly, the benefits were mainly local, 
and shared widely. For the poorest households, the additional cash injection is 
a significant proportion of household income. 
Discounting the considerable numbers of ‘briefcase companies’,14 Pakote 
Referendum/PDD appears to have succeeded in creating a capital base and revenue 
stream for a new class of contractors. The number of registered local contractors 
has expanded greatly, in the order of a threefold increase since 2009, and a large 
number of these contractors were each year awarded a PDD contract. However, 
the fact that contractors were precluded from winning more than one project 
per year meant there were few opportunities and incentives for contractors to 
consolidate their businesses and diversify over time. Thus,  the expansion in 
domestic contractor capacity may prove to have been more apparent than real—
clearly, a longer time frame and more extensive case analysis would be needed 
to draw conclusions here. 
The governance dividends of sub-national spending were mixed. On the one 
hand, these programs enabled large numbers of Timorese to participate in the 
allocation of public resources and the production of assets largely in accordance 
with their priorities. Sub-national spending is best seen as part of a suite of 
measures the government introduced to support its political, stability and social 
objectives. Thus, while the way in which these programs enabled government 
to target important constituencies needed to build stable political settlements 
should not be underestimated, it would be premature to be conclusive. 
The Pakote Referendum/PDD programs have helped to distribute wealth to rural 
areas—benefiting a number of constituencies to whom the government wanted 
to deliver a share of the oil wealth. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
geographical allocations; when the district/per capita allocations are overlaid 
with a political ‘mapping’, the pattern of spending is more explicable—an 
astute use of spending to assuage potential spoilers, broaden political coalitions, 
13  Extrapolations for FY12 Timorese financial year is the same as their calendar year, suggesting that these 
programs have created some 1.2 million unskilled and 220,000 skilled workdays respectively. At subdistrict 
level, this could provide 165 persons with 100 days of employment each, or 740 persons with 25 days each 
(World Bank 2014: 13). 
14  Briefcase companies refer to those that have little by way of capital and no operating site. In the 
current context, they refer to companies that were awarded contracts and went on to ‘on-sell’ the contract to 
contractors with the requisite capacity, taking a percentage of the contract price.
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manage dissent in relation to such initiatives as the south coast development, 
and part of a strategy to win 2012 elections and fracture the unity of the political 
opposition. 
On the other hand, nine out of 13 PDD projects examined closely gave rise to some 
form of dispute about land, procurement, labour or contractor performance, 
whereas only one of the six PDL projects gave rise to a dispute (contractor-
related). No evidence was found to support the view that sub-national spending 
mechanisms, compared to centralised spending by line ministries, are vulnerable 
to ‘weak local capacity’. The reasons for variable outcomes are more complex. 
They lie in the need to frequently modify systems and procedures in response 
to changing priorities and lessons learned. Several aspects of poor performance 
may be mitigated in ways anticipated by the PDID Decree Law 2012, including 
the clarification of assignments of responsibilities (in relation, for instance, 
to certification and supervision) and by more consistent attention to public 
communication and accountability arrangements. 
The study concluded that, after experimenting with a range of innovative but 
risky arrangements to deliver public spending and address a series of economic, 
social and political priorities, the government had largely achieved the initial 
objectives of Pakote Referendum/PDD. It took the decision to ‘regularise’ the 
system through the PDID Decree Law 2012 as the point of departure to make 
several recommendations, including in respect of how budgets are allocated 
to districts; measures to ‘incentivise’ better performance; simpler contractor 
pre-qualification procedures, and competitive tendering to improve contractor 
performance and create significant cost savings; and reverting to district 
payments for contractors to break the highly problematic payment bottleneck 
arising from delays in certification reporting to Dili and in central Treasury 
payments. Since the study was completed, many of the report’s recommendations 
have been adopted (including competitive tendering and predictable, formula-
based budget allocations) or are in the process of being implemented through 
revisions to the PDID Decree Law. In view of the study’s limited sample, 
government has initiated a further round of analysis of both the quality of 
assets and the PDID systems and procedures; this will include a study sample 
of around 200 investment projects.
Broader lessons: institutions for re-ordering power 
in post-conflict contexts
This chapter has drawn on several empirical sources: new qualitative research; 
existing data and research on public expenditure (including on the wage bill, 
large infrastructure spending, an expanded social protection scheme, goods and 
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social services spending); and a broader review of literature. But in drawing 
wider lessons, it must be noted that the study of sub-national spending on which 
this chapter draws provides only a thin basis on which to sustain conclusions 
about how sub-national spending may be transforming the country’s political 
economy. 
At face value, Timor-Leste appears to provide a positive example of where 
domestic elites have used the ‘breathing space’ given by a peacekeeping operation 
to forge a locally acceptable settlement that has been sustained hitherto after 
the departure of foreign troops and police (Akmeemana 2014). The approach 
that was adopted was politically savvy, targeted at particular constituencies, 
but also the broader populace. Although the United Nations Integrated Mission 
in Timor-Leste assumed executive policing responsibilities with one of the 
largest UN police contingents in the world from 2006 until 2011, the Timorese 
police force has answered to its own command since 2008 and handled internal 
threats itself (ICG 2012). In the interplay between a government buoyed by large 
inflows of petroleum revenues, and a UN mission with a very broad mandate, 
a settlement with a distinctively East Timorese cast emerged, into which the 
UN had difficulty in inserting itself (Goldstone 2013: 209–10); but it was one 
that was locally legitimate, and has thus brought at least near-term stability. 
A striking characteristic has been the government’s ability to reach and ‘cater 
to groups which see it as the focal point for their demands for various forms 
of recognition (material, political, and symbolic) to which they feel entitled 
as compensation for losses sustained or services rendered during the struggle 
for independence and since’ (Goldstone 2013: 209). The argument that Timor 
has moved from a very narrowly based elite bargain in the direction of a more 
inclusive settlement does not deny that a new economic elite is capturing the 
bulk of resources in the post-2007 era. 
Certainly, the ways in which public spending can be adroitly used to create 
political capital, pacify populations and consolidate alliances by demonstrating 
‘commitment credibility’ have been well documented, as have the failures to do 
so and their consequences in the form of violent conflict (Taydas and Peksen 
2012; Azam 2001: 435; Burgoon 2006). Recent observers of public spending in 
Timor-Leste conclude that it ‘seems to be enriching elites to a greater degree 
than before, which is also in line with the expectations of particularist rent 
distribution associated with clientelist rentier states’ (Barma 2014). This may 
be true, but in respect of the particular case of sub-national spending, this 
conclusion needs to be nuanced. Certainly, the pace and frequency of changes to 
sub-national spending arrangements generated confusion and scepticism among 
officials, local leaders and common citizens. Yet it also provided incentives 
for certain disaffected groups to co-operate, and thus, while amounting to 
only 3 per cent of the budget, it has had a much larger political footprint of 
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immediate social and electoral dividends for the incumbent government. It has 
also arguably underwritten a political assessment that a blend of centralisation 
and decentralisation offers technically feasible and politically credible ways to 
consolidate power and project authority to dispersed rural populations, while 
building upon existing community governance arrangements (which shape 
social order and collective values for the majority rural population) in order to 
achieve stability. 
Second, the PDD mechanism certainly generated a fair number of localised 
disputes. This is hardly surprising given the pace of roll-out; the frequent changes 
in the rules, often year on year; the sheer logistical difficulties of monitoring up 
to 500 ongoing projects each year; and the fact that local authority figures were 
largely removed from the process. The comparative evidence from PDL points to 
the obvious dividends of local participatory processes, of companies prevailing 
through competitive tendering, and of having local authorities involved—
reduced disputes around land, creating incentives for better performance by 
contractors, and greater local ‘ownership’ of both process and product. 
We would caution against overstating either positive spillover effects of PDD 
mechanisms, or pessimism that they foster forms of patronage that corrode 
democratic prospects. The claims that decentralised spending mechanisms are 
socially generative, including those that invest heavily in popular participation, 
are routinely overstated and decidedly mixed;15 there is seldom evidence of 
positive long-term impact on institutional quality, inclusiveness of decision-
making, trust and group formation (Casey et al. 2012; King 2013). On the other 
hand, the disputes generated by these mechanisms are not necessarily corrosive 
in the long term, provided that they do not feed larger narratives of grievance 
and exclusion.16 Decentralised spending arrangements undoubtedly multiply 
the number of sites where political contest occurs. But, while these contests 
might result in small disputes, the overall project that creates local contests 
about where budget should be spent, by whom and with what expectations can 
also be a powerful form of political legitimation for the governing regime. 
The sub-national spending study—on the basis of limited case examples—did 
not find that the distribution of benevolent largesse by the state necessarily 
accentuates existing cleavages. Admittedly, Timor’s local landscape is quite 
different from that in any number of countries emerging from civil war. 
Social  cohesion at the local level is fairly high; local norms generally act as 
some form of constraint on elite behaviour; and prevalent cultural ideals and 
15  See King (2013) on the comparative record of community-driven development projects in Afghanistan, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Aceh (Indonesia), Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
16  Belun’s Conflict Potential Analysis reports a ‘medium level’ conflict potential, ‘attest(ing) to the gradual 
stabilisation of the security situation’ and, of interest, ‘an overall improvement in most indicators describing 
politically motivated violence’ (Belun 2013: 5). 
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expectations of leadership emphasise community co-operation and have enabled 
cultural continuity and survival through occupation, hardship, natural disaster, 
and political upheaval (Brown 2012a: 66; 2012b). Moreover, many of the kinds 
of conflicts observed around sub-national spending could be ameliorated by 
measures recommended by the study and appear to have been largely adopted 
(although their remedial impact is yet to be determined). Further, had it been 
the case that sub-national spending was projecting political power that was 
perceived as inequitable, and thus creating cleavages or feeding existing 
narratives of exclusion, this possibility must be seen against the increased 
vote achieved by the prime minister’s CNRT (Congresso para a Nacional de 
Reconstrução de Timor; National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) party 
in the 2012 elections—for the first time, it had a higher primary vote than 
FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor)—and commitments by government to 
further ensconce these arrangements. 
While we cannot claim insight into the political strategy of Timor’s leaders, 
it does appear that they are favourably weighing the political and electoral 
dividends of sub-national spending to date. Since the 2012 PDID Decree, 
the  government has committed a further US$300 million over eight years to 
a  national, village-level spending program in the PNDS, and announced a 
further, perhaps expanded, round of sub-national spending under revisions to 
the PDID Decree from 2015. Perhaps more significantly, the Council of Ministers 
approved the Decree Law on Pre-Deconcentration in August 2013, a new law is 
being prepared to govern village authorities, and elections for district/municipal 
assemblies and village councils are anticipated for 2015 and beyond. Looking 
forward, however, it would be foolhardy for observers to assume that Timor-
Leste is set to ‘institutionally innovate’ along a path toward a liberal form of 
decentralised government. 
Timor’s record of fast-tracked, dynamic institutional innovation around sub-
national spending mechanisms should interest proponents of ‘iterative, adaptive 
learning’ (Andrews 2013). This is instanced by the Pakote Referendum’s radical 
break with convention, the experimentation with hybrid institutional forms, 
the circling back and forth between decentralised and centralised authority 
across different elements of the system, through to the routines of administrative 
rationality suggested by the PDID Decree and the revisions that are currently 
being drafted. This record also speaks to the conditions under which governing 
elites will invest in innovative arrangements that break from the past to 
enhance prospects of regime durability. But, in neither form nor function do 
these institutional modalities mimic liberal conventions about the desirability 
of particular models of government at local level. 
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Conclusion
The current PDID mechanism is a hybrid system that resonates with the broader 
re-ordering of power in Timor-Leste. It is populist in character, and demonstrably 
shifts discretion over some aspects of public finance management to lower 
levels of territorial authority. At the same time, the variable geographically 
and politically targeted nature of spending points to the salience of a highly 
centralised political executive (in the form of the annual Budget Review 
Committee process). It is reliant on capabilities that are alert to and adept in 
the political art and value in making decisions right down to the project level, 
on the basis of relationships with local authorities, officials and other targeted 
constituencies. In light of the experience with Pakote Referendum/PDD, the Pre-
Deconcentration Decree Law is unlikely to herald a linear trajectory to populist 
devolution and participatory democracy, but rather its essence will be the 
extension of the regime’s reach into the periphery. With the PNDS also comes 
the acknowledgement of the suku as a point of articulation between locally 
established governance practices and efforts to render national socio-political 
order ‘legible’ from the centre (Brown 2012a: 61).
How do elite choices to invest in particular forms of institutions impact on 
the durability, nature and legitimacy of political settlements over time? Is the 
system emerging in Timor-Leste what Terry Karl describes as a ‘rentier’ system 
that ‘progressively substitutes public spending for statecraft’? (Karl  1997). 
There might, in closing, be two contending answers to this question. In 
the specific and narrow terms of the study reported here, one answer may 
lie in whether political elites follow through on a few key principles—local 
consultation, competitive procurement, expenditure transparency, and so on—
to which they have apparently committed in the PDID Decree. A second, much 
more speculative response may be found in the wider literature of comparative 
politics (Slater 2010) and historical institutionalism (Thelen 2004), together with 
scholarship on the oil curse (for example, Karl 1997; Barma 2014). This might 
suggest that the flow of oil rents will undermine incentives for elites to coalesce 
and invest in functional and legitimate public authorities. Among other things, 
this would mean that follow-through on principles like transparency and 
competitive procurement might be likely in form, but not in function. Rather, 
oil will finance what Slater calls a ‘provisioning pact’, which may be sustained 
over time; but, over time, the political demands perpetuated by provisioning 
will exceed available revenue and seriously corrode state capacity (Slater 2010). 
According to Slater, this trajectory leads to either fragmentation or militarisation 
(armed groups in control). Such a trajectory might prove to be both crisis-prone 
as elites battle for control over the prize of oil rents (Tornell and Lane 1999) 
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and, for a time, durable.17 Durability would rest on two capabilities: patronage 
through state-sanctioned systems (such as the PDD and PNDS), and coercion to 
deal with episodic conflict. 
The type of system we describe as developing in Timor-Leste faces two key 
vulnerabilities. Leadership transitions are difficult in systems that are highly 
dependent on a personalised executive. As with the regimes of Kagame (Rwanda), 
Museveni (Uganda), and Hun Sen (Cambodia), government since 2007 has been 
highly dependent on the personalised authority of Prime Minister Gusmão. 
The first real test of the emerging political settlement and ‘mutual dependency’ 
among elites (Phillips 2013) will occur now that the Prime Minister has stepped 
down. There are clear signals that the transition has been given a great deal of 
thought. In the 2012 elections, CNRT successfully thwarted FRETILIN’s attempts 
to recapture popular support in the rural base. After the election, it appeared 
that the FRETILIN leadership, and its Secretary-General Mari Alkatiri in 
particular, has negotiated a form of ‘détente’ with then Prime Minister Gusmão. 
This has been described by some as the beginning of a ‘post-political’ era in 
Timorese politics, in which Gusmão and Alkatiri have elected to eschew direct 
political competition in favour of a form of collaboration, and a consolidation 
of the patrimonial system (Rees 2013). The second vulnerability is structural: 
the exhaustion of oil and gas revenues. If the economy does not diversify in the 
medium term, the country’s economic viability will be in question unless new 
hydrocarbon deposits are found, and may need to be buttressed by significant 
international interventions—sizeable aid rents along with potential security 
interventions—in the longer term. 
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‘Empty Land’? The Politics 
of Land in Timor‑Leste
Meabh Cryan
Our ancestors footsteps are our land, in the past when our ancestors would walk 
and stop to rest, they would first leave a signal. When they went past a place 
that had no signal or sign they would place some rocks or plant some trees … 
If another community wants to use our land for farming or other activities, they 
must first ask permission because even though the land may seem physically 
empty it has an owner and eventually we will need to visit it to worship the 
ancestors, to look for firewood or other things … We use some ‘empty land’ to 
bury the dead, when anyone from our clan dies they must be buried on their land 
… Our land is our body, we will not sell it because if we sold it we would all die. 
Interview with participant from Suku Tutuala (Haburas 2013: 107)
During the land law consultations of 2009, then minister for justice Sra Lucia 
Lobato frequently referred to the vast quantities of ‘empty land’ that needed 
to be brought under state control in order to drive investment in Timor-Leste. 
These statements and comments reflect the predominantly top-down, neoliberal 
paradigm that the Timor-Leste government has adopted in its Strategic 
Development Plan 2011–2030 (RDTL 2010). In the government’s view of land, 
there are vast, ‘empty’ areas of forest, mountain, beach and scrub land that have 
no owner, and, therefore, can be considered rai estado (state land)—a concept 
in stark contrast to the passage above that underlines the importance of land 
to local communities. This difference in worldviews cuts to the heart of land 
politics in Timor-Leste and yet is rarely acknowledged by the political elite and 
other development actors.
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Rai mamuk or ‘empty land’ is one of many such phrases that litter the land 
rights discourse in Timor-Leste. Language and discourse may seem a strange 
starting point for a discussion of land rights and land politics, which are often 
described and defined in more concrete terms. However, in the context of a long 
legacy of land injustice and displacement in Timor-Leste; the absence of a legal 
structure for the resolution of land rights; increasing demand for land from the 
state, domestic and foreign investors, as well as growing urban and peri-urban 
communities, these seemingly innocent, spatially descriptive words are part of 
the language of power that individuals, communities and the state tap into in 
order to influence the validity and existence of land rights in Timor-Leste. 
This chapter outlines the politics and exclusion surrounding the 2009 
draft transitional land law, which led to an alternative civil society-driven 
consultation process and eventually to the development of a highly participatory 
program known as Matadalan ba Rai (lit. guide to land). During this process, 
a team of civil society representatives spoke to communities about their land 
problems using participatory mechanisms, including village-level community 
consultation groups, interviews, video, photography, artwork, and storytelling. 
The large published report speaks to a set of land identities and meanings very 
different to those put forward by the government and key development actors 
and donors in Timor-Leste.
Land rights in Timor-Leste: a history
Timor-Leste’s vibrant patchwork of customary land rights and uses over 
450 years of Portuguese colonisation, layers of displacement and migration, and 
a violent 24-year occupation by the Indonesian military provide the context 
for the land issues that the country faces today. Under both the Portuguese 
and Indonesian regimes, land was taken from traditional owners by force, and 
through the co-opting of complex local political alliances. By the end of the 
Portuguese colonial occupation in 1975, 2,843 titles had been issued and land 
was concentrated in the hands of five principal groups: the Portuguese state; 
the mestiço (mixed race) elite; Timorese liurai (traditional chiefs), who had been 
co-opted by the Portuguese; the Catholic Church; and Chinese traders (Fitzpatrick 
2002: 93, 104). During the Indonesian era, some 44,091 titles were issued 
(Fitzpatrick 2002: 95). Of these, it is estimated that between 10 and 30 per cent 
of titles were issued corruptly; a further 30 per cent were issued to the 25,000 
Indonesian citizens moving to Timor from other provinces of Indonesia under 
the Transmigrasi (Transmigration) program (Fitzpatrick 2002: 66). In 1999, the 
Indonesia military and militia groups retreated from Timor-Leste, taking with 
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them all land records and destroying over 70 per cent of built infrastructure 
(CAVR 2006a: 27). Over 68,000 homes were destroyed in the capital city alone 
(CAVR 2006a: 27). 
Land has contributed to, and in many cases escalated, violent conflict in Timor-
Leste. Most notably, this occurred during the 2006 crisis, when discontent 
over housing distribution in the capital, Dili, between groups associated with 
lorosa’e (eastern) and loromonu (western) areas of Timor-Leste aggravated the 
conflict and contributed to extensive property destruction. The haphazard and 
ad hoc refugee return process post-2006, the failure to deal with urban land 
ownership issues since independence, as well as a concentration of economic 
development and opportunities in the capital has further complicated land 
rights in Dili and beyond.
Significant funding has been poured into efforts to formalise and register land 
and property rights, most notably three consecutive USAID-funded land law 
projects costing a total of US$14.5 million. The primary objective of these land 
law programs was to promote economic development, conflict prevention, 
economic investment, and the sustainable use of resources. The clearly stated 
view of these consecutive projects has been that ‘a formal property rights system 
contributes to economic development and facilitates private sector investment 
in the economy’ (Rede ba Rai 2013: 23).
Land legislation 1999–2009
Due to the contentious and political nature of land policy decisions, very little was 
done to regulate land issues during the UNTAET (United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor) period (1999–2002) other than basic resettlement 
of internally displaced people and refugees and the minimum amount needed 
to establish the basis of a functioning administration in Dili and in district 
capitals. The FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) government’s Law No. 
1/2003 on The Regulation of State Land provides an expansive definition of 
state land. It defines all previously designated Portuguese state land and all 
former Indonesian state land as the property of the Timorese state (irrespective 
of how it was acquired), and states that all ‘abandoned property’ should be 
administered by the Timorese state. While there was almost no consultation 
on this law during its drafting and approval phases, its implementation has 
regularly proven contentious. There have been significant objections from 
communities in Dili and rural areas who feel that their land was wrongly taken 
from them by previous state action and that they should be provided with some 
form of compensation from the present government.
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Ita Nia Rai and the 2009 draft land law
A third, highly ambitious USAID land law project, branded locally as Ita Nia Rai 
(lit. our land), was launched in 2008. The passage of significant land legislation 
laying down the basis of all land ownership in Timor-Leste was stated as one 
of its five core objectives. Other objectives included the establishment of an 
independent land commission and a national cadastre, and the mapping and 
registration of over 50,000 land claims.
The program’s legal advisor began drafting a policy document in early 2008, 
which was presented to a drafting committee in September 2008 (Lopes 2008). 
This document was quickly followed by a draft transitional land law, released 
for public consultation in June 2009.
Civil society advocates immediately argued that these policy options did not 
reflect Timorese cultural understandings of land and, given the importance and 
fundamental nature of land in Timor to identity, spirituality and community 
life in general, that the law should be based on a broadly consultative land 
policy. In this respect, they argued that the processes (as well as the outcomes) 
of drafting land policy were vitally important to resolving land issues in 
Timor-Leste.
The original Ministry of Justice plan for consultation allowed comments and 
submissions on the law within a three-month period. After significant lobbying 
from civil society groups and opposition leaders (most notably Fernanda Borges 
from Partidu Unidade Nasional (National Unity Party)), the ministry agreed that 
they would hold district-level consultations in each of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts. 
After a significant campaign on the design of this participatory process, further 
consultations were organised in 27 subdistricts, and the process became one 
of the most consultative legislative processes in Timor-Leste (aside from the 
development of the national constitution). 
Despite praise, the process turned out to be severely flawed. Copies of the 
law were handed out on the morning of the consultations but the minister of 
justice misrepresented the law on multiple occasions, stating that its purpose 
was to ensure fair distribution of land to all people. Community concerns 
were dismissed as beik (stupid) and rarely, if ever, documented by government 
officials. The Rede ba Rai (Timor-Leste Land Network) and members of a host of 
national civil society organisations were responsible for the only coherent and 
public documentation of the process (Wright 2009).
Although the Minister assured participants that the law would re-distribute land 
in Timor-Leste, and guaranteed that it would give land to those who currently 
do not have land rights, many community members left the meeting worried 
and confused as there are no articles in the law that match the ministers words 
(Wright 2009).
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After some alterations, the law was approved by the Council of Ministers in 
March 2010. The law lays down the basic principles by which land titles will be 
recognised and issued in Timor-Leste. This includes a recognition of previous 
(Portuguese- and Indonesian- era) freehold ownership rights. A complex process 
of adverse possession is laid down, which is, however, only applicable to those 
who moved onto land after 31 December 1998. This date is highly significant as 
it does not allow anyone who began using land during or after the 1999 conflict 
to formalise their rights. In terms of this chapter, perhaps the most significant 
element of the law is its broad and wide-ranging definition of state land, which 
includes all land under state possession, all notional ‘empty land’ without an 
identified owner, all properties identified in 2003 by the state as abandoned, and 
any land that was once used by the Portuguese or Indonesian governments. This 
effectively creates a presumption in favour of state land that trumps all other 
claims. A token recognition of community property and community protection 
zones and a weak protection against eviction for those living in the ‘family 
home’ provides only very limited levels of protection vis à vis the state.
Perhaps the biggest fear of civil society was that the expansive definition of state 
land, along with strong powers of expropriation and a top-down, neoliberal state 
development paradigm, would lead to an erosion of communal and informal 
rights with little or no due process or adequate compensation.
The Matadalan ba Rai project
Aside from the substantive criticisms of various concepts and articles of the 
transitional land law, a key criticism of the government and USAID drafting 
process was that there was no overall land policy, and, as a result, it was 
difficult for communities to understand the core objectives and values of such 
an important piece of legislation. Civil society consistently urged meaningful 
consultation to be carried out in order to build consensus on such a fundamental 
issue. After significant unsuccessful lobbying of the minister for justice and 
land sector donors, including USAID and the World Bank, civil society actors 
decided to launch a land consultation process ‘of their own’.
Based on our experiences we [civil society] concluded that the Government 
and International Agencies working in the land sector are unwilling to hold 
meaningful consultation with communities about land issues and that they have 
no will to draft a Land Policy which could help to guide our work throughout 
this sector. It is because of this that we have organised a separate consultation 
process (Haburas Foundation 2013: 17).
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
146
The consultation process intended firstly to gather a broad sense of the land 
problems and issues that communities faced on the ground which could be fed 
in to civil society advocacy work and submissions on the draft land laws, but 
also to inform civil societies’ own work on land issues. The project also hoped 
to show, contrary to government and donor organisations beliefs, that effective 
and efficient consultation was possible and could be carried out without 
unrealistically large budgets and time frames (Haburas Foundation 2013: 18).
A basic consultation process was carried out in 36 suku (villages) across seven 
of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts. The consultation process was carried out between 
April and August 2010, and included a variety of participatory methods to help 
community groups identify and prioritise key land problems in their respective 
suku. Later, further thematic workshops, interviews and surveys were used 
to check and add more depth and case study evidence to the data collected 
during the preliminary consultation process. A total of 1,973 participants were 
involved in the process.
Land issues identified by community groups were distilled into categories, 
and the percentage of people selecting these issues as a priority was calculated 
(see Figure 9.1). The data shows clearly that the largest worry for community 
groups is fear of a ‘state land grab’, whereas more localised issues such as ‘land 
conflict between neighbours’ were considered a relatively minor issue. 
Figure 9.1 Prioritisation of community level land problems.
Source: Haburas Foundation 2013 . 
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Throughout the consultation process, community values and understandings 
of land came to the fore through narratives, stories, case studies and mapping 
processes. In writing up the results, 15 separate chapters are dedicated to each 
of the categories identified above, but three themes recurred throughout the 
report: the importance of the context and ‘social function’ of land; the legacy of 
colonial injustice; and disillusionment with the lack of consultation over land 
decisions and development processes. All three issues are crucially important 
to the land rights context in Timor-Leste, but in the remainder of this chapter 
I will focus on the first to illustrate the extreme divergence between local 
understandings of the ‘social function’ of land and government perceptions of 
its economic value.
Timorese contexts and the social function of land
During the consultation process, an ‘imagination and mapping’ session 
was undertaken, where communities described their land and discussed the 
fundamental question ‘what is land?’ Discussions and artwork from these 
sessions shows the multi-layered functions of land. As summarised by the 
Matadalan report:
Land is our home, land is where we grow rice and cassava. Land gives us food 
and a place to open our small stalls. Land is a place to farm and fish and raise 
animals. Land is a place to get water, to pick firewood and to look for medicine. 
Land is the basis of our culture because it is here that we see our ancestors 
footsteps, our sacred stones and our spiritual houses. Land is core to identity, it 
shows who is our family. Land is a way to share resources and wealth (Haburas 
Foundation 2013: 35–36).
The drawing below was developed by a community group in Tutuala, Lautem 
District, in order to illustrate the significance of their land. They show economic 
areas: a fisherman catching fish to sustain his livelihood, and the food gardens 
and chickens to the far right. Their land is also an important place for their 
culture—represented by the sacred symbol tei on the far left of the shore. This 
symbol represents the source of the Tutuala Ratu (clan). They go to the sacrificial 
altar to pray to the ancestors, to ask for permission to share the land, and to 
thank the ancestors for the sustenance and strength they derive from the land.
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Figure 9.2 Explaining the significance of land, Tutuala, Lautem.
Source: Haburas Foundation 2013 .
The drawing shows three houses made with traditional materials. A fundamental 
basis of their identity is the uma lulik (spiritual house), which can be seen on 
the right, and the sacred stones to the far right that mark the ia mari tulia 
(footsteps of the ancestors). This group explained that boats are fundamentally 
important to their culture and identity because that was how their ancestors 
first came to these lands. Finally, the group explained that their land was a place 
of nature, close to the sea, the forest and the mountains, full of wild birds and 
animals. This explanation and picture is a perfect explanation of the complex 
layers of function and attachment that land performs at the community level.
During the consultation process, a pilot survey attempting to show how 
individual households thought about and perceived their land rights was 
carried out in rural areas. In this survey, instead of asking households whether 
they owned a particular piece of land, they were asked a number of questions 
about what activities they could and could not do on a piece of land that they 
used or had rights to. 
Respondents were asked whether they had rights to build a house on their land, 
farm their land, plant perennial trees, pass on the land as inheritance, build a 
spiritual house on the land, lease the land to an outsider, or to sell the land.
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While the right to farm and build a house are relatively strong ‘use’ rights, the 
right to plant perennial trees, pass on land as inheritance, and, particularly, to 
build a spiritual house on land are traditionally seen as the strongest forms of 
rights across Timor-Leste. The planting of perennial trees is often described 
by communities as ‘traditional title’ because the longevity of trees implies an 
equally long-term interest in the land.
What can be seen in the data is that many households who perceived themselves 
as having extremely strong rights (that is, the right to plant perennial trees and 
the right to pass land on as inheritance) felt that they could not lease land to 
someone from outside of their community (only 36 per cent agreed they could), 
and even fewer (17 per cent) felt that they had the right to sell their land. 
Conclusion
The Matadalan ba Rai report puts together 250 pages of rich case studies and 
analysis showing and discussing community perceptions of land in Timor-Leste. 
What emerges is a clear illustration of the importance of the social and spiritual 
elements of land. The Haburas Foundation team also provides an interesting 
summary in the report’s introduction, stating that land in Timor has many 
dimensions:
Land is always linked to people and has many social functions. At Haburas 
Foundation and Rede ba Rai we follow the principle that land has seven 
functions: Social, Cultural, Economic, Political Identity, Habitation and Shelter, 
Ecological and finally as a mechanism for the sharing and distribution of wealth 
and resources (Haburas Foundation 2013: 35).
This understanding of land rights highlights the disparity between local 
understandings of land, the government view that ‘empty land’ is land to be 
alienated for development, and the donor view that land (once titled) could easily 
be sold and mortgaged in order to drive investment and economic development.
A fundamental driver and catalyst of this clash of worldviews and 
understandings of land is the government development paradigm, which 
prioritises infrastructure and petroleum development with little reference to 
local values and rights. Over 50 per cent of the 2013 state Budget was spent on 
infrastructure projects (with only 8.4 per cent and 4.2 per cent on education 
and health respectively) (La’o Hamutuk 2013). The Strategic Development Plan 
clearly echoes the logic and priorities of the land titling programs. Mega projects 
such as the south coast development plan, urban beautification schemes, and 
private investments are increasingly driving forced evictions, conflict and 
disputes between communities and the state. 
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The Matadalan ba Rai project has continued and sparked the creation of Land 
Defence Groups across eight of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts. The program team 
continues to disseminate information about community land rights, to work 
against forced evictions, and advocate for more just and consultative land laws 
as part of the Timor-Leste land rights network. The consultation report acts as 
a guide and strategic plan for civil society organisation work on land. It was 
given serious consideration by a number of parliamentarians during the 2011 
land law debates and a number of articles were changed during Commission 
A discussions. The government majority, however, removed any amendments 
when the law was debated and approved in plenary.
The draft transitional land laws were eventually vetoed by President Ramos-
Horta in March 2012, stating (among other reasons) that the laws had been 
unconsultative and reflected neither Timorese values nor international human 
rights best practice. While they have been redrafted and approved by the Council 
of Ministers, it is unclear whether they will be approved by parliament any 
time soon. Many of the controversial articles remain unchanged, and debate and 
dissent within parliament seems to have died down. In the absence of any enacted 
legislation, the land deals, alienation and forced evictions will likely continue 
unabated. Rather than taking proactive steps to mediate and discuss these 
divergent worldviews through consultation and constructive policy processes, 
opposition to even discussing alternative models is becoming entrenched. 
Top-down economic development that ignores traditional economies, and the 
spiritual and social realms of communities, remains the dominant worldview 
amongst the upper echelons of Dili’s policy world.
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After Xanana: Challenges for Stability1 
Cillian Nolan
Introduction
In November 2013, Timor-Leste’s Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão announced he 
would resign before the regular end of the current parliamentary term in 2017. 
The timing of that resignation remains unclear, but it now looks likely that at the 
very least he will not run for office again in 2017. When it does happen, it will 
have important ramifications for political stability. It will mark the beginning 
of a long-deferred transition of political power from the closed circle of leaders 
engaged in politics since before the country’s 1975 invasion by Indonesian 
forces. It will also be a key step towards the full demobilisation, in the broadest 
sense, of the guerrilla independence army that Gusmão effectively commanded 
from 1981 until 2000.
Since being elected prime minister in August 2007, Gusmão’s leadership has 
been marked by a pragmatic approach to shoring up stability at the expense of 
deeper institutional development. His election and subsequent decision to merge 
the defence and security ministries under his own control were instrumental in 
restoring confidence among many Timorese in the government and its security 
forces. But by restoring the old military commander as head of government, 
these steps did little to help develop new leaders or institutions. This is also 
why Gusmão’s resignation will create new pressures from among veterans who 
1 This paper was written for the 2013 Timor-Leste Update conference held at The Australian National 
University. It has not been updated to reflect the 2015 resignation of Xanana Gusmão. Please see author’s 
postscript on p.167 regarding this development.
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believe their influence may fall once the old FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da 
Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste; Armed Forces for the National Liberation of 
East Timor) command and the government are once again made separate. 
This chapter examines some of the implications of Gusmão’s resignation for 
stability. First, it looks back at the challenges that have characterised the period 
since independence, with particular reference to the recurrent, low-grade 
attacks on the government’s legitimacy posed by dissident groups. The chapter 
argues that because Gusmão, as the former commander of FALINTIL, is both 
the target and the most effective manager of these challenges, giving him a role 
outside of government in managing veterans’ affairs might help defend the 
government in the future. 
Second, it examines the implications for the country’s security sector. Gusmão’s 
unique authority helped temper rivalries within and between the police and 
the military that could re-emerge after his resignation. A crucial leadership gap 
remains in the security sector; the search for a successor to an interim police 
commander appointed from outside the force in 2009 continues, while Gusmão 
has left himself in charge of the defence and security portfolios he merged 
in 2007.
The chapter then turns to the political landscape and examines how the path 
towards Gusmão’s resignation was opened by an early 2013 rapprochement with 
his old rival Mari Alkatiri, and greater co-operation between their respective 
parties, the CNRT (Congresso Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor; National 
Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) and FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária 
de  Timor-Leste Independente; Revolutionary Front for an Independent East 
Timor). It suggests that a key issue is what the succession will mean for the 
transition to a younger generation of leaders. None of the candidates who 
might take over if he steps down in the next two years has the charisma or 
independent political base to win a future election. Real change will have to 
wait until the 2017 elections, when many believe that Taur Matan Ruak, the 
current army chief, is the most likely contender to become prime minister. 
The  FALINTIL–government link would thus continue, but Ruak is a decade 
younger than Gusmão or Alkatiri and he has shown more interest in grooming 
a new generation to take over.
Finally, the chapter considers the challenges that will face Gusmão’s successor 
and argues that while the current preference among the leadership may be for a 
‘consensus’ model of governance, more rather than less democratic competition 
may be the best safeguard of future stability. One challenge will be dealing with 
potential troublemakers, including dissident veterans, gangs and martial arts 
groups, and unemployed youth. A second is reducing the capture of resources 
by the elite that is producing corruption and growing income inequality that 
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itself could become a source of unrest. A third is addressing old social and 
political cleavages that continue to fester. The broadest challenge will be for 
Timor-Leste to find a way to emerge from the bind it is now in: that one man’s 
authority is so widely perceived to have been the guarantor of its stability.
Background: a fractured past
Threats to political stability and security in Timor-Leste during its short 
history as an independent nation have primarily consisted of a series of internal 
challenges to the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. Within a few 
years of independence, whatever cross-border threat still existed disappeared 
as the former militias lost Indonesian support and sanction. Since then, the 
destabilising influences have been domestic, many of them entailing proxy 
battles for political influence played out through efforts to control or influence 
parts of the state’s security sector.
One of the root causes behind this volatility lies in the nature of power and 
influence that developed during the Resistance and how it has been forced to 
change since independence. The battle for independence was often described as 
having been fought on three fronts: the armed front, the clandestine front, and 
the diplomatic front. The latter two included large networks of people active 
outside Timor—either in other parts of Indonesia, where students and civil 
servants carried information in and out of Timor and worked with Indonesian 
pro-democracy movements to strengthen the cause, or outside the region, where 
members of the diaspora elite lobbied for international attention in New York, 
Lisbon, Maputo, Sydney, Melbourne, and elsewhere. The dispersed nature of 
these networks allowed a large number of individuals to develop influence in 
separate forums. Since independence, that dispersed influence has struggled to 
fit back into a half-island country of just 1.1 million people.
At home, members of FALINTIL held highly personalised relationships with 
both their armed subordinates and with members of the clandestine front. 
These were closed networks of different cells. The central command played an 
important role in setting overall strategy and co-ordinating efforts, but, at an 
operational level, the most important relationships were between individual 
fighters and small groups of followers. These relationships created enduring 
loyalties that, since independence, have sometimes undermined efforts at 
institution building (Rees 2004; Hood 2006).
In the early years following independence, a weak security sector provided 
fertile ground for mobilising old divisions. The most serious problem was how 
the 2001 demobilisation of the guerrilla army FALINTIL was handled. Some 
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1,300 ex-combatants were demobilised and enrolled in a reintegration program. 
Gusmão personally selected 650 fighters to be recruited into the first battalion 
of the new armed forces; they have since received a regular salary and greater 
prestige. Meanwhile, the police force—established in 2000 from a mix of 
800 Timorese who had formerly served with the Indonesian police and new 
recruits—struggled in the early years to earn public legitimacy. Those who had 
served the Indonesian government were often seen as complicit in its crimes, 
while the rest struggled to learn policing skills. 
It was out of the demobilised former FALINTIL, and others who were more 
loosely associated with the armed front, that many of Timor-Leste’s dissident 
groups were born. They generally share the following characteristics: 
• They mobilise support largely in isolated rural populations by drawing on 
the personal connections and histories of former FALINTIL members.
• They exhibit a parasitic relationship with rural communities, where they 
collect funds (usually through petty extortion efforts and harassment, and 
sometimes by raising membership fees or selling uniforms).
• They are protean in nature, tending to strengthen and weaken again 
over time. 
• The divisions between different groups are often unclear, which makes 
managing them more complex. 
• They operate outside the political system, in part because they would likely 
fare poorly if they entered mainstream politics.
The largest and most consistently active of these groups is the Conselho Popular 
pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL; Committee 
for the Popular Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste). The group 
was established before independence and has been questioning the legitimacy 
of the state ever since, calling for cancellation of the 2002 constitution 
and the reconstitution of the security forces. Led by ex-FALINTIL fighter, 
Ologari Assuwain, who joined Mauk Moruk in the 1984 leadership challenge, 
it is a mix of a small number of former FALINTIL dissidents and their followers. 
One of its founding patrons was Abílio Araújo—a man who had headed 
the FRETILIN External Delegation in the 1980s from his Lisbon home but 
ultimately switched sides and became one of the Soeharto government’s greatest 
supporters abroad. Since independence, he has been looking for his way back 
into Timorese politics. 
Where these groups have been mobilised to serve the interests of particular 
political masters, the results have been toxic—both for the development of the 
security sector and for stability generally. The first interior minister, Rogério 
Lobato, mobilised various veterans groups onto the streets once it appeared clear 
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he would be passed over for the post of defence minister in the first government 
(Rees 2004: 51ff).2 Having proven his capacity to create unrest, he was appointed 
interior minister, where he set about institutionalising factionalism through the 
creation of special units with conflicting loyalties, and helped sponsor informal 
security groups from outside the police, such as a group called Forças de Base 
de Apoio (Resistance Bases), drawn in part from the informal auxiliary support 
services who had helped FALINTIL.
These brewing tensions came to a head in the 2006 crisis, when a series of 
complex political tensions crystallised to create destructive disorder in and 
around the security forces following the dismissal of 591 members of the army 
known as ‘the petitioners’. The crisis led to the collapse of the police command 
and the death of 31 people, including eight police officers shot by the army. 
Veterans groups such as Colimau 2000 were mobilised as a way of attacking the 
legitimacy of the army; the army responded by calling up and arming former 
FALINTIL members as a reserve force (ISCITL 2006). One legacy of the crisis 
is that while no one would welcome a return to such violence, many of these 
informal groups believe that maintaining their access to arms is the only way of 
thwarting any recurrence.
Tensions within and between the police and the army have largely been kept 
under wraps since the crisis and the experience of the Joint Command, which 
saw the police and army working together to flush out the followers of Alfredo 
Reinado and the remaining faction of the petitioners (Wilson 2009). This is 
largely because of Gusmão’s ability to balance influences within the security 
forces. By merging the defence and security portfolios and naming himself 
minister of defence and security, he was able to stave off fears of politicisation.
Challenges for the security sector
Gusmão’s resignation as prime minister will also likely prompt the resurfacing 
of certain tensions within the security services. His personal authority helped 
dampen tensions within and between the police and the army and reassured a 
broader public that personal rivalries would not be allowed to fester. But while 
playing an important role in restoring stability after the 2006 crisis, seven years 
later the stopgap measure has long been transformed into a significant obstacle 
to institutional development. The long-deferred appointment of a new police 
commissioner will be important if the post-crisis reforms are to mean much in 
the long term. In the army, the appointment of an independent defence minister, 
2  Lobato had served briefly as defence minister in the FRETILIN administration appointed in 1975, but left 
the country days before the Indonesian invasion. He spent most of the occupation in Angola and Mozambique.
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drawn from outside the ranks of FALINTIL, would be an important step towards 
marking the independence of government policy from the influence of the 
former guerrilla army. A key issue for any future defence minister will be how 
to handle the retirement of former FALINTIL still serving in the army.
The police
The leadership of the police force is an issue that has not been fully resolved since 
the force’s chain of command collapsed during the crisis. In April 2009, the then 
prosecutor-general, Longuinhos Monteiro, was appointed police commissioner 
to oversee a two-year transitional period aimed at strengthening the chain of 
command in the police, including implementation of a new policing law that 
focused largely on introducing a paramilitary hierarchy and style of discipline. 
Monteiro, widely seen as a Gusmão loyalist, had few enemies within the force. 
But pressure has always existed for the appointment of a commissioner drawn 
from within the institution’s ranks. In 2011, Monteiro’s term was extended for 
two years because a number of key reforms, such as the introduction of a new 
rank structure, were still ongoing. In 2013, his term was extended again, largely 
because no one from within the institution was seen as a credible replacement. 
The rank reform has produced a clear field of candidates with the requisite rank, 
but the concern seems to be that none of them has the authority to prevent the 
re-emergence of factional tensions.
The reforms that began in 2009 have had a real impact on police professionalism, 
but there are still areas of serious concern. Increased pay, a more coherent 
and extensive rank structure, a greater emphasis on discipline, and improved 
management functions have all contributed to a healthier police institution. 
The problems include a continued reluctance to improve police accountability, 
weak investigations, an over-reliance on large-scale special operations (generally 
featuring military backup), and undisciplined crowd and riot control (ICG 2013). 
There is still a serious need for improvement.
The army
The army looks in better shape in terms of leadership arrangements, having 
already experienced a transfer of command in October 2011. That transition 
followed the resignation of Taur Matan Ruak, who handed over command to 
his deputy, Lere Annan Timor. Lere is widely seen as somewhat rash of temper 
and has not always been viewed as politically impartial (he remains a strong 
FRETILIN supporter). But he is assisted in the job by two well-respected 
subordinates: Filomeno Paixão, his deputy, who is widely seen as having 
improved the military’s administration; and Falur Rate Laek, the chief of staff. 
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Two fundamental challenges loom on the horizon. The first is establishing real 
independent civilian control over defence policy. This cannot be said to fully 
exist until there is a defence minister drawn from outside FALINTIL. In August 
2012, Gusmão proposed Maria Domingas Alves, the former minister of social 
solidarity, as minister of defence and security. She had developed a strong 
reputation for management but had no expertise in the portfolio. She would 
also have been the first woman to hold such a post—something many in the 
defence forces apparently opposed. Ruak formally rejected the nomination. 
A second nominee, the head of the intelligence services, was officially approved 
as minister but never inaugurated; he apparently declined to take up the post 
believing he did not have Gusmão’s real support. 
The second challenge will be retiring the ageing contingent of ex-FALINTIL 
forces who are still serving in the military. The impact of this transition will be 
more political than operational. Many of the first battalion formed in 2001 are 
now older than the statutory age of retirement (55); rates of absenteeism among 
those ranks are understood to be high. Procedurally, their retirement was held 
up pending the establishment of a civil service statute on retirement, and the 
legal basis for their retirement (and pensions) has only been in place since 2013. 
But politically it has also been a sensitive question because it will represent a 
greater severance of the link between FALINTIL and the state. That is likely to 
fuel further demands for attention from not just the FALINTIL veterans but also 
those who have staked their political legitimacy around their ties to veterans. 
This is one reason why having Gusmão move to lead a forum such as a proposed 
veterans council could be a key tool for managing tensions. 
New configurations of political power
If the question of a leadership transition within the security sector remains a 
vexed one, the same is true among the country’s political leadership. One thing 
is clear: if Gusmão resigns this year, his successor will not be from the small 
circle of leaders known in Timor-Leste as the ’75 Generation.  
The political path to transition has already been opened by a rapprochement in 
early 2013 between Gusmão and his old foe Mari Alkatiri. In February 2013, 
the two men—whose parties together control 55 of 65 seats in parliament—
announced what they called ‘a new political arrangement’, in which FRETILIN, 
the sole party in opposition, would play a constructive role on issues of national 
interest in exchange for a greater role in decision-making. It is likely that the 
move also involved a consensus on stepping back from leading political roles. 
It is impossible to imagine Gusmão stepping down if he believed Alkatiri would 
make another bid for leadership in 2017. 
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If both men step down, a real transfer of political power from the old guard to a 
younger generation is possible. But it will likely involve a managed transition—
first to a Gusmão protégé to serve out his remaining term, and then to a consensus 
candidate who many believe will be Taur Matan Ruak. 
The old guard
Xanana Gusmão, now 68, and Mari Alkatiri, 64, are the foremost representatives 
of the ’75 Generation—shorthand for the elite that has thus far dominated 
Timorese politics. After serving as president for five years (2002–07), Gusmão 
set up CNRT as a vehicle for replacing Alkatiri as prime minister. It is a 
presidentialist party—established and held together largely as a vehicle for 
Gusmão—in a parliamentary system. Alkatiri returned in 1999 from exile in 
Angola and Mozambique, became Secretary-General of FRETILIN—which 
he had helped found in 1975—and served as the first prime minister from 
May 2002 until June 2006, when he was forced to step down in the wake of the 
2006 crisis. Alkatiri is Secretary-General of the party while Francisco ‘Lu Olo’ 
Guterres, a former FALINTIL commander who served largely in non-combat 
roles, is the party president. José Ramos-Horta, 64, the former president, and 
Mário Carrascalão, 77, who was governor of Indonesian East Timor from 1983 
until 1992, and served briefly as a vice-prime minister from 2009 to 2010, round 
out the group but have been largely marginalised in recent years following 
disappointing showings in the 2012 elections.
Discussion of how and when a transition of political power will take place has 
never been cast as a decision for voters. Instead, it has been framed as an issue 
for the older generation to determine the ‘readiness’ of their juniors.
That determination has not been forthcoming, as none has shown much interest 
in handing over power. A process known as the Maubisse Forum, which began 
in 2010 with the sponsorship of the Catholic Church, was nominally aimed at 
discussing the preparation of younger leaders in advance of the 2012 elections. 
Gusmão, Alkatiri, Lu Olo, Ramos-Horta, and Carrascalão all attended, as did Taur 
Matan Ruak. It produced few results; an expanded meeting the following year 
(Maubisse II) pledged only to work towards a peaceful election, with Gusmão 
suggesting that the younger generation still lacked the authority to lead. 
Political parties have not proven effective avenues for the advancement of 
younger leaders. FRETILIN is widely considered to have the broadest cast of 
younger, charismatic leaders, many of whom have their own support bases 
and experience serving as ministers in the first government. But despite their 
lobbying, there has been little serious discussion of leadership change at party 
level—a 2011 internal leadership vote was contested only by the incumbents. 
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CNRT has few obvious potential successors as party chief; the party has staked 
its electoral appeal so much on the figure of Gusmão himself, and has drawn 
support from such a disparate range of groups that there are real questions 
about whether it will survive Gusmão’s resignation.
Where younger politicians have risen to important positions, they have 
struggled to obtain real influence. Partido Democrático (Democratic Party) was 
formed in 2001 in large part to meet the political aspirations of former student 
activists. Since 2007, the party has tried to get its leader, Fernando ‘Lasama’ de 
Araújo, elected as either president or prime minister, but it has been weakened 
by internal leadership disputes. After Lasama’s failure to make it into the second 
round of presidential polls in April 2012, the party nearly fell apart: his own 
camp favoured an alliance with FRETILIN and supported Lu Olo in the second 
round, while others, led by party secretary-general Mariano Sabino, defended 
an alliance with CNRT. After the election, Partido Democrático entered into 
coalition with CNRT, and Lasama was appointed vice-prime minister. The role 
has turned out to be largely ceremonial.
The next government
If Gusmão resigns before the 2017 elections, he will choose his own successor. 
There is no discussion of calling new elections. Under the constitution, the 
president appoints a person selected by the parties with representation in 
parliament. FRETILIN—the only other party that could form a coalition 
government—has made clear that it will not seek to challenge CNRT’s 
‘prerogative’, as the party with the most seats (Tempo Semanal 2014). Many 
Timorese commentators have taken to framing the question as who will receive 
Gusmão’s blessing.
This means the next prime minister is most likely to come from within CNRT. 
There are three leading figures within the party, none of whom has a strong 
political base independent of Gusmão—one reason why there are questions 
surrounding the longevity of the party following his retirement. Agio Pereira, 
the current Minister of State and long-time trusted adviser of Gusmão, is widely 
considered the forerunner. The other two are Dionísio Babo Soares, the current 
Minister of Justice and Secretary-General of the party, and Bendito Freitas, the 
current Minister of Education.
There is, nevertheless, a chance that CNRT could choose to put forward a 
candidate from outside the party if it were to go into coalition with FRETILIN. 
The three figures most frequently cited are Rui de Araújo, minister of health 
in the first post-independence government; Lasama, Partido Democrático 
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President; and Estanislau da Silva, the FRETILIN member of parliament who 
served briefly as prime minister in 2007 after then Prime Minister Ramos-Horta 
left office to serve as president.
None of these potential replacements—with the possible exception of Rui 
Araújo—would herald a real political transition because they do not wield 
authority independent of Gusmão and are thus unlikely to be re-elected. 
Prospects for more lasting change exist following new elections in 2017. 
Taur  Matan Ruak, now President, is the leading contender, although not 
everyone is convinced he will run. Ruak, who is from Baguia in eastern Baucau 
subdistrict, was the last FALINTIL senior commander from 1998 to 2001. He then 
served as Timor-Leste’s first armed forces chief from 2001 until his resignation in 
September 2011 to run for the presidency. He originally struggled to win over 
voters in the west, but in the second round of the election he beat Lu Olo in 
every district except Baucau and Viqueque—winning 61 per cent of the overall 
vote. 
Many of Ruak’s supporters saw his transition from the military to the presidency 
as a natural step toward becoming prime minister. His popularity has likely 
increased since the election. He has made extensive trips to rural communities 
across the country, promising to act on their concerns in the capital, and 
positioned himself as the leading constructive critic of government. He has also 
invested in a core staff of younger advisers who have breathed some new life 
into the once stuffy presidential staff, indicating he may be more interested in 
developing future leaders than many of his older counterparts. 
If he runs in 2017, Ruak will have to either join an existing party or create his 
own to enter government. One option would be for him to join CNRT, where he 
would likely be welcome given that there is no one else strong enough to lead it 
into an election without Gusmão. He is far less likely to join FRETILIN, but he 
has generally maintained good relations with the party. 
If he establishes a new party, it is likely to draw a considerable number of voters 
away from existing parties, particularly CNRT (if this happens, the party is 
unlikely to survive Gusmão’s retirement). In any case, he is likely to continue to 
both attract young voters and promote younger people for party and legislative 
positions.
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Challenges for a successor
Gusmão’s successor will face an array of potential security problems, from 
challenges by armed groups to economic discontent to a possible deepening 
of old social and political cleavages. None will be new; the difference is that 
Gusmão will not be in a position to address them. 
The main security threats will still be internal. The dissident ex-FALINTIL 
members and aggrieved veterans have not gone away. Some veterans of the 
Resistance (a broadly defined constituency) believe they are entitled to a nearly 
endless stream of benefits, including state pensions, scholarships for their 
children, preferential access to state contracts, health care abroad and more. 
It will be in the interest of future governments to decrease these benefits that 
may have peaked in 2012 at US$109.7 million (or 9 per cent of actual annual state 
expenditures) but remain a heavy burden on the state.3 Ruak has become an 
outspoken critic of the veterans’ sense of entitlement and of the poor execution 
of many small infrastructure projects that they have won through preferential 
treatment in securing government contracts. Limiting the benefits provided to 
them, though, will be politically difficult and could cause the kind of mini-
rebellion that Mauk Moruk tried to provoke. 
A younger generation of spoilers that came to prominence in the 2006 crisis may 
play a bigger role in the future. It includes a diverse range of army deserters, 
martial arts groups, and gangs, many of whose members had either joined or 
co-operated with FALINTIL, in roles such as estafeta (messenger) during the last 
years of the Resistance. They have few political objectives of their own but can 
be mobilised to support the interests of others. Gusmão’s response to the crisis, 
which saw figures who had played leading roles in the crisis awarded lucrative 
government contracts, has also arguably established a perverse incentive for 
causing future trouble. 
Timor-Leste’s unemployed youth could also be a source of unrest, particularly 
in a country where nearly 70 per cent of the population is under 30, have 
limited engagement with the political system established by their elders, and 
see a small elite benefiting from government contracts and public expenditures 
projects. Some 95 per cent of the country’s revenue is built on oil and gas 
receipts; a Petroleum Fund established to maximise these earnings has grown 
to over US$16 billion. The elite that decides how to spend this wealth is small: 
the finance minister and the natural resources minister are siblings, for example. 
3  However, see Magalhães in this collection.
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Wealth distribution remains markedly uneven, particularly between rural areas 
and Dili, and is likely growing worse, given that so much of government spending 
(which makes up the bulk of the non-oil economy) is centred in the capital. 
Several old political cleavages that Gusmão succeeded in papering over could also 
re-emerge. The most important is the old division between former supporters 
of integration and independence. A significant portion of Gusmão’s first and 
second cabinets were drawn from those who in 1999 had supported continued 
integration with Indonesia—a strategy that both promoted reconciliation 
with Indonesia and helped sponsor a boom in investment and construction 
activities by Indonesian firms. Some Timorese, however, resent that those who 
once opposed independence are now reaping its benefits. This sentiment is 
particularly pronounced among members of the army.
A second potential cleavage concerns the favoured position of Portuguese-
Timorese mestiços (mixed race). A significant portion of Timor-Leste’s small 
political elite is of mixed descent—many born from Portuguese deportados sent 
to its farthest colonial outpost as punishment. Many took part in the Resistance 
from their exile abroad. No party has publicly tried to mobilise support around 
the issue, but many admit that quiet resentment exists and that it could grow 
in the future, particularly if it becomes a proxy for resentment along class lines. 
Conclusion
One way or another, the illustrious political career of Xanana Gusmão is drawing 
to a close. If he does not step down as announced at the end of the year, at 
the very least it looks clear that he will not run again in 2017. He is one of 
the few guerrilla leaders who made a successful transition to political leader, 
and he has been a huge force for stability. Now the reins need to be passed 
to a new generation. It will not be easy for the country’s weak institutions to 
adapt to a less personalised system of governance, but they will never have the 
opportunity to develop as long as it remains in place.
The security challenges are daunting, and professionalisation of the security 
forces remains a work in progress, and needs to be a top priority of a successor. 
But Gusmão’s departure, whenever it takes place, and the replacement of the 
’75 Generation by younger cadres, should help expand the political elite and 
make the country less prone to political problems rooted in the feuds and 
rivalries of the distant past.
The consensus between Gusmão and Mari Alkatiri, if it lasts, is a prerequisite for 
a workable transition. But it should not come at the expense of open competition 
between and within the parties—the one pressure most likely to produce a new 
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crop of leaders. The end goal should be a political system that accommodates 
many voices, grants no special favours to particular groups, including veterans, 
and does a better job of distributing benefits beyond Dili.
Postscript 
On 9 February 2015, more than a year after he publicly announced his intention 
to resign before the end of his term, Xanana Gusmão stepped down as prime 
minister. What followed was a negotiated transition of power—just one week 
later, Rui de Araújo (named by Gusmão in his resignation letter) took over 
as prime minister, with a slimmed-down cabinet of 34 members. Four others 
named as possible successors in this essay—leading CNRT figures Agio Pereira 
and Dionisio Babo, Estanislau da Silva from FRETILIN, and Fernando Lasama 
de Araújo from Partido Democrático—each took on senior roles as ministers of 
state. The Ministry of Defence and Security was divided into two, with former 
police commander Longuinhos Monteiro taking over the Ministry of Interior 
and Cirilo Cristovão the Ministry of Defence. Gusmão himself took on the post 
of Minister of Planning and Strategic Investment. Araújo’s appointment marks 
an important step in the transition of political power to a younger generation, 
but the extent to which his tenure leads to a more lasting transformation in 
Timorese politics will depend in part on how much informal authority Gusmão 
is willing to cede.
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CHAPTER 11




The social and political turmoil across 2006 to 2008, commonly known as the 
‘crisis’, reverberated through Dili and Timor-Leste, resulting in many deaths 
and injury, widespread material destruction, and massive internal displacement. 
With the first fractures emerging from within the newly formed state, an initial 
split in the military led in turn to a splintering across the security sector, resulting 
in a massacre of police by the military, attacks on the homes of military leaders 
and bases, and the arming by ministers of para-militaries and the involvement 
of parliamentarians in fuelling violence. Rather than being a site of mediation 
for social conflict, the new state had become a major source of insecurity and 
societal violence. 
Among all the peace-building efforts throughout the crisis, it was striking that 
one state-led response was a customary-like ceremony held in front of the Palácio 
do Governo (The Government Palace) in December 2006. A generic uma lulik 
(sacred house) was built,1 and lia na’in (‘the owners of the word’ as interpreters 
of regulation) from different districts were called upon to enact a sorumutu 
(a ceremonial discussion) to create a binding resolution. Most of the senior 
political leadership of the country—including those in bitter conflict with one 
1  The building constructed for the sorumutu did not represent any one style; styles vary markedly over the 
territory.
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another—sat together. A nahe biti2 was enacted and there was a sprinkling of 
coconut juice on a flagpole as a symbol of life.3 Despite all these elements (or 
because of them), the event itself had a bizarre quality to it. While attended by 
the political elite, there appeared very little public engagement and no sense 
of an outcome, let alone any kind of binding compact between parties. Despite 
being an event for peace, there was a need for heavily armed security to be 
present. Moreover, practices important to custom, such as the killing of pigs, 
needed to be undertaken off-site or substituted for acts that did not offend 
foreign sensibilities (Braithwaite et al. 2012: 225–28). 
The value of reflecting on the event here, then, is not so much directly in terms 
of what it contributed to peace in and of itself. Rather, the interest here is much 
more in terms of how this sorumutu demonstrated recognition by those at the 
centre of modern governance that customary social life provided one avenue 
to shore up the legitimacy of the state. That the event could be seen as ‘elite 
capture’ of customary practices still in effect showed a recognition for how 
important such aspects of social life are to East Timorese society, and, in this 
sense, serves in this essay as a kind of metaphorical framing for thinking on the 
challenges of governance and security in a post-conflict and postcolonial state. 
On the question of stability, then, this article puts forward two propositions. 
The first argument is, perhaps, the more subtle of the two and is made across the 
chapter as a whole: Timor-Leste security and stability tends to be reproduced or 
fractured across distinctive patterns of social life, and that modern systems of 
governance (which are typically seen as central to the reproduction of security) 
do not exist in some kind of ‘perfect isolation’ from other forms of social 
regulation and power. 
The second argument is one of analytical frameworks: hybridity has some value 
when helping adjust analysis for societies who encompass distinctly different 
sets of social practices (for instance, the customary). However, the constituent 
parts of the hybrid need to be theorised in order to ensure sound analysis. In 
doing so, we start to see, for instance, how a hybrid order might become multi-
layered rather than implicitly based around two distinct binaries, as is often the 
case. 
In making these two general arguments, there are three sections to this 
chapter. The first briefly considers the ways in which politics in Timor-Leste is 
frequently represented as if it is essentially modern in form, rather than taking 
into consideration a broader definition of politics that encompasses customary 
2  ‘The stretching or laying down of the mat as a means to facilitate consensus, or reconciliation’ (Babo-Soares 
2004: 21).
3  Interview with one of the organisers of the Sorumutu, Dili, 2006.
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and traditional systems of power. While there has been increased recognition of 
the importance of the customary, too often modernity is seen as the exclusive 
domain for what constitutes politics.
The second section in this chapter argues the value of a term such as ‘hybrid 
political order’ as a way of recognising social practices; it means what might 
otherwise be regarded as ‘ungoverned spaces’ and drawn into political analysis. 
These spaces involve different patterns of social regulation, power and authority, 
as well as playing a vitally important role in terms of the overall sustainability 
of the polity per se (a polity being taken as the broader political community 
comprised of different social practices). Here, I argue how the constituent 
parts of the hybrid political order can be theorised; one way of doing so is 
through the use of ontological categories including the customary, traditional, 
modern and postmodern.4 Briefly, what is meant by ontology here is the ‘nature 
of being’, of how we understand the world around us in ways that are often 
based on such deeply grounded assumptions that it can be very challenging 
to think reflexively about them (time and space for instance). For the moment, 
though, it is important to note that ontologies are treated as textual devices for 
analysis—and a product of my own modernity—which, nevertheless, help to 
understand the relationship between different kinds of practice and meaning-
generation. 
Building on the prior two sections, the final section of this chapter details what 
is meant by different ontological categories within my suggested hybrid order 
model order, and brings the chapter back to why these are important to how 
we understand questions of governance and security. Such considerations are 
important, not least because 12 years after formal independence and in the wake 
of massive efforts to modernise Timor-Leste via local and international efforts, 
the customary and the traditional remain vital to the social fabric of daily life 
for many East Timorese. This is not just as a point for academic understanding, 
4  This schema is referred to as ‘constitutive abstraction’ and has been developed particularly by Paul 
James. See both James, P. 1996. Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community. London: Sage; 
and James 2006. Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In, London: Sage. In relation to 
Timor-Leste, this schema has been applied to understanding the post-independence period in Timor-Leste 
by Damian Grenfell, see Grenfell, D. and P. James (eds) 2008. Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence: Beyond 
Savage Globalization? Abingdon: Routledge. One of the challenges of this schema comes with the actual 
names of its categories. I have used ‘customary’ here rather than ‘tribal’ for instance—the problem being 
that while the ‘customary’ perhaps suggests a narrower domain, the term ‘tribal’ has been used in such a 
pejorative fashion that to employ it here risks distracting from what is actually being argued. Equally, the 
term ‘traditional’ can add a layer of confusion, as it is certainly not referring to ‘traditional culture’ as it might 
often be used elsewhere. The problem, though, in naming these categories is that the ‘modern’ is the most 
accurate, as the term is a product of itself, whereas modernist attempts (such as this one) to name non-modern 
categories of social being will seem to inevitably jar.
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but has relevance to the formation and implementation of modern legal services, 
democratic forms of governance, as well as administrative systems across various 
levels of society, resource management, policing, gender programs, and so forth. 
Figure 11.1 Sorumutu, Dili, 2006.
Source: Damian Grenfell .
‘Seeing the modern’ in Timor-Leste
From afar, it is easy to conflate the appearance of a country as it is represented 
on a map with thinking about what life must be like on the ground. As is the 
norm, Timor-Leste is given a distinct territorial form, a capital, and population. 
Districts are presented as sub-territories of the national whole, with roads, 
mountains and place names playing to the same sense of territorial integrity. 
In  CIA Fact Books, Wikipedia and elsewhere, Timor-Leste is categorised 
in all kinds of ways, including as a democratic country with a constitution, 
parliament, periodic elections, and a citizenship. For all intents and purposes, 
Timor-Leste is portrayed only as a modern nation and polity. 
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This ‘seeing the modern’ is, to an extent, understandable from a distance. 
It  continues to occur often within Timor-Leste, however, as analysis is made 
in many different guises (academics, non-government organisations (NGOs), 
industry and business, government, aid agencies, and so on). In doing so, it is as 
if an idealised vision of what people think the country should be is presented 
as if it is already the reality—an imaginary that is brought to life by rendering 
large parts of social life either negatively, or, almost more powerfully, simply 
beyond consideration.
To take one example from the most recent elections, the International Republican 
Institute’s (IRI) report Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections—July 7, 2012, 
covers all the points that one may immediately expect of an election analysis: 
the objectives of the mission, background, summary of electoral systems, 
political parties, brief histories, and so forth. On the surface, it all appears fairly 
innocuous. However, implicitly, the report not only treats politics as narrowly 
confined to a particular version of modern political systems (constitutional 
democracy), but there is no sense of how politics outside that system has any 
significance, even in terms of how they impact on the elections. We are told 
that ‘Timor-Leste is a representative democracy with both the president and 
parliament directly elected by Timorese citizens’ as if that is the full extent of 
political life (IRI 2013: 13). Measuring the elections against a preconceived form 
of what democracy should look like, the stated purpose of the study was ‘to 
identify problems, potential issues and areas where efficiency gains could be 
made to strengthen Timor-Leste’s elections framework’ (IRI 2013: 7). 
Approaches such as this do not recognise the fuller context in which state-
building occurs, with one key concern being the potential consequences of 
measuring democracy via one idealised framework that fails to take into account 
the diversity of how politics is actually enacted locally. One example from 
another report by the European Union on the same elections demonstrates such 
potential limitations: 
The voter register appears to be over-inclusive, especially after the latest updating 
conducted just before the parliamentary election, and is only sporadically 
cleansed of deceased people. However, the electoral administration, as well as the 
political parties and other stakeholders, were comfortable with the inclusiveness 
of the registration process and did not seem to view the surprisingly large 
increase in the voting population with concern (EUEOM 2012: 4). 
In the first instance, such reports give little sense of the social context for how 
such decisions might be made. In the report there is a concern that a list does 
not match reality, and while the ‘surprise’ might suggest a veiled criticism that 
a voter registration list had not been ‘cleansed of deceased people’, it actually 
shows little sense of why this might be the case. Studies from back in 2002 
have shown the importance of ancestors in shaping both leadership in local 
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communities and the potential flow-on effects of engagement with national 
politics (Hohe 2002: 74), as well as on the voting patterns of the living (Toome et 
al. 2012: 32–33). It is possible that, in some instances at least, the deceased are 
expunged only reluctantly, and, in time, from such bureaucratic lists out of 
respect for how matebian sira (souls of the dead) remain central to the lives 
of the living, and also out of fear of reprisal should the ancestors not be given 
suitable recognition (Grenfell 2012: 95). Perhaps if there were these kinds of 
considerations, the nature of the implied critiques may well change. 
This chapter does not argue against such a portrayal as found in the above reports 
per se, as there were, of course, elections, and it could be seen as important to 
measure their success or otherwise within the frameworks from which such 
systems of governance are conceived. What is being argued, however, is against 
the way politics is presented as if it is essentially modern, and that practices that 
do not fit the domain of political contestation by political parties are somehow 
beyond consideration, even where they reverberate upon the broader ability to 
influence state-building or the political process. 
As has been increasingly noted across a range of literature, customary practices 
remain vitally important when considering the broader condition of Timor-Leste 
as a ‘polity’, even with more than a decade of state-building in the territory. 
For example, the intersection between state and local governance (Cummins 
2010; Gusmão 2012; dos Santos and da Silva 2012; Tilman 2012), conflict 
resolution (McWilliam 2007), the practices of memorialisation (Kent 2011) and 
reconciliation (Larke 2009), management of natural resources (Palmer 2012), 
and development practices (Carroll-Bell 2015) all demonstrate the traction that 
customary life-worlds have.5 
An important next step then is to develop an analytical framework that ensures 
that not only is the customary not written out of political consideration, but 
helps us to understand how these different ontological formations intersect and 
interweave in ways that rebound on how something such as how systems of 
modern governance or security can be sustained or undermined. 
5 This term is originally inspired by Habermas in the sense of shared cultural domains and sets of basic 
assumptions about the world around us. Pointing to the underpinning dimensions of social life that are in 
a lived sense taken for granted as ‘reality’, the concept here is similar to Bourdieu’s concept of Habitus, the 
notion of enduring schema within which practice is situated and socially made sense of.  
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A hybrid political order
The term ‘hybridity’ is regularly used in research on conflict and peace, 
especially in discussions on state-building and security in postcolonial and 
post-conflict societies (MacGinty 2011; Richmond 2011; Wallis 2012). The term 
has often been used to identify situations where patterns of governance coexist, 
inform, contest and intersect with attempts to build a new state, typically with 
a strong external-international dimension, as discussed below:
These processes of mutual diffusion lead to a situation of a contradictory and 
dialectic co-existence of forms of socio-political organization that have their 
roots in both non-state indigenous societal structures and introduced state 
structures—hybrid political orders. In hybrid political orders, diverse and 
competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power 
co-exist, overlap, interact, and intertwine, combining elements of introduced 
Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous 
traditions of governance and politics … In this environment, the ‘state’ has no 
privileged monopolistic position as the only agency providing security, welfare, 
and representation; it has to share authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other 
institutions (Boege et al. 2009: 17). 
In the case of Timor-Leste, I will use the term ‘customary’ rather than indigenous, 
and ‘modern’ in place of ‘introduced state-structures’, so as to begin categorising 
such social relations in ontological terms. Nevertheless, this quote captures well 
the key aspects of what is meant here by a ‘hybrid political order’, particularly 
that the relationship between ontologies can be marked by sustainable unison, 
adaptation, as well as contestation. As such, a ‘hybrid political order’ is a 
way of speaking on particular polities that comprise differentiated patterns of 
governance where no one form is clearly in dominance, and assists in correcting 
the analytical blindness that can occur when sites of conflict are, for instance, 
rendered ‘ungoverned’. As Mallet argues: 
an appreciation of hybrid political orders provides us with a way of: transcending 
the reductive failed states and ungoverned spaces discourses which so frame 
much of international politics; locating the often multiple and sometimes 
invisible governance mechanisms present in post-conflict or ‘ungoverned’ areas; 
and understanding their place and role within the broader political community 
(Mallett 2010: 74).
As discussed, various pieces of research have shown, firstly, the importance 
of the customary to sociality in Timor-Leste, and, secondly, how different life-
worlds sit in relation to each other. This capturing of difference is perhaps less 
common in policymaking, though can still surface in debates on law as outlined 
in the following quote referring to the utility of the Law Against Domestic 
Violence passed by parliament in 2010. 
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The current law prohibits customary justice processes from supplanting state 
justice in resolving domestic violence cases; however, given its prominence in 
Timorese society, it is a necessary component of a strategy to combat domestic 
violence. Thus, it is crucial to establish and regulate links between state justice 
and customary justice systems. While customary justice has weaknesses in the 
area of domestic violence, it has a role to play if appropriate mechanisms are put 
into place. A clear and legally established link between the customary justice 
and formal justice systems would serve to reduce confusion and increase the 
legitimacy of formal decisions while respecting and reflecting important elements 
of the Timorese cultural identity (UNDPJSP 2013: viii).
Here, policymakers are being urged to find ways in which two different life-
worlds can be brought together to negotiate a complex and pressing social 
problem. The customary and the modern (‘state-law’) are being called on 
to intersect in a way that sustains a process larger than either part, and, in 
doing so, represents what we are referring to here as a ‘hybrid political order’. 
Some people use ‘multiple realities’ as a way of acknowledging a simultaneous 
co-presence of different ways of being (Cummins 2012: 110). Others refer to 
‘entanglement’ so as to speak to ‘the co-existence of fundamentally different 
socio-political cultures and logics of governance’ (Brown 2012: 54). Here, the 
concept of hybridity—and more particularly a ‘hybrid political order’—will be 
drawn upon not dissimilarly, but in a way that allows for a consideration of the 
condition of the broader polity rather than the more subjective views of people 
whose lives sit at the intersection of different life-worlds.
To do so, there needs to be considerable care, as terms such as ‘hybridity’ can 
be used as labels that result in either concealing more than what they reveal, or 
worse, in subtle ways inadvertently diminishing the importance and relevance 
of certain sets of social practices (Grenfell 2014). The use of ‘hybridity’ here is 
not necessarily suggesting a syncretic relationship—as in where something new 
is formed through the amalgamation of two or more existing practices—but 
rather the holding together of multiple life-worlds or ontological formations in 
ways that in their sum inform the character of a political community. While it 
is acknowledged that any society is hybrid in the sense of something generated 
over time from multiple sources of knowledge and practice, in Timor-Leste it 
is difficult to identify a dominant life-world within that polity. What remains, 
however, is a need to be explicit in terms of how we approach the composite 
parts of such a hybrid order, how they sit in relation to one another, and how 
such an approach can help us to think about the broader polity. 
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Social differences and political change
In thinking about what comprises a hybrid order, it is possible that the 
composite parts could be framed at different levels of analytical abstraction. 
For instance, at a less abstract level it is possible to draw the practice of tara 
bandu (lit. hanging the law) and NGO peace-building efforts into a form of hybrid 
relationship (Belun 2013), or the way that different marriage practices are drawn 
together as part of ceremonial acts (da Silva 2010; Hicks 2012). The emphasis in 
this article, however, is on establishing a broader model for analysis; it is argued 
that it is also possible to work at a more abstract level of ontology to frame how 
we speak of what it is being hybridised. 
Briefly, to again give a sense of what I mean by ontology, the term refers to the 
more basic foundations for how we live. Articles on Timor-Leste are often filled 
with terms such as ‘customary’, ‘modern’, ‘traditional’ and the like, but if any 
definitional work is done on them, it tends to only be at the level of practice 
and often only through empirical explanation. In the process of theorising these 
ontologies, the customary or the modern are elements of the human condition 
present in any society, and there are at least four different broad ontological 
formations that provide a starting place for thinking here: the customary, 
traditional, modern and postmodern. When treated as analytical categories, 
each has a distinctive way of comprehending time, space, knowledge and 
embodiment, and are manifest in practices that are different across exchange, 
production, communication and organisation. These are analytical categories 
that help re-engagement with the subject—intellectual devices rather than 
reified categories. 
A key point of difference between each of these categories—customary, 
traditional, modern and postmodern—is the level of abstraction in terms of 
social integration. No society comprises any one of these social formations, but 
it is possible to speak about some societies where one ontological formation is 
dominant. Timor-Leste is far more ontologically uneven, in that it is more difficult 
to identify a clearly dominant life-world, hence the relevance of approaching it 
as a ‘hybrid political order’. 
To briefly outline the various ontological formations, the modern is taken to 
be a pattern of social integration demarcated by levels of social abstraction 
where people are integrated in ways that are highly disembodied (the opposite 
being face-to-face/embodied extended forms of social integration). All forms of 
sociality have elements of abstraction to them, as noted by Benedict Anderson 
at the start of his celebrated treatise on nations. Thus, the argument here is that 
the modern is distinguished by the way people are held in relation to each other 
across time and space (to use Anderson’s language, the creation of ‘imagined 
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communities’). In this regard, the modern is pivotal to the nation, as it is these 
abstracted means that allow for a commonality to be felt, and for a citizenry to 
emerge with some sense of connection to one another. 
Attempts to modernise Timor-Leste did not only begin in 1999, but it is the 
extraordinary efforts since that time that are of interest here. As I have said 
elsewhere (Grenfell 2012), these efforts can be characterised as a lifting of sociality 
into a modern pattern of social integration in order to sustain the formation of 
Timor-Leste as a nation. So many of the development projects, infrastructure 
programs (roads, energy, telecommunications), governance systems, capacity 
building, and literacy efforts, have been named as part of nation-building and 
economic advancement, and are driven by the quest for re-calibrating social 
relations in order to achieve a sustainable modernity. 
If we take one mode of practice within a modern ontology, such as organisation, 
then it is possible, for example, to reflect on state-building practices in the East 
Timorese context. Under this category, authority is based in constitutions and 
laws. A prime minister can be removed and a president overthrown. Authority 
is claimed via the secular and the scientific (rather than the mythological or 
cosmological) and, in turn, authority tends increasingly to be located via those 
who can claim a particular expertise; bureaucrats, politicians, NGO directors, 
and even academics become part of a knowledge elite who claim authority 
based on logic and competency, rather than familial connections or relationship 
to faith. Again, this is an analytical category, and does not mean, for instance, 
that the authority of a politician or an NGO director is informed purely at the 
level of the modern. 
The desire for modernity is not just the assumed ontological basis for the 
acts of many aid agencies and NGOs that have occupied Timor-Leste since 
independence. For many East Timorese, modernity can be seen as the tangible 
expression of sovereignty following a war for independence. As such, it is 
important not to think in terms of the modern as ‘outside’, and the customary 
as ‘inside’, but rather of a far more complex and staggered set of ontological 
relations that sit in hybrid relation with one another.6 
The customary is taken as an ontological formation where both subjectively 
and objectively, social life is framed far more by what we refer to as the face-
to-face or ‘embodied extended’ relations. Social organisation is primarily 
based in genealogical or affinal ties, where ‘kin’ is a foundational point for 
identity and determines one’s place in society (McWilliam 2005). Modes of 
6  In fact, if a modernity was not a significant layer of social life at the time of the Portuguese withdrawal 
in the early 1970s, it is hard to imagine how a nationalist movement may have succeeded against such 
extraordinary odds. 
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communication emphasise the oral (the traditional and the modern moves to 
print for example), and authority is significantly determined by genealogical 
relations. Epistemologically, the customary tends to be underpinned by a 
mythological sense of origin or destiny specific to a grouping of people (destiny 
shifts in the modern, for instance, to that of the citizenry and the ‘birth’ and 
fate of the nation), and the spirit and the human world are often taken to be in 
coterminous relation.
In terms of Timor-Leste, lulik (sacred) and lisan or adat (custom including the laws 
that govern the spiritual), or leaders such as lia na’in are typical manifestations 
within a customary ontology, especially in their exclusive application to specific 
groups and in the connections between the world of the spirits and the living 
(Marriot 2009: 160). One reason why we can talk about the unevenness of social 
formations in Timor-Leste is that while some aspects of daily life only hold 
residually to customary modes of exchange and production (for instance wage 
labour in urban centres), in a political and ethical sense, the role of lulik and 
lisan remains strong. As recognised in the quote on domestic violence above, 
in many instances customary authority has far greater traction over regulating 
society than modern forms of authority.
In terms of a hybrid political order, we can then return to the sorumutu discussed 
at the outset. The conference at which this essay was presented acts as a reminder 
for how the emergent modern state in Timor-Leste remains dependent on 
alternative ontological formations. It was telling how, at a point of crisis, there 
was a perceived need to draw on customary forms of leadership (such as the lia 
na’in), lulik practices (the spilling of coconut juice), and through the symbols 
such as the symbolic use of the chicken, rooster and horns on the roof top of 
the constructed house). There are many things that could be discussed here, 
including whether these acts remain customary in such a context. Nevertheless, 
for the purposes of this essay, what is important is how the state—at a point 
of crisis—sought to undertake such an act, at least in part as a process of 
re-legitimising the modern systems of governance. The cultural authority of 
the sorumutu was not only used as part of a way to resolve the intense political 
competition at the elite level, but also had a nationalising effect at a moment 
where there was enough concern for the nation’s future that the slogan ‘Timor 
ida deit’ (there is just one Timor) became a state-sanctioned mantra. 
However, sitting in the background of the uma lulik, and on top of the Palácio 
do Governo, were a Christmas tree and star, marking the forthcoming December 
festivities. The sorumutu ceremony itself included priests as the Catholic authority. 
Albeit briefly articulated here, this suggests a third ontological formation of 
relevance when thinking on a ‘hybrid political order’, referred to here as the 
‘traditional’. In terms of the abstraction of social relations, the ‘traditional’ 
speaks to patterns of social integration that are at once more abstracted than 
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the customary, binding people into broader communities via a cosmological 
order (rather than a secular one as per modernity, or a mythological one as 
tends to occur in customary society). For instance, authority structures within 
a traditional ontology tend to be removed from genealogy; the authority of the 
priest is underpinned by a relationship with a God rather than to ancestors. 
Hence, and unlike a lia na’in, he can be placed into a community from which he 
has no familial connection (though, and importantly, he is still called ‘father’). 
Epistemologically, and keeping to the relevant example of Catholicism, there 
is a move from the customary specificity of mythological origin and destiny to 
a cosmologically based universality of humanity. There is a common fate, and 
origin and destiny are universalised, even for those who are yet to realise it. 
In this context, the figure of Christ on a globe reaching out to all of humanity, 
as it does in front of the Motael Church in Dili, is an impossible claim within 
customary society, and equally appears an anachronism within modernity 
(though the universalism remains sans faith).7
While the point can be made that the Catholic Church is imbued with modernity, 
and many of the ways in which it has come to organise reflects that, as manifest 
in aspects of its institutional formation, interventions into community, economic 
structures and so on. And obviously, even the practices of the most devout 
Catholics move across different life-worlds. However, at the core of Catholic 
practice is a belief in God, which is neither customary nor modern in form, 
and, in turn, is the way in which authority is ultimately prescribed within the 
Church. The Catholic Church is a tangible example of what is classified here 
as part of a broader traditional ontology, and as a more abstracted mode of 
organisation than is typical in customary society. 
The argument here, then, is that in Timor-Leste, the hybrid political order is 
not one based in and around a dichotomised or binary relationship between the 
customary and the modern, but can actually be analysed around at least three 
social formations (with the possibility of a postmodern ontology emerging in 
the consumer-citizenry of Dili and migrants to the capital). Moreover, not only 
are these not pristine and unchanging categories in and of themselves, but there 
is a tendency towards the ontological forms drawing each other into a process 
of reinterpretation and layering (Bovensiepen 2014; Traube 2007). This leads 
7  And thus hybridity spans different ontologies, something that we can see in a range or writings 
including that by McGregor et al. (2012: 1134) when they write that ‘Catholic symbols that were placed in 
sacred spaces, or lulik, in an attempt to dispel local beliefs, have been reappropriated to signify the strength 
of the lulik. Similarly, open-air masses and prayer meetings came to be held on sites of importance to animist 
belief, such as the 1993 mass on Mount Matebian.’ However, given the shortness of space, the concern I have 
here is that I am creating the sense too strongly that the Catholicism and ‘the traditional’ are the same thing. 
Rather, Catholicism is a very relevant example for thinking on Timor-Leste, but in ontological terms is one 
possible manifestation that occurs with a particular form of abstraction across modes of production, exchange, 
communication, organisation, and so on. 
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to constant contradiction and a sense of multiple truths, and the unevenness 
of social integration can be seen in the multiple meanings found in the most 
common items of day-to-day life. 
Figure 11.2 Sorumutu venue, Dili, 2006.
Source: Damian Grenfell .
The concept of a hybrid political order should help us think about locating 
sustainable practices amidst the intense pressure of social change in Timor-
Leste, and to identify why points of tension can emerge in society. Conflict can 
be caused, for instance, as an attempt to change the social order in Timor-Leste 
that fails to account for how meaning is reproduced for many people. To return 
to the crisis discussed at the beginning of this essay (and questions of stability 
more generally), one way of explaining why some aspects of the violence of that 
time occurred is that as customary and traditional forms of authority were being 
supplanted through the institutional formation of a modern state, the societal 
traction of newer forms of authority was not extensive enough to contain 
different points of tension. One form of organisation and authority was being 
displaced while another was yet to form to the extent necessary to replace it. 
Hence, from this view, the crisis was, in many respects, underpinned by how 
state-building in the territory had been approached; the process had created 
fissures for contestation in between the systems of governance that were being 
constructed, and those that already existed (Grenfell 2008). 
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In a different way, though, the concept of a hybrid order should also work to 
alert us to the need to broaden modernist assumptions, both at an ideological 
level and in daily practice, and it is possible to see how limited the reports on 
elections discussed earlier are. By way of example, if one thinks of the lack of 
state integration in many of the rural communities in Timor-Leste,8 the limited 
access to policing and government services does not mean that these communities 
are unsustainable. Adat and the Catholic faith remain the normative and 
regulatory basis for social life—in many respects providing for the resolution 
of conflict, distribution of resources, as well as the basis for shared identity. 
In doing so, articulations of customary and traditional social life have, in effect, 
underpinned the development of the modern state. If such forms of social 
regulation were not as pronounced or strong, one can imagine that attempts at 
forging a new state would have been an even more riven affair than it has been 
to date. The simple resources required to govern at that level and in a uniform 
way in the post-independence period would have likely been too significant a 
strain on a state still in formation.9 The irony of this is that while the state has 
been reliant on particularly customary systems of governance in order to ensure 
its development, the modernist prophecy is one where the state becomes the 
dominant system, with other forms either subjugated or made peripheral. 
Conclusion
In order to conclude, I will provide a brief précis of the essay. The main 
argument has comprised two parts: the first linking stability to governance and 
security, and arguing that in a polity such as Timor-Leste, both sustainability 
and conflict are imbricated in the uneven ontological layering of that society. 
The second argument, as a consequence of the first, has been more a question of 
approach—one that argues for taking the different ontologies of Timor-Leste into 
analytical consideration when speaking about major political processes (such as 
state-building or elections, and to other domains such as security provision, 
development practices, gender, and so on). The concept of a ‘hybrid political 
order’ is helpful, not just in terms of describing the character of polity as it 
has emerged in an independent Timor-Leste, but also as a way for researchers 
8  While it can be argued that the state penetrates into all communities via authority structures such as 
the village chiefs, such positions very often remain primarily connected to the suku itself (and informed by 
alternative authority structures) and in a formal sense remain ambiguous in terms of being formally part of 
the state. While schools and health clinics can be other manifestations of state penetration, in many rural 
communities such services remain extremely limited and overall the sense of the state is minimal. 
9  Joanne Wallis and others write how the hybrid political order in Timor-Leste is demonstrated by the 
Government’s attempt to govern the state by engaging with and utilising local socio-political practices. This 
is largely based on a pragmatic recognition of not having the reach or resources to provide for much of the 
Timorese population (Wallis 2012: 758).
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to be thinking and aware of how complex patterns of sociality sit in relation 
to one another. Moreover, this hybrid order allows for a proper recognition of 
how the modern features as part of East Timorese society as one layer of social 
life, avoiding any implication or assumption that the outsider (essentially the 
foreign intervener) represents the modern while the local Timorese somehow 
represents the customary. Moreover, I have argued that in Timor-Leste the 
composite parts of the hybrid political order should be expanded so as to 
include an intermediary category of the traditional, and that this, along with the 
customary, remain of great social importance in Timor-Leste, not only in rural 
villages and locations far from the centre, but also for the ways they effect the 
character and sustainability of modern systems of governance in the territory. 
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CHAPTER 12
Building Social Cohesion from Below: 




By the end of 2009, most people in Timor-Leste who were internally displaced by 
the 2006–07 violence  had returned to their communities. Nonetheless, many 
unresolved grievances remained, suggesting that genuine reintegration had not 
automatically taken place. Multiple small-scale conflicts continued to afflict a 
number of communities in and around Dili. In response, Catholic Relief Services 
and the Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission of Dili implemented the Laletek 
(Bridge) Project, a two-year peace-building initiative aimed at rebuilding social 
cohesion. The project adopted a multi-pronged, evidence-based approach that 
encouraged opposing groups to learn about one another’s experiences, focusing 
on what connected them, and supported them to collaborate on issues of mutual 
interest. This chapter reflects on some of the lessons learned from the project. 
It identifies a number of challenges as well as the tools and preconditions 
necessary for successful and sustainable peace-building in the complex urban 
environment of Dili.
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Background 
While Timor-Leste is often called a ‘post-conflict’ country, those involved 
in peace-building work understand that as human beings we cannot avoid 
conflicts—it is a fact of life. As individuals and groups we deal with conflicts 
many times each day as we negotiate our different needs, expectations and 
interests (Caritas Training Manual 2006: 58). Conflict is not necessarily a bad 
thing as long as it is not expressed through violence. It is through conflict that 
unjust relationships and structures are often challenged. Conversely, the absence 
of war or violent conflict does not necessarily mean that there is ‘peace’. Rather 
than labelling Timor-Leste as a post-conflict country, it may be more appropriate 
to consider it a ‘post-war’ country that has recently emerged from 25 years of 
brutal Indonesian military rule. This experience of war and occupation may 
have contributed to a sense in which, for many Timorese, violence continues 
to be understood as a legitimate means of resolving conflicts. For the first 10 
years after the 1999 Referendum, Timor-Leste experienced numerous violent 
incidents where grievances were expressed through the burning of houses and 
attacks upon those perceived as the enemies. This crisis peaked in 2006–07 
when over 150,000 people left their homes (ICG 2008: 2), mostly in the capital of 
Dili, to seek refuge in churches or other public spaces. 
After successful parliamentary and presidential elections were held in 2007, the 
Fourth Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste designed a comprehensive 
National Recovery Strategy (NRS) that was launched on 19 December 2007 
and chaired by the vice prime minister. The NRS consisted of five interlinked 
pillars—housing, stability, socioeconomic development, trust building, and 
social protection—to encourage and facilitate internally displaced people (IDP) 
to return to their homes. The process was co-ordinated by the government, 
involving the local government, community leaders, various international 
and local non-government organisations (NGOs), religious leaders, bilateral 
and multilateral donors, and United Nations agencies. From the time of the 
launch of the NRS to the closing of the last big IDP camp in Metinaro at the 
end of July 2009, there was regular and effective co-ordination and division of 
responsibilities. 
Despite the success of the program, the repatriation of IDPs to their homes 
occurred very swiftly. This did not allow for meaningful processes of reintegration 
to take place between IDPs and their local communities either before or after 
their repatriation. To strengthen the Trust Building Pillar (Hamutuk Hari’i 
Konfiasa) of the NRS, the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Diocesan Justice 
and Peace Commission (DJPC) of Dili designed and implemented the Laletek 
(Bridge) Project. 
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Design of the Laletek Project
The Laletek Project was implemented from 15 March 2010 to 14 March 2012. 
It  was designed to achieve the goal of social cohesion by bridging divides 
between adversary groups while at the same time empowering community 
members to engage with decision-makers to access services and participate in 
decision-making processes. 
At the time of the project’s development, the CRS Team was supporting 
government efforts to ensure that IDP’s could be reintegrated safely back 
into their communities and live in safe and dignified conditions. The DJPC 
was also actively engaged in a number of Dili-based communities through its 
youth engagement and human rights program. Utilising CRS and DJPC’s in-
depth knowledge about the different communities in Dili, consultations were 
conducted with the Ministério da Solidariedade Social (MSS; Ministry of Social 
Solidarity), civil society organisations working in peace-building and/or in the 
capital, as well as government officials and community leaders at the subdistrict 
and village levels in order to avoid duplication, ensure complementarity of 
approaches, and leverage resources. Twenty-two conflict-prone aldeia (hamlet/
sub-villages) in six suku (villages)—Becora, Camea, Mascarinhas, Bidau Santa 
Ana, Fatuhada and Comoro—were selected as the target areas of the Laletek 
Project based on incidents of past, current and ongoing violent conflict.1 
These 22 aldeia also had a high number of ‘spoilers’ who exhibited tendencies 
to engage in communal conflict and prevent, or actively sabotage, local 
development efforts. 
1  Bairo Pite and Vila Verde were also identified during the assessment but were not selected as other 
organisations, including BELUN and CARE International, were working in those areas.
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Figure 12.1 Liliana Amaral, Lalatek Technical Advisor, leading a mapping 
exercise in Fatuhada.
Source: CRS Timor-Leste .
Baseline study
The next phase of project development involved conducting a baseline 
study.2 A thorough baseline study was conducted in the six target suku using 
participatory rural appraisal techniques.3 Twenty local facilitators were trained 
to conduct 23 focus group discussions and 30 key informant interviews with 
a total of 267 respondents, 42 per cent of whom were women. Baseline studies 
were not common practice in peace-building projects in Timor-Leste at this time. 
CRS was of the view that this lack of in-depth analysis had led to the creation 
of generic projects that risked targeting the wrong people. The generic nature 
of these projects also made it hard to measure impacts that could be attributed 
to project interventions. 
2  The baseline study was conducted after the Office for Conflict Mitigation and Management of the 
United States Agency for International Development had agreed to fund the Laletek Project to the order of 
US$600,000, and an additional US$84,000 was provided from CRS.
3  The baseline study utilised a participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methodology. In this approach data was 
gathered from and analysed by community members using diagrammatic tools. The data was then verified by 
sharing the research findings with community members, who then helped formulate an activity plan for the 
duration of the project. Semi-structured interviews, FGDs, Venn diagrams, timeline and community mapping 
were among the main tools selected for this PRA, which focused on collecting conflict- and development-
related data and stories of the most significant change (MSC).
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The baseline study found that 42 per cent of a total of 192 respondents from 
the six suku had experienced violence in the last six months, 10 per cent of 
respondents had experienced violence directly in 2010, while 32 per cent 
knew someone who had experienced it. The Becora, Comoro and Fatuhada 
percentages were quite high at 56–67 per cent. Camea also had a rate of 
violence, at 41  per  cent, while the other two villages, Bidau Santa Ana and 
Mascarenhas, stood at 27 per cent and 13 per cent respectively. The types of 
violence experienced or witnessed included physical and verbal abuse within 
households and schools, stone throwing and fighting using sharp objects 
between different youth groups, mostly members of martial arts groups.
The baseline study also found that only 55 per cent of respondents believed that 
groups within their aldeia had developed better relationships with each other 
since 2007. However, there were still tensions in the community. For example, 
IDPs had yet to be completely accepted back into the community, especially in 
Becora, Camea and Mascarenhas; two to three fights per week occurred between 
martial arts groups in Comoro and Fatuhada, and there were tensions between 
newly elected community leaders and former leaders in Bidau Santa Ana. 
Furthermore, 35 per cent of the respondents said that conflicts could be resolved 
at the local level depending on the nature and the scale of the conflict, while 
conflicts involving large numbers of people or those that involved the killing 
or serious injury of someone needed to involve the police, MSS Dialogue Team, 
and the justice system. The baseline data also showed that most infrastructure 
projects implemented at the village level by institutions such as the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Programme, 
and directly by the government (such as the MSS for the disaster response and 
Ministério das Obras Publicas (Ministry of Public Works) for road, water and 
sanitation) were planned in consultation with local leaders in order to identify 
needs. However, the implementation of the projects was contracted out and did 
not involve the local population and leaders. 
How the baseline informed the strategies 
The baseline study provided Laletek Project staff with a good understanding 
of the variety of different conflicts taking place in each suku/aldeia, and the 
frequency with which violent incidences occurred, their locations and the 
actors involved—whether individuals or groups. It also provided information 
about the local actors involved in peace-building and existing conflict resolution 
mechanisms. This exercise helped the project staff to identify the barriers and 
enablers of peace in order to tailor the project activities, as well as the timing 
and targets of project activities. 
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At the time that Laletek was implemented, there were numerous government 
and NGO-led peace-building initiatives in and around Dili involved in various 
conflict mitigation and resolution activities. Their programs emphasised 
activities such as skills development for local leaders and youth engagement, 
women’s empowerment, and the identification and resolution of macro causes 
of conflict or individual cases of conflict. While each might have contributed 
to a more peaceful Timor-Leste, they did not focus explicitly on building trust 
and developing healthy relationships. This became an explicit focus of the 
Laletek Project as, based on CRS’s previous peace-building experience, without 
overcoming the animosity that divides opposing groups and spurs violence, 
communities would continue to experience violent conflict. 
The Laletek Project also complemented other peace-building efforts by working 
at the lowest possible level—the aldeia—using a people-to-people approach to 
strengthen intra-communal relationships, as well as engaging various groups in 
the maintenance and management of new community infrastructure projects. 
The project activities built on pre-existing and past trust-building efforts, and 
attempted to benefit the community as a whole rather than focusing on one 
target group. 
The baseline data showed that suku Bidau Santa Ana had an existing social 
contract based on the suku law written by the local leaders. This suku law, 
which bound all community members, listed the sorts of behaviours that were 
unacceptable to the community and the punishments for those who violated 
them. Similarly, suku Camea, Becora and Mascarenhas, which had conducted 
a subdistrict tara bandu4 ceremony shortly before the baseline study, had also 
signed a tara bandu law as a binding social contract. This was an initiative by the 
local government supported by The Asia Foundation through their Community 
Policing Project. However, when a violent incident took place four days after 
the ceremony between Camea and Becora, some youth and aldeia leaders said 
that they had not been involved in drafting this law and did not know what its 
content was. The Laletek Project saw an opportunity to strengthen the impact 
of these existing social contracts by supporting local leaders to socialise the 
and suku laws in their aldeia and accompanying them to utilise these laws in 
resolving local conflicts. In several aldeia in Manleuana in suku Comoro, which 
had yet to develop a written social contract, the project supported the local 
4  Tara bandu is a traditional ceremony that is aimed at regulating people-to-people relations, people-to-
animal relations, and people’s relationship to the environment (Belun and The Asia Foundation 2013: 4). It is 
done with an sacred animal sacrifice where the blood is drunk or splattered and oath is taken by parties 
involved, witnessed by their ancestors.
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leaders and the MSS to bring together community and conflicting martial 
arts groups—Perguruan Silat Setia Hati (PSHT) and Kmanek Oan Rai Klaran 
(KORK)—into a peace agreement.
The Laletek Project was also committed to addressing the root causes of the 
conflicts in different localities through dialogue and mediation. By ensuring 
that those involved in the conflicts were present, and that local leaders were 
in charge, the project helped to strengthen local peace-building capacities. 
For example, the population in the aldeia of Fatuk Francisco, Camea, accused 
people of the neighbouring aldeia, Buburlau, of stopping their water supply 
by cutting a water pipe, leaving the community with no access to clean water. 
The pipe was fixed by the IOM after the IDPs returned; however, because the 
Buburlau community received no water from the pipes passing their aldeia, the 
pipes were cut again. The mediation provided by the Laletek Project brought 
40 people from both aldeia together, resulting in an agreement that both 
communities would have access to clean water. Following this agreement, once 
the pipe was fixed, the water supply was not cut again. 
The Laletek Project also gave opposing groups, different ethnic groups, 
neighbouring aldeia members, and leaders who had a history of conflicts training 
in ‘active non-violence’ to equip them with the tools and skills to identify, 
analyse, and resolve their common problems. The training courses provided 
a safe venue for members of conflicting groups to share how the conflicts have 
affected them and to explore ways forward. Conflict maps were used as a visual 
aid to help participants analyse and identify the root causes of conflicts and to 
identify lasting solutions. The Laletek Project also implemented other activities, 
including annual traditional dance competitions among aldeia, and sporting 
events in Bebonuk, which carefully selected participants to ensure that each 
team comprised opposing groups.
Furthermore, the project engaged everyone in the community, including the 
spoilers, to work together to do something tangible for the community through 
small community infrastructure projects. This was done when the opposing 
groups in the community felt ready to collaborate. They identified their needs 
together using a community resource map developed by the project; they listed 
all the needs and prioritised one that could be developed as a joint project and 
would facilitate dialogue and co-operation. Laletek Project staff accompanied 
the participants closely, facilitating activities when requested by the local 
leaders, and providing small grants of US$1,000–4,500 for the rehabilitation or 
construction of community infrastructure water taps, public toilets and aldeia 
meeting venues.
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
194
What worked?
The Laletek Project applied the Lederach Four Dimensions of Conflict 
Transformation framework (Lederach, Neufeldt and Culbertson 2007: 18–22) 
to analyse how conflicts have changed the community in personal, interpersonal, 
structural and cultural dimensions; to define the root causes of the problems, 
and establish the changes sought. The four dimensions helped in gaining an 
understanding of how conflicts affect individuals personally, how they impact 
trust and relationship patterns, how the systems and structures are organised, 
and how conflicts disturb the patterns of behaviours. These four dimensions 
are linked and considered as equally important; therefore, the Laletek Project 
analysed the four to see how each contributed to the aldeia-level conflicts in 
the target areas. The main emphasis of the Laletek Project was the relational 
dimension—to build healthier relationships between opposing groups—as this 
was the main challenge to preventing sustainable reintegration after the 2006–
07 crisis. 
The following strategies were adopted to address these factors driving conflict 
identified in the baseline survey. 
Figure 12.2 The four dimensions of a conflict transformation framework.
Source: Lederach, Neufeldt and Culbertson (2007) .
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Understanding the complexity of local conflicts: Laletek did not take for 
granted what were perceived to be the main fault lines of conflict in Timor-Leste 
like the ‘east–west’ divide, or disputes between martial arts groups. Instead, the 
project invested time and effort in learning about the realities in each aldeia in 
order to develop an in-depth understanding of the relational tensions between 
different groups, and how personal, structural and cultural issues exacerbated 
these. For instance, the stone-throwing in the aldeia, along the river dividing 
Becora and Camea suku, was commonly seen as a conflict between easterners 
who just came back from the IDP camps and the westerners who stayed behind 
during the conflict. One of the main issues identified during the baseline study, 
however, related to who had access to the very limited water in the river. 
Project  staff facilitated the aldeia people of Culau Laletek and Mota Ulun, 
Becora, and Fatuk Francisco, Camea, in finding a solution. The tap water system 
destroyed in 1999 was rebuilt, bringing water to their respective homes, and 
violent stone-throwing between the aldeia stopped. In the process, all parties 
got to know each other and learned to work together.
Staying focused: Part of Laletek’s success was that it did not lose sight of its 
key goal, which was for opposing groups to sit together, discuss their problems, 
and find a common resolution. Activities were carried out not for their own 
sake, nor according to pre-determined schedules, but only if and when they 
contributed to the project goal of bringing opposing groups together. This meant 
that if  opposing groups were not ready to work together in a training or 
community project, the team would step back and find a different entry point 
and opportunity. For instance, in the first few meetings in Bidau Santa Ana, 
only those living close by the suku office and well acquainted with the newly 
elected suku chief were involved. As it turned out, there were tensions between 
the outgoing suku council and the newly elected ones. Therefore, the local youth 
suggested a team-building exercise at the beach, to which members of both suku 
councils were invited to discuss their suku development informally, share meals 
together, and make a joint statement to the community. While this was a very 
simple activity, it showed to the community that the two leaders were working 
together.
Community ownership: The strength of Laletek was the degree of community 
ownership the project was able to create. Community ownership drove the 
project, rather than pre-determined project plans and schedules. Team members 
were consistent in encouraging communities and leaders to take the initiative 
in addressing their own issues. This was demonstrated throughout the project, 
including in conflict mapping and monitoring, reconciliation dialogue, and 
small infrastructure project planning. At the beginning, there was some 
resistance when those asked to get involved demanded payment. Thus, the staff 
spent a lot of time working with the informal and formal community leaders 
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to get their support for the project, and to develop their understanding that 
the project was supporting their existing efforts. This meant that there were no 
payments for participation, except for reimbursement of transportation costs 
when meetings were conducted outside a leader’s aldeia. The fact that the DJPC 
Dili was embedded in the community through the Catholic Church also helped 
to revive the volunteerism spirits of the community. 
Vertical relationship-building was also fostered with leaders at the sub-
national and national level through accompaniment of local leaders during 
preparation and implementation of any community reconciliation or community 
infrastructure projects. For instance, the project worked with the secretary of 
state for art and culture to provide mentoring to community groups in preparing 
for the traditional dance competition. Another example is Camea community 
leaders proposing the building of a water pipe system; the project invited the 
subdistrict officials and the Department of Water and Sanitation to be involved 
to ensure there was no overlap with their development plan. When there were 
violent incidents that were outside the local leaders’ authority, these issues were 
referred to the police and the Department of Peace-Building and Social Cohesion 
(DPSC) of the MSS.
Committed and dedicated staff: Another strength of the project was that 
it employed committed staff who understood and believed in what they were 
doing. After receiving training on conflict transformation skills, they were 
closely mentored to accompany local leaders and help them resolve existing 
and emerging conflicts. The staff employed effective community engagement 
strategies to realise project objectives. For instance, given that the project was 
designed to bridge particular opposing groups,  staff ensured that only those 
who were directly involved in conflicts were selected for each project activity. 
These activities included Active Non-Violence Workshops, traditional dancing 
competitions, mediation and dialogue, as well as community infrastructure 
rehabilitation or building activities. 
Challenges of implementation
The project faced various challenges during its implementation. A few of the 
critical ones are discussed below. 
Lack of readiness for peace: The fact that the project was implemented soon 
after a major crisis that drove half of Dili’s residents out of their homes, and led 
to the destruction of properties and loss of lives, was a particular challenge. 
A number of groups and individuals still held grudges towards each other and 
were not ready for peace when the project started. The most challenging area 
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was Bebonuk, which had a protracted conflict involving four to five aldeia. 
Martial arts leaders simply said ‘no’ to the project, stating that they wanted 
war and revenge for the death of one of their members during the crisis. Project 
flexibility helped here as staff just took their time and worked separately with 
the two groups. Eventually, in the second year of the project, it was possible 
to bring the groups together as the project team decided to take a different 
approach, asking locally based, respected nuns and a priest to do a house-to-
house visit, talking to each of the main leaders involved in the conflict and their 
parents. This personalised approach managed to open their minds and hearts. 
This led to various joint activities, including the rehabilitation of the Bebonuk 
Youth Center.
Lack of participation of local leadership: As the Timor-Leste community is 
very hierarchical, the blessings and support of local elected leaders is crucial 
for projects to succeed. Laletek staff put a lot of effort into cultivating good 
relationships with aldeia and suku leaders; nevertheless, these attempts were 
not successful in all 22 target aldeia. Throughout the project, the aldeia chiefs 
of Culau Laletek and Mococo Mate of Becora suku, for example, refused to be 
involved in the project. In other aldeia and suku, community leaders were too 
busy with full-time jobs to be involved. Nonetheless, in some cases Laletek staff 
managed to convince local leaders to appoint someone in their place to liaise 
with project staff. 
Politicising of local leadership: The fact that some community leaders were 
representatives of political parties and that the project was implemented soon 
after the suku election (when new aldeia chief took over the old ones in 14 of 
the 22 aldeia) created additional problems. In most aldeia, the names of those 
newly elected leaders were unknown by the community members and they had 
not yet met their aldeia/suku leaders and council members. Some of the newly 
elected aldeia and suku chiefs did not feel that they had the authority to call 
the conflicting parties together to resolve an issue. The project staff worked to 
empower the new aldeia and suku chiefs by accompanying them in preparing 
and leading meetings with the community, and conducting and mediating 
a conflict. 
Expectation for payment for involvement: At the beginning of the project, 
both community members and community leaders had high expectations 
that they would be paid for participating in the project. To address this 
issue, project staff spent a lot of time and effort highlighting that the project 
was, in fact, supporting local community efforts. This also contributed to 
strengthening community ownership of the project. The fact that the DJPC was 
the implementing partner of the project also helped as the project was seen as 
coming from the Catholic Church so the community were willing to participate 
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with no financial incentive. Nevertheless, a mediation dialogue between two 
conflicting schools in Fatuhada and Aimutin was cancelled as a teacher based at 
one of the schools expected a payment for participating in this event. 
Conclusion
There are a few lessons that can be learned from this two-year project for 
successful future peace-building works. First, it is important to understand 
the context well by conducting thorough research, instead of simplifying the 
conflict based on what appears on the surface. A baseline study is a good way 
to gain a picture of the situation, including those involved in conflicts, those 
involved in peace-making, and the sources of local conflicts. This information 
can be used as an entry point for project activities. It can encourage the local 
population to work together, and strengthen the potential for conflict resolution 
and transformation.
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, conflicts are part of day-to-day interactions 
between people and between groups. Given that conflict is not a one-off 
occurrence, it is important for any project-based interventions to empower local 
leaders to resolve their own problems, to support them to network with other 
organisations, and advocate for assistance from the sub-national or national 
government, rather than doing it for them. The project will come to an end, but 
those leaders will remain in the community and can continue to transform any 
violent incidences constructively beyond the life of the project.
Third, a great deal of thought and preparatory work is needed to ensure that the 
right people are involved in the project. This includes those involved directly 
in the conflicts and those who can or have the potential to resolve communal 
conflicts. In working with spoilers, project staff have to tread carefully so as not 
to reward bad behaviour by singling those individuals out from the rest of the 
communities and solely targeting them in all project activities. Instead, spoilers 
should be treated as members of their community, who, like other citizens, are 
responsible for maintaining peace in their neighbourhood.
Given that the Laletek Project was a small, two-year project implemented in an 
urban setting, further study is needed to see how it can be replicated in a rural 
setting where there may be more entrenched violent conflict. 
199
12. Building Social Cohesion from Below
References
Belun and The Asia Foundation 2013. Tara Bandu: Its Role and Use in Community 
Conflict Prevention in Timor-Leste. Dili: Asia Foundation.
Bishop, J. 2011. Final Evaluation Report: Strengthening Early Recovery for 
Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of Internally Displaced People 
(SERC) Project. Dili: United Nations Development Programme.
Catholic Relief Services 2010. Laletek (Bridge) Program Baseline Study Report. 
Dili: CRS/Timor-Leste program.
Catholic Relief Services, United States Conference of Catholic Bishop 2011. 
Social Cohesion and Youth Learning Document. Cairo: CRS. 
Catholic Relief Services 2013. Laletek Project Manual: Strategic Community Peace-
Building in Practice. Baltimore: CRS. www.crsprogramquality.org/storage/
pubs/peace-building/strategic-community-peace-building-in-practice.pdf. 
Globalism Research Centre, RMIT University Melbourne 2009. Understanding 
Community: Security and Sustainability in Four Aldeia in Timor Leste—
Luha Oli, Nanu, Sarelari and Golgota. Melbourne: Globalism Research Centre.
Gusmão, X. 1/3/2011. Timor-Leste: Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development. 
Address by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Security 
of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste at Johns Hopkins University, 
Washington DC.
ICG (International Crisis Group) 2008. Timor-Leste Displacement Crisis. Asia 
Report 148. 
Lederach, J.P. 2003. The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. New York: 
Good Books. 
Lederach, J.P., R. Neufeldt and H. Culbertson 2007. Reflective Peace-Building: 
A Planning, Monitoring, and Learning Toolkit. Indiana: The Joan B. Kroc 
Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.
Paffenholz, T. 2009. Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project: 
Civil Society and Peace-Building. Centre on Conflict, Development and Peace-
Building (CCDP) Working Paper Geneva: CCDP. 
Paffenholz, T. and C. Spurk 2006. Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peace-
Building. Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction 
36(October). Washington DC: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction Social 
Development Department, The World Bank.
A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN
200
RDTL (República Democrática de Timor-Leste) 19/12/2007. ‘Hamutuk Hari’i 
Futuru’: A National Recovery Strategy. Office of the Vice Prime-Minister 
Media Release, Dili. Reproduced by East Timor and Indonesia Action 
Network. www.etan.org/et2008/6june/22/19hamutuk.htm.
Scambary, J. 2012. Laletek Project Final Evaluation: Final Report. Dili: CRS/
Timor-Leste Program. www.dmeforpeace.org/learn/laletek-project-final-
evaluation.
Scambary, J. 2013. Conflict and Resilience in an Urban Squatter Settlement in 








A Social Movement as an 
Antidote to Corruption
Adérito de Jesus Soares
Introduction 
Corruption has become a very complex and intractable problem facing the 
world. Billions of dollars earmarked for the poor, including vital education 
and health sector assistance, ends up in the pockets of a relatively few corrupt 
people every year (OECD 2014: 2). Studies by the OECD, for example, have 
estimated that corruption may cost 5 per cent of global gross domestic product, 
which, according to the World Bank, represents up to US$1 trillion paid in 
bribes every year.
Various entities at regional, national and international levels have been 
attempting to tackle corruption. But it remains well entrenched and is even on 
the rise in some countries, particularly among those in the developing world. 
Of  course, corruption also occurs in developed countries, but they generally 
have stronger legal frameworks and mechanisms in place to tackle it. By contrast, 
many developing countries, such as Timor-Leste, lack effective institutional 
capacity to deter corrupt practices. 
Timor-Leste as a post-conflict society is confronting the problem of 
corruption and putting in place a number of mechanisms to address problems 
of accountability and transparency. Central to these efforts has been the 
establishment and implementation of the Comissão Anti-Corrupção (CAC; Anti-
Corruption Commission) in 2010. But while efforts have been made to tackle 
the growing problem of corruption in Timor-Leste, there remain a number of 
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significant factors that make Timor-Leste at least potentially prone to corruption. 
Among these factors are the fledgling nature of the state institutions, and the 
legal framework that remains a work in progress and weak. There is a growing 
business sector that lacks a culture of accountability, while high unemployment 
and widespread economic hardship loom large as real challenges. 
I argue in this chapter that given the faults of its legal system and the weakness 
of enforcement in this post-conflict Timor-Leste society, it would be a serious 
mistake to rely solely on legal mechanisms to fight corruption. This is even more 
the case given that Timor-Leste has inherited cultures of corruption from two 
previous colonial regimes that continue to influence contemporary practice. 
In this context, I argue that comprehensive efforts to combat corruption must 
go beyond legal measures to involve raising public awareness in the community 
at large. 
There is a very simplistic understanding on the public’s part about the capacity 
of legal mechanisms to counter corruption. It is simply more dramatic and 
attractive for the public to see alleged corrupters arrested, prosecuted and sent 
to jail; and it is important to have legal mechanisms that can enable this if due 
process is followed. However, more comprehensive, non-legal strategies also 
need to be developed, so that both strategies can be combined to effectively 
address the issue of corruption.1 
Thus, this chapter is divided as follows. I first describe the state of corruption in 
Timor-Leste, past and present. This is followed by a discussion of some common 
challenges facing anti-corruption commissions around the world, and a review 
of Timor-Leste’s efforts in dealing with corruption. I then describe efforts to raise 
public awareness on this issue, followed by an account of the role of the private 
sector in economic development and its vulnerability to corrupt practice. 
Corruption in Timor-Leste at a glance
Timor-Leste has experienced the ill effects of corruption, from the Portuguese 
colonial period to 24 years of illegal occupation by the Indonesian regime 
(1974–99). During both of these dark periods, corruption became entrenched 
within the colonial architecture and machineries of state. 
From the 17th century, the Portuguese imposed a finta (collective tax) 
on the population of Timor-Leste. Finta were collected in different forms 
including corn, rice, cattle, honey, sandalwood and gold (Castro 1867: 375–
76). Portuguese  soldiers and officers were tasked with collecting finta from 
1  I have elaborated this line of argument elsewhere (see Soares 2013: 85–97).
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the villagers and various petty reino (kingdoms) that encompassed the great 
majority of the population. But this process was prone to corruption, and the 
amount of finta that eventually reached the capital, Dili, was always less than 
what had been collected. Although Timor made a relatively minor contribution 
to the coffers of the Portuguese treasury, petty corruption among the Portuguese 
officers was widespread across the land. Colonial documents note that corruption 
was rife in the customs sector. It not only involved Portuguese officers and 
soldiers, but to some extent the Timorese elite—regulo (kings) and suku (village) 
leaders—were also involved in the cycle of corruption that affected the majority 
of Timor’s people. History has shown that various rebellions by the Timorese 
were frequently triggered by resentments over the collection of finta, which 
was often obtained through coercion and the use of violence (Roque 2010: 10). 
During the 24 years of the Indonesian occupation, the experience of corruption in 
Timorese society was perpetuated and solidified. Indonesian military and senior 
government officers were involved in massive corruption while running Timor-
Timur—as it was known during the occupation—as a branch of the Indonesian 
company, P.T. Denok Hernandez International. This company had the monopoly 
on coffee exports from East Timor and was used by the Indonesian military as 
a cash cow for the generals (Taylor 2000: 125). In addition, the top Indonesian 
civilian officers emptied the public purse by diverting Jakarta’s money into their 
own pockets (Carrascalão 2006: 145–49). The web of corruption became wider 
as many Timorese elite, who were in positions of power, also benefited directly 
from corruption with their Indonesian patrons. The culture of corruption in the 
public sector became entrenched in daily life. 
Both petty and grand corruption flourished during the occupation. Thus, the 
attempt to integrate Timor-Leste into the Republic became, among other 
things, a project of massive plunder throughout the territory, quite apart from 
the human rights atrocities widely documented elsewhere. Even General Kiki 
Syahnakri, the then military commander in Timor-Leste, lamented that Timorese 
people rejected the politics of integration into Indonesia because of the massive 
corruption committed by both military and civilian leaders in the territory 
(Syahnakri 2013: 346). Of course, Syahnakri’s comment is only partly correct, as 
there were more fundamental reasons for the Timorese to oppose integration, but 
his criticism did put corruption at the centre of the Indonesian’s administrative 
machinery in Timor-Leste at the time. The same observation came from Mário 
Viegas Carrascalão, the then Indonesian-appointed governor in Timor-Leste. 
According to Carrascalão, during his tenure, the central government used to 
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appoint one high-level military retiree as the ‘Pimpro’ (pimpinan proyek; project 
leader), who had the task of granting government contracts to individuals 
preferred by the regime, without any proper procurement mechanisms.2
In post-independence Timor-Leste, there is no doubt that corruption is on the 
rise. For a start, there is more cash floating around, especially in the public sector, 
while the oversight mechanisms that are in place remain very weak. Timor-Leste 
is one of the most oil- and gas-dependent countries in the world. State revenues 
from oil and gas exceed 90 per cent. This also makes the country vulnerable 
to corruption, like the experience of many oil-rich countries in the world 
where the public sector’s culture of accountability is still very underdeveloped. 
The dramatic increase in the annual state budget since 2007—even though the 
capacity to execute the budget remains highly constrained—has opened more 
opportunities for corruption by public servants in collusion with the private 
sector. Although Timor-Leste has one of the best oil and gas trust funds in the 
world, designed with Norwegian advice following independence, the issue of 
expending substantial quantities of this fund in the state budget raises serious 
questions. 
Tensions between time and expectations 
The experience of many anti-corruption commissions established around the 
world shows that there is a very high public expectation when the commission 
is first established. The public often expects the commission to work quick 
miracles in combating corruption. They expect the commission to act quickly in 
the shortest time frame possible, putting additional pressures on the commission. 
However, such expectations are bound to be unmet if state support for a new 
commission is insufficient. State support can manifest through strong political 
will, the provision of a sufficient budget, a judicial system that is truly based 
on the rule of law, and so forth. Support from the public can be expressed in 
various ways, including an abhorrence of bribery, encouraging people to inform 
relevant institutions about instances of suspected corruption, and support for 
anti-corruption campaigns. 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption of Hong Kong and the 
Corruption Prevention and Investigation Bureau of Singapore are successful 
because they had these conditions in place. However, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia have all established anti-corruption commissions but failed 
to combat corruption because they lacked these safeguards (see Doig et al. 2005).
2  See ‘Saya Bukan Pengkhianat’ [I am not a traitor], Tempo’s interview with Carrascalão. setiyardi.
wordpress.com/2009/04/03/mario-viegas-carrascalao-saya-bukan-pengkhianat/.
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It is one of the paradoxes of combating corruption in post-conflict countries 
that on one hand, the legal system is generally weak (including the judiciary), 
but on the other hand, public expectation is very high, and to some extent 
unequal to the efficacy of that country’s legal system. This is understandable, as 
the public is anxious about social ills (corruption) that have negative impacts on 
people’s lives. The public want to see swift, tangible results, such as imprisoning 
criminals. Therefore, to be successful in combating corruption, there should be 
realistic support measures in place and an anti-corruption push that should not 
be monopolised by any anti-corruption commission. Instead, there should be a 
widespread social movement across the country. Today, with the expansion of 
global capitalism, organised crime has also expanded. For this reason, efforts 
need to be expanded beyond state borders. Timor-Leste’s endeavours in fighting 
corruption post-independence illustrate this paradox very well. 
Anti-corruption efforts post-independence 
During Timor-Leste’s transition to independence from 1999 to 2002, the United 
Nations established the Office of the Inspectorate General (OIG), which still 
exists under the auspices of the Timor-Leste government. The main task of the 
OIG is to conduct internal audits of alleged maladministration and corruption 
in the public sector. It submits its reports to the prime minister, who has the 
discretionary power and the final say on whether there should be further 
investigations, whether to impose administrative sanctions, or to archive the 
cases. Following the establishment of the Provedor de Direitos Humanos e Justiça 
(PDHJ; Human Rights Commission) in 2006, the OIG has worked side by side 
with the PDHJ in the area of good governance. Both institutions have the 
power to carry out investigations: OIG for internal administrative audits; the 
PDHJ for independent non-criminal investigations, which it submits to the 
Ministério Público (Office of the Public Prosecutor). The mandate to investigate 
corruption was removed from the PDHJ when the new CAC was established in 
2010. The CAC was given a broad mandate of conducting criminal investigations 
and as well as awareness-raising (Soares 2013). However, the CAC, as in the 
case of the PDHJ, has to submit its final investigations to the prosecutor. 
The prosecutor then decides whether to pursue cases should they demonstrate 
strong admissible evidence. 
There are still areas of overlap in this institutional arrangement. For instance, 
it is hard to avoid allegations of corruption being investigated simultaneously 
by two state institutions in the early stages of a case. This is partly because of 
confusion created by the laws governing the mandates of these institutions.3 
3  An analysis of the legal framework is of utmost importance; however, it is not the focus of this chapter.
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Some of this confusion emerges from weak institutional leadership and, to some 
extent, competition between the institutions. This occurred in the case of 
the relationship between the CAC and the Ministério Público. Given that the 
prosecutor’s office controls and supervises all criminal investigations under 
Timorese law, this institution has the discretionary power to decide which cases 
it investigates and which can be delegated to the CAC. 
With the establishment of the Audit Court in 2012, which is mandated to audit 
all government expenditure, another institutional player has been added to the 
list of oversight in this country of a little over one million people. 
The imperative of awareness-raising
Since its inception in 2010, the CAC has been very active in raising awareness 
about the causes and consequences of corruption in public life. The CAC’s vision 
was to ‘create a strong culture of rejecting corruption’ in Timorese society. 
As  such, awareness-raising was central to realising this objective, given the 
dark trajectory of corruption in modern Timorese society. As the inaugural 
CAC commissioner, I believe that combating corruption can only be successful 
if it becomes a widespread social movement involving all segments of Timorese 
society (Soares 2010). 
It is important to note that prior to the establishment of CAC, awareness-raising 
about corruption had been carried out by other institutions, including some 
non-government organisations (NGOs), albeit in an unsystematic way and with 
a much smaller audience than the one CAC managed to reach. According to a 
commissioned survey, 52.5 per cent of respondents did not understand what 
was meant by the term corruption (CAC 2011). Only a very small percentage 
of respondents knew how to report corruption cases to the proper authorities. 
According to the survey, over 60 per cent of respondents agreed that the CAC 
had to intensify its public outreach. 
In 2013, more than 7,000 people attended the CAC’s public outreach meetings 
and seminars across the country (CAC Annual Report 2013), with a much 
larger audience reached via media reports on these meetings. Apart from the 
objective of encouraging the public to report corruption cases to the CAC 
or other competent authorities—such as the Ministério Público—the other 
important objective of this outreach was to inspire the civic spirit of citizens, 
and encourage them to join anti-corruption efforts, to help them understand 
the consequences of corruption, and to prevent them from becoming involved 
in corrupt behaviour. Target audiences at public outreach events varied from 
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youth groups to community leaders, district governance officers, women’s 
groups, and students from primary school to university. The CAC reached out 
to all 13 districts in Timor once it began effective operations in January 2011.4 
The CAC conducted outreach programs in collaboration with other entities 
such as NGOs, youth groups, schools, universities, and religious organisations, 
especially the Catholic Church. The form of public outreach varied. For 
instance, the CAC organised essay and speech competitions with various schools 
and universities. It also disseminated basic information about corruption to 
community leaders and public servants in various districts. 
As for public servants, the CAC combined two approaches: disseminating basic 
information; and discussing preventative strategies with them. One example of 
successful public outreach was the celebrations of 9 December for International 
Anti-Corruption Day. Since 2010, CAC has held large events on this day. 
For  instance, in 2013, in collaboration with the Comissão da Função Pública 
(CFP;  Public Service Commission), the CAC organised a one-day conference, 
attended by 1,500 people, including all directors general and heads of 
department from the civil service. The country’s leaders also attended and 
addressed the forum. 
The CAC encourages the public to report any allegation of corruption across 
Timorese society. As a result, in 2011, CAC received 103 reports from the public. 
The number declined a little in 2012 with 60 reports, followed by 75 reports in 
2013 (CAC 2014). However, these reports did not all necessarily translate into 
potential corruption cases. Indeed, only a small percentage of the reports were 
followed up by the CAC. On investigation, many of these reports were found to 
be unrelated to corruption but linked to other issues, including human rights 
violations and civil cases such as divorce.
Public awareness-raising and monitoring activities carried out by NGOs and the 
media are of the utmost importance in this context. However, Dili-based NGOs 
and media need to focus their attentions more at the district level, particularly 
as development and high-value infrastructure projects are increasingly taking 
place at the subdistrict and district levels. In order to broaden the network 
of security, it is also important to break the ‘exclusivity’ of NGO agendas by 
involving communities at the local level.
4  CAC was established with the swearing-in of its first commissioner in February 2010, however, its effective 
operation only commenced in January 2011. The first year (2010) was basically used to establish infrastructure 
and recruit staff and investigators, as well as to train the first recruits. 
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With the increasing roles of the private sector in Timor-Leste’s economy, in 
conjunction with the presence of substantial foreign private sector enterprise—
many of which do not have good reputations on transparency and accountability, 
a cautious look at these actors is also required. 
Private sector fetishism and the need for raising 
public awareness
No one could deny the importance of the private sector in a modern liberal 
economy. However, caution is needed in post-conflict societies such as Timor-
Leste. It is noticeable that from independence to the present, the government 
has prioritised the private sector—in this case, mostly national contractors who 
rely on government projects—to fuel economic development and job creation. 
On the other hand, the government also has been trying hard to convince 
international/foreign investors to invest in Timor-Leste. One example was the 
strategy of lowering company tax to attract foreign investors. 
This fetishising of the private sector in development can result in favouritism 
towards certain businesses, bypassing laws and procedures, and lead to 
corruption. For instance, the government has awarded infrastructure projects 
through single source mechanisms to a small group of national contractors 
known as the Consorcio Nasional de Timorense (Timorese National Consortium) 
that has strong connections with those in power. These apparent conflicts of 
interest have evoked some public criticism as potentially leading to corruption.5 
From independence to the present, there have been many government projects 
awarded to individual businesses through the single source process. Thus, this 
discretionary power of leaders in terms of awarding government projects has 
created the perception of corruption, if not actual collusion. 
Favouritism shown to the private sector by the government could also jeopardise 
the economy of Timor-Leste. This is because most of the private sector lacks the 
interest or capacity to invest in alternative areas such as agriculture and fisheries, 
but relies instead and almost solely on government (infrastructure) projects. 
At the same time, many have also become brokers to foreign investors who have 
taken part in many of the state’s recent multimillion-dollar project tenders. 
This dependency could create a networking of patron–client relationships 
5  See Tempo Semanal, PM Eskolta Samuel-Xanana Protetor Koruptor [PM escorted Samuel-PM protected 
corruptor]. www.temposemanal.com/nasional/pm-eskolta-samuel-xanana-protetor-korruptor. Consorcio 
Nasional de Timorense is composed of several Timor business groups such as Tinolina Lda, owned by 
Agostinho Gomes; Suai Indah Ltd, owned by Americo; Marabia, Lda, owned by Jorge Serano; Jonice Ltd, 
owned by Nilton Gusmão; Hidayat Lda, owned by Ahmad Alkatiri; and Montana Diak Lda and GS Lda.
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across the Timorese economy. Fetishising the private sector could also lead to a 
marginalisation of other groups, such as farmers, and the informal sectors that 
also have great potential to contribute to equitable economic development. 
Engaging the private sector from the outset in activities directed to awareness-
raising is crucial in combating corruption. This has not happened to any extent 
in Timor-Leste. In early 2014, the CAC in collaboration with the Timor-Leste 
Câmara de Comércio e Indústria (Chamber of Commerce and Industry), held 
a one-day conference to consider ways to prevent corruption. The seminar 
attracted a small number of participants compared to other public awareness-
raising initiatives. Thus, a serious dialogue with the private sector on how to 
combat corruption is needed, as they have strong leverage in terms of capital 
and are well connected to local power-holders and influential elites.
Conclusion 
I have briefly discussed the current state of corruption in Timor-Leste and the 
opportunities for combating it. I have highlighted the importance of awareness-
raising in order to create social movements to combat corruption. I have also 
raised some notes of caution in relation to the private sector’s role in the 
economic dynamics of post-conflict societies like Timor-Leste. 
A weak legal system and continuing fragile state institutions could be 
compensated by a massive public education campaign against corruption. 
Combining two approaches could well thwart corruption at the outset. 
The  power of social movements and vocal public criticism, combined with 
a swift investigation, is a more thorough antidote to combat this ill. 
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CHAPTER 14
The Veterans’ Valorisation Scheme: 
Marginalising Women’s Contributions 
to the Resistance1
Lia Kent and Naomi Kinsella
As women, we are offended and upset that on national days the leaders mention 
all the heroes’ names to honour them, but forget our women leaders who gave 
their lives to liberate this nation
Maria Tapó, Bi Lear, We-We, Muki, Soimali, Mariazinha, 
Bi-Doli-Mau and others.
It is now ten years since we have restored our independence but the leaders have 
forgotten the contribution and values [that women brought to the independence 
struggle]. Will it be that these women’s participation ended with their deaths? 
Or for those who are still alive, that they will only receive recognition as the wife 
of a deceased combatant or cadre? If so, this is unfair, particularly when we want 
to create a complete history of our people. 
Secretary General Lourdes Maria A.M. Alves de Araujo, Organização Popular da 
Mulher Timorense (OPMT; Popular Organisation of East Timorese Women).2
1  Some of the material in this chapter has been published as Lia Kent and Naomi Kinsella, A Luta Kontinua: 
The Marginalisation of East Timorese Women in the Veterans’ Valorisation Scheme. International Feminist 
Journal of Politics (2014).
2  Speech of the OPMT Secretary General, Lourdes Maria A.M. Alves de Araújo at a fundraising event for 
the OPMT documentation project, 6 August 2010.
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Introduction
It is well known that East Timorese women played critical roles during the 24-year 
Resistance struggle (the Resistance) against the Indonesian occupation. As large 
numbers of men took up arms against the Indonesian military and were imprisoned 
and killed, women took on new responsibilities. Some hid in the mountains and 
forests with FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste; 
Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)—the military wing of 
FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor)—where they played important logistical 
roles: they collected food, cooked, mended clothing, took care of the wounded, 
acted as guards, and managed munitions. When under fire, women guerrillas 
would prepare supplies for removal in case of retreat, or salvage ammunition, 
weapons, or other supplies from the bodies of dead soldiers on both sides. Women 
were also engaged militarily against the Indonesian forces and took part in raids 
on Indonesian security posts and exchanges of fire (Alves,  Abrantes and Reis 
2003: 25–27; Conway 2010). More commonly, women were involved in the frente 
clandestina (clandestine front)—the network of civilians based in the villages and 
towns that supported, and greatly outnumbered, the FALINTIL forces. It has been 
estimated that women comprised 60 per cent of clandestinos (Cristalis and Scott 
2005: 39), acting as couriers, supplying those on the frontlines with food and 
other necessities, seeking support within the church and local communities for 
the independence struggle, and hiding senior members of the Resistance. Women 
were also active in the diplomatic front of the Resistance. Urban-based student 
activists often living in exile worked with international solidarity and women’s 
networks to raise awareness about human rights violations, and to ensure the 
outside world did not forget their struggle. Members of FRETILIN’s Organização 
Popular da Mulher Timorense (OPMT; Popular Organisation of East Timorese 
Women) and the Organização da Mulher Timorense (OMT; Timorese Women’s 
Organisation) played a critical role in the lead up to the 1999 referendum for 
self-determination, providing civic education in preparation for the referendum 
(CAVR 2005a: part 3, para 514–16).
Through a case study of the veterans’ valorisation scheme (veterans’ scheme), 
this chapter argues that women in independent Timor-Leste have been 
insufficiently recognised for their diverse and critical contributions to the 
Resistance. Specifically, it shows that the scheme, established in 2006 to provide 
symbolic recognition and material benefits to veterans of the 24-year Resistance, 
has discriminated against women. Given that the veterans’ scheme has become 
a key nation-building pillar, consuming a significant amount of state resources 
and helping to shape social, political and economic status in independent Timor-
Leste, this has significant implications for East Timorese women and, indeed, 
for the society as a whole. 
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Drawing on interviews with politicians, veterans and representatives of 
women’s organisation, along with a close reading of the veterans’ legislation 
and pension statistics, we shows the scheme’s increasing orientation towards 
meeting narrowly defined ‘stability’ goals has been to women’s detriment.3 
We  then demonstrate that the scheme’s emphasis on rank and time served 
within the Resistance has marginalised women’s contributions, while provisions 
within the scheme—particularly those relating to remarriage, second wives and 
vulnerability criteria—add another layer of discrimination. We then make some 
suggestions as to how the veterans’ scheme could be adapted to better recognise 
women’s roles in the Resistance, acknowledging that any attempts to widen its 
existing parameters are likely to encounter significant opposition from powerful 
male veterans. Nonetheless, we argue that the marginalisation of women within 
the scheme represents a lost opportunity to recognise women’s agency in the 
Resistance struggle, and, in doing so, to potentially improve women’s social 
and economic standing and status in society. The marginalisation of women’s 
contributions also has consequences for the nation as a whole by narrowing 
the way the Indonesian occupation is remembered and represented, and further 
promoting a militarised construction of citizenship.
Background to the veterans’ scheme
The marginalisation of women within the veterans’ scheme can be traced to 
the establishment of a series of commissions by the then President Xanana 
Gusmão from 2002, to identify and register veterans of the Resistance. The 
commissions were intended to avoid the improper use of veteran credentials 
to obtain political and material benefits, to placate the growing number of 
disaffected members of the Resistance who were threatening to rearm, and fulfil 
the constitutional requirement to valorise the Resistance (Rees 2003). The first 
two commissions—the Comissão para os Assuntos dos Antigos Combatentes 
(CAAC; Commission for the Issues of Former Combatants) and the Comissão para 
os Assuntos dos Veteranos dos FALINTIL (CAVF; Commission for the Issues of 
FALINTIL Veterans)—were established in September 2002 to register veterans 
of the armed struggle. Only 13 women (out of a total of 36,959 names) registered 
with the CAAC and CAVF during the initial registration phase, and these 13 
names were then omitted from the final list. At the time, the justification given 
for the exclusion was that they had acted in support roles to FALINTIL and that 
they had held political (as opposed to military) positions within the Resistance 
structure. While this may have rankled with women who had spent years as an 
3  Interviews were conducted by Naomi Kinsella, Natalia de Jesus Cesaltino and Manuela Leong Pereira 
in 2011.
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integral part of FALINTIL in logistics and intelligence collection roles, there is 
evidence to suggest that the women were placated by President Gusmão, who 
instructed them to wait for a third commission, which would register veterans 
involved in the clandestine front (Ospina 2006: 24).
The Comissão para os Assuntos dos Quadros da Resistencia (CAQR; Commission 
for Matters of Cadres of the Resistance) was established in 2004 to register former 
clandestinos. It was far more successful than the previous commissions in gaining 
women’s participation; indeed, 25 per cent of those who initially registered their 
names with CAQR were women. At the completion of the various presidential 
commissions’ mandates, a total of 76,061 former members of the Resistance had 
been registered.4 This included 10,337 women (13.5 per cent of the total).5 
Following the completion of the first phase of registration, an ad hoc 
parliamentary commission was established to develop legislation on ‘valorising’ 
the Resistance. Unfortunately, the draft law was completed in July 2005—before 
CAQR had finished its work. This meant that the commission involving the largest 
number of women had little impact on veterans’ policy formulation. The 2006 
Statute of the National Liberation Combatants defines a ‘National Liberation 
Combatant’ (NLC) as a Timorese citizen who participated in the independence 
struggle for more than three years (or less than three years if killed due to their 
participation in the struggle), and was ‘part of the structures or organizations 
of the Resistance’. Benefits for NLCs under the legislation include various forms 
of symbolic recognition, including medals, the right to funeral honours, and 
presidential decorations. NLCs, their spouses and children also have the right 
to access state health and education services free of charge, and a later decree 
law has established scholarships to assist with uniforms, books and tertiary 
education fees for veterans’ children.
The valorisation process also provides for entitlements to pensions for a select 
group of veterans. Initially, pension eligibility was based upon ‘vulnerability’ 
criteria. Elderly and disabled veterans were prioritised, while widows, orphans, 
elderly parents, or tortured siblings of deceased veterans were eligible for a 
‘survival pension’. Later revisions to the law have, however, raised pension 
amounts and shifted the beneficiary emphasis. It is clear that length of service 
and rank within the Resistance structure are now key factors in determining 
4  Two different technical commissions were created in 2004 and 2006 to respectively verify the previous 
commissions’ data and consolidate it into a single database. See the press release, H.E. President Kay Rala 
Xanana Gusmão has sworn in the Commission of Verification of Data’s (CVD) Monday, 15 November 2004; 
Presidential Dispatch 1/2006, Extension of the Mandate of the Data Consolidation Commission (CCD) of the 
Timorese Resistance and National Liberation Combatants, 9 December 2006. 
5  March 2011 statistics from the Secretary of State for National Liberation Combatant Affairs.
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pension amounts.6 A combatant’s years of service are considered to be the sum 
of all periods of deportation, detention and work in ‘exclusive dedication’ to the 
Resistance (‘exclusive dedication’ meaning that individuals were not engaged in 
study or regular waged labour). 
The manner in which the scheme attributes monetary benefits has led to 
tensions between the clandestine front and FALINTIL. A key issue concerns 
the requirement for ‘exclusive dedication’ to the struggle, which makes it 
extremely difficult for former clandestinos to gain access to pensions. This is 
because clandestine front activities were often only possible by concealing one’s 
activities behind study or work, or using one’s position within the Indonesian 
Government, police or military to pass on intelligence to the Resistance. 
This definition has also excluded large numbers of women, not only because 
there were more women in the clandestine front than FALINTIL but because 
women tended not to hold official positions or titles within the Resistance 
structure despite carrying out important clandestine work. Other tensions 
have emerged due to difficulties in verifying who is a legitimate veteran for 
the purpose of the scheme. Despite the establishment of special committees 
to ‘verify’ veterans’ claims, complaints of exaggeration or under-recognition 
of years of service are common, in some cases giving rise to violent disputes 
(see Belun and CICR 2013; ICG 2011). 
Rising pension amounts
Since the introduction of the veterans’ valorisation scheme, veterans’ pension 
payments have risen steadily. In 2010, US$23.1 million (3 per cent of the state 
budget) was allocated to veterans’ affairs, most of that for the payment of benefits 
(RDTL 2010). By 2011, this amount had risen to US$82.7 million, or 6 per cent 
of the 2011 state budget (RDTL 2011). Although payment amounts may have 
peaked in 2012 at US$109.7 million (or 9 per cent of the budget), they remain a 
significant allocation of state resources (IPAC 2014: 12). As Wallace (this volume) 
observes, more money is now spent on veterans than on health or education, 
and the lowest veterans’ payment of US$276 per month is many times higher 
than the average East Timorese income.
6  Law 3/2006 as amended by Law 9/2009 of 29 July 2009, Article 26 ‘Special Retirement Pension’, Article 
25 ‘Subsistence Pension’, Article 28 and Article 29. Veterans with more than eight years of full-time dedication 
to the struggle are eligible for monthly pensions, those with four to seven years’ full-time service can apply 
to receive a one-off payment and a superior pension has also been created for a small number of ‘prominent 
figures’ within the liberation struggle. The family of deceased veterans can receive either a survival pension 
or one-off payment depending upon their relationship with the veteran. The survival pension is payable to 
only one heir, with the spouse receiving first priority followed by parents, children and siblings who have 
suffered torture as a result of the veterans’ militancy. Once this individual dies, the right to a pension is 
extinguished.
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The significant size of the veterans’ pensions indicates that the Timor-Leste 
Government has relied on the scheme as a means of ‘buying’ political stability. 
In the wake of the security crisis of 2006–07, for instance, the veterans’ scheme 
has been used as a means of placating those who could become potential threats 
to the state (UNHCHR 2006). This, in turn, makes it difficult to reign in pension 
amounts. In January 2008, for example, when the government attempted to 
reduce pension amounts due to budgetary constraints, the opposition party 
accused the government of ‘insulting veterans’ and the proposed reductions 
were never made.7 The orientation of the scheme towards meeting narrowly 
defined stability goals also means there is likely to be little interest among the 
political leadership in making it more inclusive of women. 
What is clear is that, at the time of writing, the primary beneficiaries of the 
scheme are men who can claim to have been high-ranking and/or long-serving 
combatants. In addition to pensions and recognition of their past roles, these men 
are being rewarded with significant respect and power. Veterans’ views carry 
weight in parliamentary debates, election campaigns and within local politics. 
Veterans are also benefiting financially through the preferential allocation of 
government contracts (IPAC 2014: 13), and continue to play a variety of informal 
security roles, such as intelligence gathering and personal protection (ICG 2012: 
14). All of this suggests that the veterans’ scheme is bolstering the power and 
influence of a militarised male constituency—an issue that is problematic, not 
only for East Timorese women but for the society as a whole.
Problematic assumptions within the veterans’ scheme 
Behind the marginalisation of women in the veterans’ scheme is the implicit 
assumption that the Resistance was an overwhelmingly male struggle. A prevailing 
view held by prominent male Resistance figures is that given men were the primary 
participants in the armed front, a program to valorise veterans will necessarily 
include a higher proportion of men than women. While readily agreeing that 
women played an invaluable role in the struggle, and suffered in gender-specific 
ways as a result of this contribution, a number of senior Resistance figures 
interviewed for this study suggested that the valorisation scheme was intended to 
recognise a persons’ contribution to the struggle regardless of whether they were 
a man or woman, and was, therefore, non-discriminatory.8 
7  Timor Post 8/1/2008. Government Asks the Parliament to Alter the Veterans’ Law, Fretilin: AMP Insults 
Veterans. 
8  Interviews with the Secretary of State for National Liberation Combatant Affairs, Marito Reis, 21 March 
2008; Parliamentarian Cornelio Gama (nom de guerre L7), 12 April 2011; Parliamentarian Faustino dos Santos 
(nom de guerre Renan Selak), 13 April 2011; former Resistance member and member of the CAAC and CAVF, 
Andre da Costa Abel (nom de guerre L4), 26 March 2011.
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While this argument appears logical on the surface, a deeper reading suggests 
that it is based on erroneous and gender-stereotypical assumptions about 
the roles of East Timorese women. Key among these is the implicit view that 
women’s contributions to the Resistance were not as important as the roles of 
male combatants. This view ignores the way in which the Resistance effectively 
operated. As is well known, FALINTIL relied heavily upon the clandestine 
network for its survival, and civilian-led demonstrations, diplomacy 
and advocacy were vital to the ultimate success of the independence struggle.
Assumptions that downplay women’s agency as political and military actors 
are reflected in criteria upon which veterans gain access to pensions under the 
scheme. Roles such as bearing arms against the enemy are elevated over the 
contributions women made to the Resistance as logisticians, couriers, cooks, 
nurses, clandestinos and international activists. The reliance on tallying up the 
years of ‘exclusive dedication’ to the struggle and a person’s formal position 
within the Resistance hierarchy in determining access to decorations and 
pensions further excludes women. While this definition also excludes men 
who made non-armed contributions to the Resistance, women are particularly 
disadvantaged because they are far less likely than men to have held formal 
positions within the Resistance hierarchy and be able to prove an uninterrupted, 
full-time period of service. 
Specific provisions in the veterans’ scheme further discriminate against women. 
For instance, one provision precludes spouses of deceased veterans from 
receiving a pension if they have remarried. The implicit assumption behind 
this provision seems to be that women should have been ‘loyal’ wives awaiting 
the return of their men from the battlefront. It also seems to reflect a view 
that women are not independent persons but the property and responsibility 
of their husbands. The deeply entrenched nature of this assumption was 
evident during the parliamentary debate on the 2006 NLC statute, when some 
women parliamentarians raised a motion to amend the law, allowing widows 
of Resistance members to be entitled to pensions regardless of whether they 
had remarried or not. They argued that in many cases these women were left 
vulnerable to sexual abuse by the Indonesian security forces and their militia 
after their husband disappeared, died or fled to the jungle. Remarriage was often 
the only way they could avoid this abuse. The motion was defeated as former 
male commanders, with the support of a number of female parliamentarians 
who were widows of FALINTIL, argued that these women should have been 
loyal to the memory of  their deceased husbands and demonstrated the same 
strength as other women who had not remarried. 
The veterans’ scheme also excludes women who suffered sexual violence as 
a result of their work for, or connections with the Resistance. Although the 
veterans’ scheme is not intended as a reparation program for victims of human 
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rights violations during the conflict, it does purport to support veterans 
and their immediate family who were left vulnerable as a result of their 
contribution to the Resistance. Factors such as an individual’s age, disability, 
and their experiences of detention and torture are, therefore, taken into account 
within the scheme. The issue of sexual violence, however, never entered into 
parliamentary discussions on the veterans’ legislation. This is despite the fact 
that women associated with the Resistance were particularly vulnerable to 
rape and sexual abuse during the occupation, and often became proxy targets 
for male family members who were fighting in the mountains or who had fled 
abroad (CAVR 2005: ch. 7; see also Carey 2001: 258–59).
Another aspect of the veterans’ legislation that discriminates against women is 
its neglect of second wives. It is well known that many male FALINTIL fighters 
took on second wives—often referred to as feen ailaran (bush wives)—while 
remaining legally married to their first wives. Under the NLC legislation, the 
survival pension must be equally divided among heirs with equal claims, such 
as the veteran’s parents or his/her children. Although spouses receive priority 
over parents and children in relation to receipt of a survival pension, in the 
event that multiple wives come forward to present their claims only the legally 
married spouse is entitled. This ignores the reality that former Resistance fighters 
had multiple relationships and children with women who they subsequently 
abandoned. It also serves to reinforce the gendered stereotype that these ‘bush 
wives’ were women of low morals and not legitimate wives as they had been 
‘living rough’ with male FALINTIL fighters in the bush. The extent to which 
‘bush wives’ continue to be held in low regard was reflected in the attitudes of 
policymakers interviewed for this study. The prevailing view expressed was 
that it was up to the woman herself to negotiate with the legal wife on sharing 
the pension. A ‘bush wife’ who seeks to claim veterans’ benefits is, therefore, 
dependent upon the largesse of a woman and family with whom she has no links 
and, therefore, no leverage.
This is not to suggest that the veterans’ scheme has not benefited some women. 
At the time this study was conducted, 38 per cent of those in receipt of a 
veterans’ pension were women. However, of these women, 97.5 per cent were 
receiving a Survival Pension, which means they were not receiving a pension in 
recognition of their own contribution, but that of a family member. This means 
that the underlying gendered assumptions about women’s roles during the 
conflict are not being challenged. Nonetheless, that a significant percentage 
of pension recipients are women suggests that, in theory, the scheme has had 
some empowering possibilities for those who were widowed during the conflict. 
Given the tenuous position widows occupy in society, particularly those without 
the support of extended families, more research is needed to gauge the extent to 
which women are truly benefiting from the survival pension.
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Towards a more inclusive veterans’ scheme?
At a purely technical level, a greater recognition of women’s contributions to the 
Resistance could be accomplished relatively easily. Possibilities could include 
amending the legislation to allow second wives to claim a part of their former 
husband’s pension and allowing remarried spouses to claim the pension. There is 
also scope within the existing veterans’ legislation to award the title of National 
Liberation Combatant (NLC) to women who provided logistical support, medical 
services or intelligence to FALINTIL or the clandestine networks for a minimum 
of three years. It would also be relatively easy and affordable to award women 
the honorific title of ‘Supporter of the National Liberation Struggle’ if they do 
not have the necessary years to qualify as an NLC, but they did provide valuable 
support to the Resistance. A special award could be created to recognise women’s 
roles within the Resistance, as was done for young people who were involved in 
the Santa Cruz demonstration of 1991.
Of course, given what is at stake for existing male veterans in terms of financial 
and symbolic power, any attempts to broaden the parameters of the veterans’ 
scheme are likely to encounter significant resistance. Little is likely to be 
accomplished without the active involvement of women’s NGOs and women 
parliamentarians. None of the male former Resistance figures interviewed for 
this study saw it as their role to advance the interests of their female camarada 
(comrades), and, at the time of writing, women’s NGOs had been noticeably 
absent from any debates surrounding veterans’ policy and legislation. 
One notable exception was the successful attempt by women’s groups to advocate 
for honorary military decorations, including ‘The Order of the Guerilla’ to 
be bestowed upon women who were stationed with FALINTIL in the jungle. 
Although the women maintain political rather than military titles, that this 
award recognises them as part of the armed front is significant. Yet, even this 
relatively modest initiative has encountered resistance. One former senior 
member of FALINTIL complained that women ‘who just sat there’ have been 
provided with the same level of symbolic recognition as men who directed 
military strategy.9 Given the powerful nature of the veterans’ lobby, it might be 
necessary for women parliamentarians, OPMT, OMT and women’s NGOs to form 
a strategic partnership to enable women to exert more influence over veterans’ 
policy. Insisting on women’s representation from FALINTIL and the clandestine 
and diplomatic fronts, and within the proposed Consultative Council of NLCs, 
could be the first challenge of this partnership. 
9  Interview with former senior member of the Resistance, 21 March 2011.
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Of course, for those seeking to promote gender equality in Timor-Leste, it may 
also be problematic to place too much faith in a strategy that seeks to recognise 
more women as veterans. What is clear is that the veterans’ scheme is bolstering 
a vision of citizenship that is based upon a militarised identity. It perpetuates the 
idea that a person’s role in the (armed) Resistance is a key factor in determining 
their status to speak as a ‘legitimate’ East Timorese and, consequently, their 
access to political and economic power. East Timorese women’s organisations 
and others pursuing a gender equality agenda need to carefully consider the 
extent to which they want to ‘buy in’ to this vision of citizenship or seek to 
promote a more inclusive vision. Energies might be better spent, for instance, 
advocating for an expansion of the existing social safety net system to address 
the needs of vulnerable East Timorese regardless of whether they participated 
in the struggle. 
Conclusion 
The marginalisation of women within the veterans’ scheme has consequences 
not only for East Timorese women but also for society as a whole. It means 
that the economic benefits that flow from the veterans’ scheme are accruing 
mainly to men. Second, given that social status in Timor-Leste is inexorably 
tied to an ability to establish one’s credentials within the Resistance, women 
are missing out on the respect that is accorded to veterans and the social capital 
that accrues from this. In this sense, the veterans’ scheme represents a missed 
opportunity to promote women’s agency and strength, and to help improve 
their social status. Third, the elevation of the role of armed men is further 
privileging the voices of former male combatants above others, and, in doing 
so, contributing to a militarised construction of citizenship. This construction 
of citizenship also fosters an environment in which violence against women 
is condoned. Finally, the representation and remembrance of the conflict as 
an armed (and predominantly male) struggle against the Indonesian occupiers 
represents a missed opportunity to create a national narrative that is inclusive of 
the diverse and complex experiences of men, women and young people. To do 
justice to these experiences, and to work towards gender equality, it would 
seem that long-term and creative efforts are required both within and beyond 
the veterans’ scheme.
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Inequalities between urban and rural Timor-Leste have been a persistent feature 
of the social landscape from colonial times. Many of these disparities reflect the 
asymmetric political and economic dynamics that distinguish urban centres of 
power and financial influence, especially the capital Dili, from the scattered, 
impoverished countryside where near subsistence agriculture and inevitably 
limited state services prevail. Socially, too, under Portuguese rule, the old 
status distinctions between assimilados (civilizados; assimilated)1 and indígenas 
(natives) or worse (salvagem; savages) spoke to a perceived social gulf between 
advanced and educated urban modernity over and against the primitive and 
unenlightened rural hinterland (Roque 2012). If today these regimes of place-
making between cidade (town) and foho (country) have been reworked and 
revised under Indonesian occupation, and the subsequent achievement of 
independence, echoes of these discriminatory spatial categories are, nevertheless, 
reinscribed through differential access to economic opportunity and services of 
state (Silva 2011). 
These persistent inequalities can also be measured in statistical terms. In 2012, 
for example, the population of Timor-Leste stood at 1,154,625, and 70.4 per cent 
of citizens were classed as rural dwellers. They include a majority of the 
1  As Silva (2011: 159) notes, ‘assimilated’ were those who adopted Christianity, spoke Portuguese and 
consequently were considered free from the taint of usos e costumes (custom and traditions).
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vulnerable 50 per cent of the population living on less than US$2 per day—most 
of whom are highly dependent on the marked seasonal variations of the tropical 
monsoon climate. By contrast, some 57.8 per cent of urbanites in Dili occupy the 
highest wealth quintiles compared to just 8.7 per cent in rural areas (National 
Statistics Directorate (Timor-Leste) 2010: 27–28). As a result, some 91 per cent 
of urbanites enjoy safe drinking water, while just 57  per cent of their rural 
counterparts receive a similar level of service (National Statistics Directorate 
(Timor-Leste) 2010: xx). Rural areas have high rates of child mortality (8.7 per 
cent of children under five years of age) and much lower literacy levels (44 per 
cent of those >15 years) (National Statistics Directorate (Timor-Leste) 2010: 
xvii). Children in urban areas are almost four times more likely to be enrolled at 
secondary school than their peers in rural areas (National Statistics Directorate 
2011). 
In recent years, funding efforts by the national government to improve 
living standards beyond the urban concentrations have had positive impacts. 
New  schools; well-stocked village health clinics; the roll-out of electricity 
transmission services; and the expansion of social payments to pensioners, 
veterans and village labour projects have made substantial contributions to 
improving rural household well-being. But inequalities persist, and one visible 
response to endemic levels of rural poverty has been a sustained rural–urban 
drift, both from the hinterland to district townships and from the remote uplands 
to the buzz and bright lights of the city, especially to Dili, the national capital, 
and especially by young people disenchanted with the prospects of a lifetime of 
subsistence agriculture and the overly familiar confines of home communities. 
Some of these hopefuls move in search of better education opportunities and 
vocational training. Others respond to the lack of rural employment opportunities, 
and the drudgery of swidden agriculture.2 All embrace their youthful desires 
to engage and consume the attractions of modernity, away from prying eyes 
of parents and neighbourly kin. This migratory trend can be appreciated in 
the 33 per cent increase of the Dili population (58,296) since 2004—a figure 
that represents 40 per cent of the overall population increase of the Timor-Leste 
population over that period (National Statistics Directorate (Timor-Leste) 2011). 
The lure of the city and the perceived freedoms and possibilities it presents 
has been a striking feature of post-independence East Timor, and one that is 
unlikely to diminish anytime soon.3 
2  The lack of support for agricultural development has meant that in the 2014 national Budget just 2.2 per 
cent (US$34 million) has been allocated to the sector, undermining its economic and agronomic prospects. 
3  Indeed, internal migration has been a sustained feature of the history of Dili, especially from the early 
20th century. Guterres (2003: 4) notes that on the eve of the Second World War and the subsequent Japanese 
invasion, the population of Dili was just 12,000 people, which grew to 30,000 by 1975, and over 100,000 
during the Indonesian occupation. See also Ranck (1977), who argued that Dili was a migrant city even before 
the Indonesian invasion in 1975, with as much as 75 per cent of the population composed of rural migrants. 
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As in the past, migration pathways to the city are closely associated with 
kinship and broader affinal networks, which rural householders draw on in 
urban centres to access temporary accommodation and networks of patronage 
(see Ranck 1977; Field 2004). This trend was given greater impetus in the 
months and years following 1999, when thousands of squatters took up 
residence in abandoned Indonesian housing, especially in the western parts of 
Dili. Over time, the sustained pattern of urban drift has seen the emergence of a 
distinctive residential make-up in the capital, as Scambary makes clear: 
East Timor’s patterns of rural–urban migration over the past three decades 
have produced diverse hybrid micro-societies, in that they maintain aspects of 
traditional village systems such as clusters of kinship groups and vestiges of 
traditional authority, but in abbreviated form, sharing space with other kinship 
groups in highly heterogeneous societies reminiscent of more established urban 
and industrialised societies (2013: 3). 
These concentrations of familiar social relations built around extended 
networks of kinship and alliance to source communities in the rural hinterland 
have been an important enabling mechanism to facilitate migration to the city 
and corresponding circular patterns of return.4 But the reality of urban life 
for most young migrants is frequently disappointing, and despite inclusion 
in urban networks of support and patronage, youthful aspirants still face the 
reality of inconsistent itinerant work, endemic, high youth unemployment, and 
strong competition for a limited number of jobs. The absence of manufacturing 
industries with constrained private sector investment leaves little room for 
absorbing the steady stream of high school graduates who enter the employment 
market every year—an impact estimated to be more than a quarter of the youth 
population aged 15–29, or nearly 15,000 young people per annum (Thu and 
Silva 2013). The result is a complex urban dynamic of competitive adaptation 
among socially aligned networks, the rise of youthful political discontent, the 
spread of opportunistic petty crime, alcohol consumption, drug use and gang 
hooliganism (see Scambary 2012; Kostner and Clark 2007).5 
In this challenging environment, there are opportunities for bright and 
connected young people, but similarly, there are, perhaps, many more who 
struggle to secure pathways to successful urban livelihoods, and whose dreams 
end in disillusion and failure. As Guterres (2003: 192) has observed in his study 
of Timorese migrants to Dili, some of whom found the transition eventually 
untenable: ‘(r)ural life may not be exciting, but it is relatively easy and provides 
4  Scambary (2013) has highlighted the dynamic, mobile and heterogenous character of the membership of 
many urban communities, as seasonal factors and continuous visits between hinterland settlements and the city 
by school students who may return for vacations, or people who participate in religious and ceremonial events. 
5  The impact of these dynamic processes reaching a destructive high point in the 2006 crisis in East Timor 
when the fragility of the new nation was exposed (Scambary 2009). 
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a safety net for those who fail in the city’. It is noteworthy in this respect that, 
despite the continuing movement of people to the towns and cities, the rural 
population of East Timor itself continues to grow. At an estimated average 
growth rate of around 2.5 per cent per annum, the rural population is projected 
to top one million by 2020. This compares with nearly double the rate of urban 
population growth (4.83 per cent) to over half a million (UNESCP 2010). 
International migration 
The possibility of realising aspirational futures among young rural migrants to 
the city remains elusive and a significant challenge for government policy and 
Timorese society alike. However, since the historic achievement of independence, 
a growing cadre of young Timorese have found new pathways to comparative 
prosperity through international labour migration. Some of these pathways 
have been promoted and sponsored through bilateral government programs 
with regional countries such as Malaysia, South Korea and Australia. In the 
case of South Korea, for example, East Timorese labour migrants are included 
among the 15 countries that have signed a memorandum of understanding with 
South Korea to take up temporary labour opportunities, mostly for unskilled 
employment, and all subject to annual quotas (Yoon and Jung 2013: 16). In 2012, 
for example, 485 East Timorese obtained work contracts, but these numbers are 
dwarfed by migrant workers from other countries in Asia for the same year, 
such as Indonesia (6,110), Vietnam (6,853) and Cambodia (8,047) (Yoon and 
Jung 2013: 17). 
Timor-Leste has also been included in Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme, 
directed mainly at Pacific Island communities. It is designed to enhance 
employment opportunities for low-skilled, unemployed workers, and to satisfy 
demand in the horticulture and tourism sectors for low paid, seasonal workers 
(DEEWR 2013). The pilot program was initiated in 2012, and some 50 East 
Timorese have participated in work placements, which is a reasonable beginning. 
But  recent evaluations suggest that regulatory complexity for approved 
employers, and cost advantages of employing European backpackers on working 
holidays over East Timorese workers, limits the effectiveness and scope of the 
present program (Thu and Silva 2013). That said, for participants, the exercise 
has been rewarding. According to Thu and Silva (2013), in 2012–13, a sample 
of Timorese seasonal workers earned between AU$10,000 and AU$18,000 in 
their five- to six-month period of contractual labour in Australia. These figures 
are well above any comparable remuneration that they may have secured in 
Timor-Leste. Reportedly, these earnings provide a range of livelihood benefits 
to participants and their families back home. 
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Formal work exchange agreements enacted through bilateral agreements clearly 
offer labour opportunities for young, low-skilled East Timorese workers, but 
in terms of addressing problems of domestic under-employment, the results 
to date have been underwhelming and limited in scope. Far more significant 
has been the dramatic rise of informal temporary labour migration of young 
hopefuls who have left Timor-Leste seeking shiftwork and low-skill factory 
jobs in Western Europe, especially the United Kingdom (UK). Key to this 
unexpected and surprising development over the previous decade has been the 
ability of East Timorese to secure Portuguese passports and thus eligibility to 
work in the European Union. The origins of what is now a thriving chain of 
migration derive from the pioneering travel of former student activists in the 
1990s, who gained political asylum through embassies in Jakarta to escape state 
persecution following the repercussions of the Santa Cruz Cemetery massacre of 
students in Dili (1991). Following the remarkable achievement of independence 
and the decision by the Government of Portugal to automatically recognise all 
East Timorese born before 20 May 2002 as Portuguese citizens with associated 
entitlements, a path was opened to international travel and access to employment 
in the European Union (McWilliam 2012).
Since the end of Indonesian occupation, large numbers have accessed the 
migration pathway to the UK, drawn from many corners of Timor-Leste, including 
the rural hinterlands and towns where family networks and contacts in Portugal 
have been instrumental in sponsoring initial participants (see McWilliam 2012). 
Estimates of the number of participants are difficult to gauge. Shuaib (2008), in 
one study, estimated that up to 800 young Timorese were leaving for overseas 
work every year, and while his study was undertaken when the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) was beginning to be felt in Europe, the flow of Timorese labour 
migrants heading overseas has continued unabated. Young men make up the 
majority of travellers, but young women are well represented—many joining 
their brothers or cousins along well-versed networks of kinship and family. 
These days, thousands of East Timorese workers are dispersed around the UK, 
employed in a variety of low-skill jobs: shiftworkers in food packing factories 
(for example, Tesco and Sainsburys) and manufacturing, meat processing in 
Northern Ireland, cleaning, security and night porter work, car detailing, and 
restaurant services. Most live in group houses, sharing expenses and experiences, 
and keeping in touch with distant relatives and friends through the modern 
miracles of Skype and social media such as Facebook. The streams of Instagram 
images exchanged among relatives and friends in cyberspace offer insights into 
a cosmopolitan modernity involving travel and adventure, which encourages 
younger siblings and their friends back home to emulate their success. And if, 
in reality, the images often mask less desirable and unfulfilling aspects of life 
in the UK—the cold, grey weather, homesickness, isolation, gambling losses, 
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and discrimination—there is no shortage of would-be labour migrants waiting 
for news of their passport and support from sponsors who might facilitate their 
journey to a ‘better’ life. 
Remittance livelihoods
For most young Timorese migrants, the primary goal of overseas work is to 
generate savings to support their families in Timor-Leste and to build a financial 
stake to secure their own futures back home. Deirdre McKay (2007) has referred 
to the practice of remittance payments as monetised expressions of care and 
obligations to family, and the evidence is clear to see in certain contemporary 
settlements in Timor-Leste, where the bulk of new house construction is 
funded directly through remittance transfers from sons or siblings diligently 
putting away a sizeable portion of their wages to support their families at home. 
Los Palos in Lautem District is a case in point, where large numbers of its young 
people are now working and living in the UK, and, in certain areas of the town, 
such as the Aldeias of Ira Ara and Lere Loho, there is a widespread building 
and renovation boom underway (McWilliam 2012). Financial transfers from 
committed savers are enabling many young families to fast-track the construction 
of new cinder block housing and signal their success to their neighbours and 
wider community. Maria Da Costa, for example, while living with her parents 
and young daughter, has been able to construct a completely new house to lock-
up stage in just over 12 months, using the money her husband, Marito, transfers 
each month (US$500) from his job in a local library in Oxford. His proficiency 
with English and a tenacious savings ethic has achieved something they didn’t 
think possible when he embarked on his journey. There are many similar 
stories, and they highlight one reason for the popularity of international labour 
migration to Europe for young East Timorese.
Not all people who make the journey are disciplined savers, of course, and there 
are numerous stories of migrants and suaka politiku (asylum seekers) who have 
spent years overseas but fail to generate savings or send proceeds of their efforts 
to their families in need. Gambling, partying and spending-up means that there 
may be little left over to remit back home. Across the UK, including the towns 
and cities where East Timorese settle for work, there are typically numerous 
gambling and sports betting outlets (Ladbrokes, 888sport, Elite and Skybet, 
among others) that are more than ready to relieve bored shiftworkers of their 
weekly incomes. Gambling for young Timorese has a strong social aspect—they 
can gather after their shifts to put a few pounds through the digital roulette 
machines, bet on the results of English football matches, or chance the quick-
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pick lotteries. Rumours of big wins among Timorese players that circulate 
among migrant groups and local Timorese networks is often enough to keep 
young people feeding the machines. 
For those who sustain their commitment to family and their savings targets, the 
flow of remittances through Western Union wire transfers are making significant 
contributions to community livelihoods. Funds are regularly directed to support 
everyday expenses and contributions to lifecycle rituals of kin and affines. 
In addition to new house construction and improving the material conditions of 
life, savings and capital are also directed to supporting parents, siblings, spouses 
and children for everyday consumption needs and associated costs. Where 
possible, participants also seek to build a financial stake for future trading or 
microenterprises on their return home. According to Shuaib’s study of those 
receiving remittances, some 45 per cent of households used the transfers to 
support daily household consumption, 41 per cent for housing improvements, 
30 per cent for school fees, and 10 per cent for loan repayments. Most were also 
saving a portion of these funds to direct to education expenses (75 per cent), 
housing improvements (35 per cent), weddings and funerals (18 per cent), 
and business investment (10 per cent) (Shuaib 2008: 209). These findings are 
highly consistent with more recent personal research on which this chapter is 
based, and point to a growing significance of remittances for livelihood support 
and everyday consumption. 
The role of remittance in supporting the education of younger siblings to attend 
high schools in Dili and further afield in neighbouring Indonesia is a further 
important feature. This objective has long been a factor in Timorese rural–urban 
migration, as Ranck pointed out in his survey of Dili in the 1970s. Then he 
noted that urban adaptation through education was a key element of migration 
success, and ‘all the network sets show an obviously over-riding concern for 
education’ (1977: 235). 
Furthermore, and despite Timor-Leste’s tumultuous past, Indonesia has become 
an increasingly attractive destination for young East Timorese seeking to secure 
vocational training and educational qualifications. Drawing in part on earlier 
pathways for education forged by young East Timorese during the Indonesian 
period (Bexley 2009), the new transnational education migration is driven by 
a pragmatic parental assessment of relative costs and benefits, as well as the 
familiarity of Indonesian educational institutions, language and attendant 
cultural values. Although supporting children in school or university in 
Indonesia is expensive for the average East Timorese family, lower living costs in 
Java and the perceived quality of education services can make the total package 
a cost-effective option. Bexley has noted, in 2009 at least, that the Timor-Leste 
embassy in Jakarta estimated there were some 3,500 East Timorese studying in 
Indonesia, and the number is likely to have increased since then (Bexley 2009). 
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Young East Timorese appear to be enthusiastic participants in the process, 
related in part, no doubt, to the popularity of Indonesian pop music and sinetron 
(televised soap operas) that have huge followings in Timor-Leste and contribute 
in no small way to contemporary experiences of modernity and the shaping of 
youthful values and aspirations (see also Ostergaard 2005). 
Patterns and prospects for labour migration 
In his 2008 survey of 105 East Timorese households receiving remittance flows, 
Shuaib made a number of striking observations that speak to the growing 
importance of transnational labour migration and the export income it generates. 
Among these findings, he noted, for instance, that: 
1. ‘Households with members working overseas are better off financially by 
many multiples than households pursuing local employment’.
2. Western Union electronic transfers remitted some US$370,000 per month 
into Timor-Leste (2008), predominantly from the UK. This amounted to an 
estimated US$5  million per annum in 2008 now likely to be significantly 
higher.6 
3. The value of inward remittances to Timor-Leste makes migrant labour the 
country’s second largest non-oil export after coffee. 
These observations point to the growing importance of this livelihood option 
for many young East Timorese disillusioned with unemployment and the 
limited livelihood options in their hamlets of origin or on the dusty streets 
of the towns and cities. Labour migration to the distant UK is providing a 
bounteous and unexpected source of income and remittance flows to thousands 
of beneficiary households, whose member’s lives have been materially enriched 
through the practice. Despite the impact of the GFC, especially in Western 
Europe, the slowdown has had limited effect on the outward flow of Timorese 
recruits. Their willingness to tackle low-skilled, menial and factory line work 
means that they can still access the comparatively higher wage opportunities 
on offer in the UK. If the macro-economic impact of these remittances remains 
relatively small in an economy so heavily dependent on oil revenues—estimated 
to be just 1.4 per cent of non-oil GDP in 2006 (Shuaib 2008: 195)—the revenue 
flow is only likely to grow, and, over time, contribute a sustained source of 
economic support for multiple Timorese households with members overseas. 
Like its regional neighbours in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, labour migration 
is likely to provide an important and continuing source of supplementary 
6  The sum included transfers of funds through the established banks in Dili, such as ANZ Bank and the 
Portuguese Caixa Geral de Depositos trading as BNU. 
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income for many years to come.7 Its broadly democratic nature also contributes 
to expanded education opportunities for many young Timorese and to breaking 
down the historical class inequalities that have persisted between rural and 
urban residents for generations. 
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CHAPTER 16
Assessing the Implementation 




In 2013, Timor-Leste ranked 134 out of 186 countries in the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index (UNDP 2013). In 2012, 
37.4 per cent of its 1.17 million citizens lived on less than US$1.25 per day, and 
68.1 per cent of its population lived in what the UNDP defines as ‘multidimensional 
poverty’—that is, they experienced multiple deprivations at the individual level 
in health, education and standard of living (UNDP 2014). However, since 2005, 
Timor-Leste has had access to relatively large revenues from the Bayu-Undan 
and Kitan oil and gas fields. It may also receive additional future revenues from 
the Greater Sunrise field and from other fields yet to be explored (UNESCAP 
and UNDP 2003). Some projections predict that these revenues could run out 
by 2025 (La’o Hamutuk 2014), and questions of how the government should 
use these revenues to address the country’s development challenges remain 
subject to debate. The cash payment schemes that the government introduced 
in 2008 should occupy a leading role in this debate, as while they play a role 
in peace-building and social protection, they also contribute to rising levels 
of government spending. Therefore, it is important for long-term development 
to assess who these programs are targeted at, how they are implemented, what 
impact they have, and what alternatives may be available.1
1  Research for this chapter was in part performed in 2010 with Alexandra Gillies and Mericio Akara under 
a consultancy for the Revenue Watch Institute.
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Payments to veterans of the resistance and their survivors
The most extensive cash payment scheme comprises four pension schemes for 
veterans of the resistance to Indonesia’s invasion and occupation. Superior 
Pensions are for veterans distinguished ‘for their outstanding contribution to 
the resistance struggle’. Special Subsistence Pensions are for veterans with at 
least eight years of full-time participation in the struggle, or who are incapable 
of work due to physical or mental disabilities resulting from their participation 
in the struggle. Special Retirement Pensions are for veterans with at least 
15 years of full-time participation in the struggle. Survivor Pensions are for the 
surviving spouse, orphans (regardless of age), parents or siblings of ‘National 
Liberation Veteran Combatants’ who died ‘as a result of their participation’ 
in the struggle, or who were beneficiaries of either the Special Subsistence or 
Special Retirement Pensions and have since died. The order of preference among 
survivors is: surviving spouse, children, parents and then siblings. If there is 
more than one rightful claimant (such as multiple children), the pension ‘shall be 
divided equally between claimants’.2
Payments to internally displaced persons (IDPs)
The second cash payment scheme targets the approximately 100,000 persons 
who were internally displaced during, and in the aftermath of, the April and 
May 2006 security crisis. In late 2007, the government launched its National 
Recovery Strategy, Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru (Together Building the Future). 
One of the strategy’s five pillars, Hamutuk Hari’i Uma (Together Building 
Homes) (ICG 2009; Lopes 2009; OVPMRDTL 2007), aimed to facilitate the 
return or resettlement of IDPs by providing compensation for damage caused 
to their houses. The payments varied according to the level of verified damage: 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) whose houses had been totally or largely 
destroyed received US$4,500, IDPs whose houses were severely damaged but 
still standing received US$3,000, IDPs whose houses were less severely damaged 
received US$1,500, and IDPs whose houses needed only minor repairs received 
US$500. Most payments were made in 2008. In late 2009, the government also 
compensated IDPs for possessions damaged in the crisis. As it was too difficult 
to assess on a case-by-case basis, each family was given US$500. 
2  Decree Law on the Pensions of the Combatants and Martyrs of the National Liberation no. 15/2008.
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‘Petitioner’ payments 
Following the security crisis, the government also used cash payments to 
resolve the case of the ‘petitioners’—a group of 591 disgruntled soldiers who 
had helped to instigate the crisis. As the government perceived the petitioners 
as a potential source of insecurity, in early 2008 it introduced a demobilisation 
program that consisted of payments of US$8,000 each to reintegrate into civilian 
life (ICG 2013).3 
Support allowances for the elderly and disabled
The third cash payment scheme also aimed to assist other vulnerable groups 
under the National Recovery Strategy. Accordingly, in 2008 the government 
introduced a Support Allowance to meet the ‘basic needs’ of the elderly and 
disabled.4 Individuals that receive other types of benefits (such as veterans) are 
ineligible. The amount of the Support Allowance ‘shall not exceed one third of 
the minimum wage accorded for the current year to civil service employees and 
shall not be lower than the previous one’. The initial amount of the allowance 
was set at US$20 per month, which was equivalent to 20 per cent of the national 
minimum wage for civil servants. However, in 2010 the allowance was raised to 
US$30 per month in recognition that incomes had risen (RDTLMSS 2008, 2009).
Bolsa de Mãe program 
The fourth cash payment scheme, the Bolsa de Mãe (Mother’s Purse), was also 
introduced in 2008 in accordance with the National Recovery Strategy. 
It  provides the neediest female-headed households with a monthly subsidy 
to assist them to feed and educate their children. This payment is conditional 
on children receiving good grades at school and the amount of the payment 
varies according to the education level of the child: US$5 per month for primary 
school, US$10 per month for junior secondary school, US$20 per month for 
senior secondary school, $25 per month for university within Timor-Leste, 
and $30 per month for university overseas (RDTLMSS 2008, 2009). 
3  Decree on the Integration of Ex-Soldiers into Civilian Life no. 12/2008.
4  Decree Law on the Support Allowance for the Aged and Disabled no. 19/2008.
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Implementation
The implementation of the cash payment schemes has faced a number of 
administrative challenges, primarily relating to the identification of recipients. 
In order to identify veterans who should receive pension payments, the former 
President Xanana Gusmão established veterans’ commissions, who worked 
during 2003–05 to register veterans and their survivors (Fundasaun Mahein 
2011).5 In 2009, their data was verified by the Comissão de Homenagem (Homage 
Commission), which compiled the initial lists of veterans to receive payments.6 
A separate tribunal, the Comissão de Homenagem, Supervisão de Registo e Recurso 
(Commission for Homage, Supervision of Registration and Appeals), was created 
to hear appeals about the registration process.7 However, although the process 
of identification has been relatively thorough, individuals have made false 
claims of being veterans (ICG 2011).8 The identification of wives, children and 
siblings who claim the Survivor Pension has also proved difficult, as many have 
difficultly verifying their relationship to the deceased veteran in the absence of 
reliable birth or marriage records during the Indonesian occupation.9
Similar difficulties arise with respect to the IDPs payments. In order to claim 
these payments, IDPs registered with the Ministério da Solidariedade Social 
(MSS; Ministry of Social Solidarity), and then MSS estimation teams worked 
with the Ministério das Infraestruturas (Ministry of Infrastructure) and village 
chiefs to verify the reported damage. To cheat the system, some non-IDPs took 
up residence in IDP camps and tried to register to receive payments, some IDPs 
from the same household each claimed payments, while other IDPs duplicated 
their electoral cards to claim multiple payments.10 A portion of these fraudulent 
claimants are likely to have received payments, as the process for verifying 
the damage to IDP houses was labour-intensive and rushed.11 Identification 
problems also arise with respect to the Elderly and Disabled Support Allowance, 
as it can be difficult to identify who qualifies as elderly, because electoral cards 
5  Interview with a government official, 30/9/2010.
6  First Amendment to Law No. 3/2006 of 12 April no. 9/2009.
7  Statute of the National Liberation Combatants.
8  Interview with a government official (a), 27/9/2010; interview with a government official, 30/9/2010.
9  Interview with a government official, 30/9/2010.
10  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 26/9/2010; interview with a member of Timorese 
civil society, 27/9/2010; interview with an international humanitarian worker, 27/9/2010; interview with an 
international humanitarian worker, 28/9/2010.
11  Interview with an international humanitarian worker, 30/9/2010.
239
16. Assessing the Implementation and Impact of Timor‑Leste’s Cash Payment Schemes
often contain unreliable age data.12 There are fewer problems with the Bolsa de 
Mãe program, as recipients are currently identified by village chiefs and MSS 
child protection officers assess applicants and mediate claims.13 
Making cash payments is also a logistical and security challenge, particularly 
in rural areas where effective banking and mail systems are underdeveloped.14 
While most cash payment schemes are administered by the MSS, the Ministério 
das Finanças (Ministry of Finance) makes the actual payments. Many payments 
have been paid in cash, although there are plans to make more payments into 
bank accounts. In most cases, Ministry of Finance officials travel with the cash 
from Dili to district administration offices, and then work with MSS officials and 
village chiefs to ensure payment.15 
Collusion and corruption is another challenge. For example, in the case of the 
IDPs payments, some MSS officials are said to have overstated the damage to 
IDP houses in order to secure a larger payment for the IDPs and subsequent 
kickbacks for themselves.16 There is also said to be manipulation in the 
administration of allowances to the elderly and disabled: in some cases, recipients 
had died yet their names remain on the recipient list so that others could claim 
their money.17 One member of civil society cited a case where a subdistrict 
administrator asked a village chief to sign a blank list of recipients, which 
the administrator would later complete.18 There is anecdotal evidence of MSS 
officials demanding payments from elderly and disabled recipients for fictional 
‘administration costs’ before they could be paid or given their identification 
cards.19 One member of parliament (MP) argued that the commissioners who 
vetted veterans’ registrations ‘handpicked those they deemed to be veterans 
and blocked those who they did not like’.20
Related to this, there appears to be insufficient oversight of the cash payment 
schemes. This is partly explained by the fact that Timor-Leste is still a young 
state experiencing capacity and resource shortages. Census and other citizen 
registration data is often unreliable, particularly identification documents from 
Portuguese colonial times or the Indonesian occupation. The cash payment 
12  Interview with a village chief, 28/9/2010; interview with an international humanitarian worker, 
29/9/2010.
13  Interview with a government official, 28/9/2010.
14  Interview with a government official (b), 27/9/2010; interview with a government official (a), 29/9/2010.
15  Interview with a government official (a), 29/9/2010.
16  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 26/9/2010; interview with a member of Timorese civil 
society, 27/9/2010; interview with an international humanitarian worker, 27/9/2010.
17  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 26/9/2010.
18  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 1/10/2010.
19  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 1/10/2010; interview with a member of parliament 
(b), 30/9/2010.
20  Interview with a member of parliament (b), 30/9/2010; interview with a member of Timorese civil 
society, 1/10/2010.
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schemes were introduced ‘very quickly’, and it was a ‘massive job to set 
up procedures, administration and distribution systems’.21 Accountability 
structures are also in their infancy, such as the Comissão da Função Pública 
(Civil Service Commission), Escritório do Inspetor-Geral (Office of the Inspector-
General), Comissão Anti-Corrupção (Anti-Corruption Commission), and the 
Tribunal Superior Administrativo, Fiscal e de Contas (High Administrative, 
Tax and Audit Court). 
More promisingly, there are impressive examples of genuine efforts to improve 
the system. For example, the MSS is working with international donors to 
create a registry of all vulnerable families. This will allow the MSS to use reliable 
socioeconomic data and proxy means testing to target Bolsa da Mae (Mother’s 
Purse) and other payments to the neediest households.22 Efforts are also being 
made by the Ministry of Finance to examine whether mobile banking facilities 
can facilitate payments.23
Peace-building
The most important impact of the cash payment schemes has been their role in 
peace-building since the security crisis, which displaced almost one-tenth of 
the population and resulted in violence and widespread tensions. In order to 
facilitate peace-building, it was important to return or resettle IDPs, and the 
IDP recovery packages played an important role. International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) surveys of communities who received IDPs indicate that 
their return or resettlement was largely (although not entirely) peaceful and 
that societal tensions have subsided (IOM 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2009a; 2009b). 
However, there is concern that the IDP recovery packages merely ‘bought 
peace’, and that longer term solutions are required to ensure that former IDPs 
successfully reintegrated.24 In particular, there were instances of jealousy 
between recipients and non-recipients.25 Some tensions were diffused through 
mediation or customary ceremonies; others by IDPs making payments to village 
members (such as the temporary occupants of their house) (Impact Alliance 
25/2/2010; RDTLMSS 2009).26 Complaints also arose from those who lost their 
21  Interview with an international development adviser, 30/9/2010.
22  Interview with a government official, 28/9/2010.
23  Interview with a government official, 29/9/2010.
24  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 26/9/2010.
25  Interview with a government official, 29/9/2010; interview with an international humanitarian worker, 
28/9/2010; interview with an international humanitarian worker, 29/9/2010; interview with an international 
humanitarian worker, 30/9/2010.
26  Interview with an international humanitarian worker, 27/9/2010; interview with a member of Timorese 
civil society, 27/9/2010.
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belongings or assets during the crisis but were not compensated because they 
had not fled.27 A former IDP commented that ‘those who did not flee are also 
victims’.28 
The veterans’ pensions also play a peace-building role. Certain veterans groups 
contributed to escalating the security crisis, as they expressed resentment 
about their treatment since 1999.29 When they were officially ‘demobilised’ 
in February 2001, only 650 out of 1,950 veterans were recruited into the new 
army, with the rest given small packages to assist their reintegration into the 
community. Demobilised veterans mostly missed out on jobs in the civil service 
and the new police force, and many faced unemployment and significant 
hardship. Consequently, veterans groups formed and began to conduct parades 
and operate as political lobby groups. Several became increasingly strident 
and were perceived as threatening the stability of the state (World Bank 
2008). The decision to rapidly introduce the veterans’ pensions in 2008 can be 
understood partly as a response to this pressure. However, there are questions 
over the sustainability of the government effectively buying peace from the 
veterans. There is concern that veteran groups may pose a threat to stability 
should their demands (including for further payments) not be met. One MP 
cautiously observed that veteran groups remain ‘waiting in the mountains, 
ready to come back down to Dili and cause problems’.30 While no one questions 
the esteem in which veterans are held, ordinary people are concerned about 
the role that some veteran groups have played since independence, particularly 
during the security crisis.31
Similarly, the payments to ‘petitioners’ reflected their potential danger rather 
than any particular need. These payments did encourage these former soldiers 
to demobilise and reintegrate into society. However, there is a perception that 
the petitioners had been ‘rewarded for causing trouble’, especially since they 
had technically broken the law by abandoning their barracks, and, beyond 
being dismissed from the army, had not faced sanctions for their actions during 
the crisis.32 
27  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 27/9/2010.
28  Interview with a former IDP, 28/9/2010.
29  For a discussion of the treatment of veterans following the withdrawal of Indonesia in 1999, see 
Conflict, Security and Development Group (2003).
30  Interview with a member of parliament (b), 30/9/2010.
31  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 26/9/2010; interview with a member of Timorese civil 
society, 1/10/2010.
32  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society (a), 27/9/2010.
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Dependence and expectation of future payments
The cash payment schemes may also have generated a degree of dependence and 
expectation of future payments. The recovery packages for IDPs and payments to 
the ‘petitioners’ risk setting a precedent that victims, or those who threaten the 
peace, deserve financial compensation. For example, following the introduction 
of the IDPs payments, youth groups in IDP camps pressured the government 
and ended up receiving ‘student packages’ of US$200 apiece.33 Several people 
whose houses were destroyed during violence in 1999, or during the Indonesian 
invasion, have tried to make claims for IDPs payments. A prominent victims’ 
advocate even suggested on national radio on 20 July 2008 that ‘it’s better if we 
1999 victims just organise ourselves and go and live in a refugee camp’ in order to 
receive state assistance (quoted in Kent 2010: 194). Veterans have also mobilised 
for greater payments, leading to the expansion of the eligibility criteria for 
veterans’ pensions, as well as the one-off veteran payments. Similarly, whether 
members of the extensive network of civilians who supported the independence 
struggle, referred to as the frente clandestina (clandestine front), also deserve 
payments now features more frequently in public discourse. 
A stark example of escalating demand is the draft Reparations Law, which 
seeks to initiate a memory and reconciliation process for the conflict between 
1974 and 1999, and to empower and support ‘vulnerable victims’ (Amnesty 
International 2012).34 One MP argued that it ‘is not intended to be a big social 
assistance program. It is just about finding and helping the most vulnerable 
and traumatised people’.35 Others see the law as an effort to create another cash 
payment scheme aimed at a very amorphous and difficult-to-identify group. 
One civil society representative saw it as a symptom of a new culture where 
there is ‘competition to be victims because people have seen that that is how 
people benefit’.36 An MP expressed concern that ‘the compensation train is 
steaming out of control’, and if the Reparations Law creates extensive cash 
payment schemes, ‘the floodgates will open’ for further demands.37
33  Interview with a government official, 29/9/2010; interview with an international humanitarian worker, 
27/9/2010.
34  Draft Law Establishing the Public Memory Institute. www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Reparations/
Organic15JunEn.pdf, accessed 19/9/2010; Draft Law Establishing a Framework for the National Reparations 
Programme. www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Reparations/Reparations15JunEn.pdf, accessed 19/9/2010.
35  Interview with a member of parliament (b), 30/9/2010.
36  The proposed Reparations Law raises the broader issue of the role that the discourse of ‘victimhood’ 
plays in determining an emerging ‘hierarchy of the deserving’ of state recognition and assistance (Kent 2010: 
194). In contrast, a member of civil society argued that many Timorese people do not want to be classified 
as ‘victims’, but instead see themselves as ‘heroes’ because ‘we fought for our independence and we won’. 
He  suggested that the language of ‘victimhood’ has been promoted by international NGOs, which have 
adopted the international language of human rights and transitional justice, but which does not necessarily 
resonate in the Timorese context. Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 1/10/2010.
37  Interview with a member of parliament, 27/9/2010.
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Politicisation
This suggests that the cash payment schemes may be politicised and used to 
appease certain groups, which could lead to the allocation of revenues in ways 
that do not advance the country’s overall development, welfare and security. 
There is a perception that the government has sought to use the payment 
schemes to create a ‘moral and political binding’—a sort of clientelist loyalty 
between recipients and government (Fundasaun Mahein 2011).38 Cash payments 
might also reflect Prime Minister Gusmão’s rather paternalistic approach to 
government spending.39 In fact, several times a year Gusmão magnanimously 
hands out (his own) cash to people on the steps of his home.
Cash payments to veterans run the greatest risk of politicisation. Veterans 
represented a valuable political constituency for former Prime Minister 
Xanana Gusmão, who used the issue of pensions during election campaigns 
and expanded their benefits several times since he took office (La’o Hamutuk 
2013).40 Certain veteran groups have also assumed a vocal role in state affairs, 
and exercise considerable influence in parliament, including by advocating for 
larger veterans pensions (ICG 2011).41 Indeed, since their introduction in 2008, 
the veterans’ pensions and Survivor Pension have expanded dramatically. In 
response to lobbying from veteran groups (March 2008), in 2009 cash payments 
were made to veterans who ‘took part on a full-time basis in the struggle for 
national independence for a period of four to seven years’. The amount of the 
payment was US$1,380, which corresponded to 12 months of the civil service 
minimum wage (of US$115 per month).42 In 2009, the government also made 
a payment to cover cases where there was no immediate relative eligible to 
receive the survivor pension. This payment went to ‘relatives up to a fourth 
degree in collateral line’ of a deceased veteran, provided these relatives ‘suffered 
torture, deportation or imprisonment as a consequence of the militancy of 
their … relative’. The government also began to provide a limited number of 
scholarships to orphans of deceased veterans and to children of those veterans 
who receive the Special Subsistence or Special Retirement Pensions.43 This raises 
38  Interview with a member of parliament, 28/9/2010; interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 
26/9/2010; interview with a member of Timorese civil society (a), 27/9/2010.
39  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society (b), 27/9/2010; interview with a member of Parliament 
(a), 30/9/2010.
40  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 1/10/2010.
41  Interview with a member of parliament, 27/9/2010; interview with a member of parliament (b), 30/9/2010.
42  Statute of the National Liberation Combatants.
43  Statute of the National Liberation Combatants; Decree Law on the Pensions of the Combatants and 
Martyrs; Decree Law on the Regime of Awarding Scholarships to the Children of Combatants and Martyrs of 
the National Liberation no. 8/2009.
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a risk that the veterans’ pensions may entrench a perception that veterans (and 
their families) are a privileged social group, particularly as the Survivor Pensions 
and scholarships may embed intergenerational advantage (Wallis 2013). 
Economically sustainable?
The expansion of the veterans’ pensions raises questions concerning whether 
the cash payment schemes are economically sustainable, especially given that oil 
and gas resources are finite. These questions feed into a broader debate about 
whether Timor-Leste should save or spend in order to advance its development, 
and if it opts to spend, what that spending should be on.
While the IDPs’ recovery packages and the payments to the petitioners are 
finished, the number of recipients of the elderly and disabled support allowance 
and Bolsa da Mãe program has risen, largely because administrative improvements 
have facilitated the identification of more recipients. There are also proposals to 
make payments to clandestine resistance; estimates of their numbers run as high 
as 70,000.44 The proposed Reparations Law could potentially lead to payments 
for the ‘vulnerable victims’. Each expansion of the cash payment schemes places 
additional strain on the state budget. 
However, the veterans’ pensions remain by far the largest cash payment scheme, 
largely because the value of the veterans’ pensions and the number of veteran 
recipients has increased. In the US$1.7 billion 2013 budget, US$239 million was 
allocated for cash payment schemes, of which US$84.8 million was for veterans 
(RDTL 2013: 45). The lowest veterans’ pension of US$276 per month is many 
times higher than the average Timorese income; in 2010, 41 per cent of the 
population lived on less than US$38 per month (UN 2010). Despite these large 
amounts, there is a widespread view that ‘the state should pay attention to 
veterans because they fought for independence. Even if the country was poor, 
it would pay them.’45
The World Bank noted that the size of the veterans’ pensions ‘are relatively high 
compared to other post-conflict countries, particularly as a percentage of Timor-
Leste’s non-oil GDP’ (World Bank 2008: 27). Timor-Leste could face a challenge 
similar to Guinea-Bissau, where ‘commitments to veterans have impeded the 
government’s ability to address other social issues’ (World Bank 2008: 27). 
However, one international official noted that Timor-Leste is still in ‘short-term 
mode’ following the 2006–07 security crisis during which it needs to respond to 
stability needs first, and economic sustainability second.46 
44  Interview with a member of parliament, 27/9/2010.
45  Interview with a government official (a), 27/9/2010.
46  Interview with an international development adviser, 30/9/2010.
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Alternatives?
The size of the cash payment schemes suggests that it is necessary to assess 
whether they advance development, particularly in the long term, or whether 
alternatives should be considered. While payments to the elderly, disabled and 
vulnerable female-headed households appear to advance social protection aims, 
it is less clear that payments to the IDPs, petitioners or veterans are targeted 
based on need or that they advance the development of their recipients. 
Although there has not been a formal study that tracks the spending patterns 
of cash payment recipients, there is anecdotal evidence that many IDPs invested 
in their homes, started small businesses or engaged in consumption valuable 
to the local economy.47 Studies of programs similar to the elderly and disabled 
support allowance and Bolsa da Mae in countries such as Brazil and Mexico 
suggest that cash payments to poor households have a strong poverty reduction 
effect. Buying basic goods like food and clothing represent investments in 
human capital, and the extra income (especially if tied to school attendance) 
can increase the family’s incentive to have their children in school rather than 
working (Moss 2011).
However, there is also anecdotal evidence that some recipients spend their cash 
payments on luxury items, parties or traditional gambling and cockfighting.48 
Similarly, cash payments bear other economic risks, such as elevating prices of 
non-traded goods and inflation (Corden and Neary 1982)—risks emphasised by 
the World Bank (World Bank 2009). There is scepticism that the cash payment 
schemes will lead to long-term improvements in livelihoods, given the lack 
of a savings culture cultivated by the fact many people have lost their houses 
and belongings several times during the Indonesian invasion, occupation 
and subsequent conflicts.49 There are also concerns about ‘dependency’, with 
parallels drawn to Indonesia’s provision of rice and other handouts in order to 
control the population.50 One village chief noted that the cash payments have 
made some people ‘lazy’, which has led to people failing to work their fields and 
then later facing food shortages.51 
47  Interview with an international humanitarian worker, 27/9/2010; interview with an international 
humanitarian worker, 28/9/2010.
48  Interview with a member of parliament, 27/9/2010; interview with a member of parliament (b), 30/9/2010; 
interview with a member of Timorese civil society, 26/9/2010.
49  Interview with a member of Timorese civil society (b), 27/9/2010.
50  Interview with an international humanitarian worker, 27/9/2010.
51  Interview with a village chief, 28/9/2010.
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Consequently, alternatives such as social housing, income-generation projects 
(such as small shops, fuel stations, and livestock and transport co-operatives), 
microcredit schemes, tourism facilities, or infrastructure investments might 
produce more lasting development results. In this regard, the Hamutuk Hari’i 
Economia Sosial (Together Building Social Economy) pillar of the National 
Recovery Strategy aims to create livelihood opportunities and employment-
generation schemes. Infrastructure projects are perceived as particularly useful 
as they benefit communities as a whole, especially since resource shortages were 
a source of tension during the security crisis. 
However, Timor-Leste is a very young state, in which administrative, planning, 
logistical, accountability and oversight capacity is still being developed. While 
infrastructure investments might offer much greater returns than cash payments, 
without adequate state capacity, infrastructure projects can be poorly planned, 
difficult to implement, and prone to corruption. Even if well executed, years can 
pass before welfare benefits accrue to the population. In contrast, cash payment 
schemes can be implemented quickly, and can provide a direct economic benefit 
to the population, particularly in rural areas where state services and public 
goods are often limited. Cash payments also offer administrative ‘simplicity’, 
as they ‘cut out layers of bureaucracy and cut back problems of logistics and 
corruption’.52
While cash payment schemes might represent a relatively effective way to 
distribute state resources, questions need to be raised concerning the way they 
are targeted. In a very poor population that receives insufficient social services, 
it appears that most of the cash payment budget does not target the neediest 
households. While the schemes could be expanded, the finite nature of Timor-
Leste’s resources appears to militate against this. Instead, it might be better to 
reallocate the cash payment budget so that it is more finely targeted at those in 
need. However, such a move might be politically difficult, as it would probably 
involve moving resources from the veterans’ pensions. 
Conclusion
Overall, it appears that the cash payment schemes have improved many Timorese 
people’s lives by providing funds to build and repair houses, helping them to 
buy basic necessities, or supplementing their income. The schemes facilitated 
peace-building in the aftermath of the security crisis, and provide citizens with 
an immediate and direct benefit from the oil and gas revenues. However, the 
implementation of the schemes poses challenges, and their impact highlights 
52  Interview with an international humanitarian worker, 27/9/2010.
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the risks of politicisation and questions over their economic sustainability. 
Most significantly, there are questions over whether the schemes target those 
most in need, as opposed to members of certain social groups. If Timor-Leste is 
serious about advancing development and lifting its population out of poverty, 
this suggests that the schemes could be redesigned so that they target recipients 
who are most in need of social protection.
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Displacement and Informal 




On 30 August 1999, a UN-led referendum was held to determine if Timor-
Leste (better known then as East Timor) should remain a part of Indonesia 
or become an independent nation-state. The result was that 78.5 per cent of 
East Timorese favoured separation from the occupying regime. However, their 
choice was met with intimidation, violence and forced displacement by members 
of the Indonesian security forces and pro-integration militia (CAVR  2006: 
134). The  Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste 
(CAVR; Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) found 
that the Indonesian military and police were complicit in forming, supporting 
and funding pro-integration militia groups as early as late 1998 (CAVR 2006: 
124). The militia threatened and attacked pro-independence supporters in the 
months leading up to the ballot, which culminated in the massacres in Dili 
and Liquisa. Violence broke out again following voting, leading to the torture, 
mutilation and death of nearly 1,000 East Timorese across the territory. Upon 
withdrawing from East Timor, the Indonesian military’s ‘scorched earth’ 
campaign destroyed 70 per  cent of existing infrastructure (CAVR 2006: 145). 
Over half of the population—550,000 people—were displaced during this 
troubled period, including 250,000 who fled independently out of fear, or 
were forcibly removed by land, sea and air to Indonesia (Achmad 2003: 193; 
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CAVR 2006: 145). While a large number of refugees who supported integration 
with Indonesia have resettled there, a small but steady informal process of 
repatriation to Timor-Leste carries on. 
Among those forcibly displaced into West Timor, part of Indonesia’s East Nusa 
Tenggara province, were residents of Caicua village in Baucau district (see Figure 
17.1). Following nearly 13 years of resettlement in Naibonat village in Kupang 
district, Caicua residents are choosing to return to Timor-Leste. On 23 September 
2012, I followed a local East Timorese non-government organisation (NGO), Fila 
Hikas Knua (Working Group to Bring Families Back), to the Mota Ain border 
crossing post to receive six returnee families (totalling 18 individuals) as they 
made the long journey towards their origin village of Caicua. In August 2013, 
I retraced these families in Caicua and carried out in depth interviews to learn 
about their initial flight and how they were restoring their livelihoods after 
repatriation. I also took the opportunity to interview other returnees who 
repatriated through their own means, as well as Caicua residents who did 
not leave the country in 1999. In this chapter, I highlight the displacement 
experiences of six returned families and their eventual repatriation to Caicua 
in 2012 to draw attention to how lives are rebuilt in rural communities that 
continue to confront the realities of post-conflict society. I argue that in the 
case of Caicua, repatriation has yet to provide a ‘durable solution’ in itself, 
since returnees have received little official recognition and social assistance 
from the Timor-Leste state. Community-level reconciliation is, moreover, 
stalled as Caicua residents continue to anticipate the return of their remaining 
relatives in Naibonat. Notwithstanding the lack of a permanent resolution, 
translocal circulations established between Caicua and Naibonat challenge the 
securitisation of the Indonesia–Timor-Leste border and call forth the need to 
broaden existing notions of ‘durable solutions’ to displacement.
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Figure 17.1 Map of Timor Island showing the districts in Timor-Leste and 
Kupang, the capital of West Timor. 
Source: CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University .
Leaving Caicua
A large proportion of residents in the rice-growing, Wai’mua-speaking coastal 
village of Caicua in the eastern district of Baucau fled their homes following 
the announcement of the 1999 ballot results. On 9 September, respondents in 
this study, fearing a violent backlash, joined family members who worked in 
some capacity for the Indonesian security forces as they prepared to leave the 
country. At the time of flight, respondents took only minimal possessions with 
them. Aderito and his wife, Rita, together with their five-year-old son followed 
Aderito’s brother—an officer in the Indonesian army. Rita recalled the moment 
of flight: ‘I did not know where we were heading. Cuba? Portugal? We did not 
bring anything. We just went.’ They were flown out on military aircraft from 
Baucau and transported to Kupang district in West Timor. Fear of violence drove 
people to abandon their homes. An elderly man who worked as a helper for the 
Indonesian police explained why he chose to leave: ‘[I] was afraid that’s why 
I ran. Not because of experiencing difficult sorts of things. Not because [I] do 
not love [East] Timor. [I was] afraid to die. [I had] to hide in order to survive.’
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In a study on resettled East Timorese in West Timor, Damaledo (2009: 24) 
highlights the liminal space occupied by civilian refugees, describing this 
category of refugees as ‘guilty by association’ since they were not members 
of the militia, or the Indonesian army or police, but rather were vulnerable 
to incrimination by virtue of being closely related to Indonesian loyalists. 
The  remaining residents of Caicua escaped into the hills further inland. 
The whole community in Caicua was thus affected by forced displacement, even 
those who did not flee abroad.
The majority of East Timorese refugees were transported across the border into 
West Timor, where they were sheltered in refugee camps in Kupang, Atambua 
and selected areas of the Belu district. As the numbers of refugees soared, many 
people could not be accommodated in the camps, and they resettled in the 
surrounding areas in the open fields, schools and parishes. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Red Cross, the 
Catholic and Protestant Churches, and NGOs supported the local provincial 
government to provide emergency aid relief in the camps. Upon arrival in 
Kupang, a number of Caicua residents were taken by trucks to the Tuapukan 
refugee camp. Rosa, a female respondent then aged 12, recalled the dire situation 
among refugees: ‘We lived opposite the Tuapukan Church. Every day we could 
see the dead being carried past. Maybe five people each day.’ At  the time of 
flight, Rosa was separated from her father, who was an Indonesian military 
officer. While her father joined the troops in Manatuto, Rosa, her mother and 
her younger brother fled into the hills. They emerged a day later to join her 
uncle on the flight out of Baucau. They were later reunited with her father in the 
Tuapukan camp. Some families from Caicua were resettled in asrama (Indonesian 
term meaning ‘lodgings’) in military stations, where temporary shelters were 
constructed by the Indonesian military to house the combatants of the 743, 744 
and 745 battalions, who mainly originated from Baucau and Lautem districts. A 
number of respondents resided in an area popularly called Sosia, which was in 
the vicinity of a youth centre built by the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs. 
Unsurprisingly, the crowded conditions in the West Timor refugee camps gave 
rise to severe health issues, starvation and death. Some camps flooded during 
the rainy season and access to clean water was limited. Moreover, humanitarian 
agencies and their workers faced security challenges posed by East Timorese 
militia refugees who obstructed relief efforts for the repatriation of civilian 
refugees (CAVR 2006: 140; UNHCR 2002: 26). Indeed, some respondents were 
reluctant to share more details of camp life. Their apprehension hints at the 
widely reported misinformation, intimidation and violence carried out by 
fellow militia refugees and community leaders, who subsequently chose to take 
up Indonesian citizenship. 
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When official aid relief ceased, most respondents gained access to the state’s 
welfare system—for instance, Rumah dinas (public housing) in Naibonat. 
Their  relatives who were Indonesian public servants were moreover entitled 
to state pension schemes. In subsequent years, the refugees camps were closed, 
forcing the ‘former refugees’ to relocate into state resettlement sites or elsewhere 
independently. In numerous cases, poor accessibility and weak integration with 
the local community led some to return to the camp areas. To date, over 500 East 
Timorese households from Baucau and Lautem continue to reside in Naibonat.
Meanwhile in Timor-Leste, Caicua residents who escaped to the relative safety 
of the hills faced similar hardships. ‘We dug for kombili [wild yam] in the 
forest. We didn’t carry any food since we had already eaten our harvested rice’, 
a young female respondent explained, recounting her experience of foraging 
food and living in the forests for nearly two months, before returning to Caicua. 
Even when residents emerged from the hills, they were too afraid to resume 
everyday activities. Consequently, food supplies ran short. It was not until 2001 
that residents gradually recommenced cultivating their gardens and rice fields.
The UNHCR’s Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons 
of Concern (2003) puts forward voluntary repatriation, local integration 
or resettlement in a third country as a global set of standards to address 
situations of forced displacement. In accordance with this framework, a formal 
repatriation program for East Timorese refugees began in October 1999 under 
the flagship of the UNTAET, and in co-ordination with the UNHCR, the 
International Organization for Migration, the peacekeeping International Force 
for East Timor, and the Indonesian security forces. To encourage return, video 
messages were exchanged between separated families, and family reunions were 
organised at the border (Jakarta Post 5/1/2002). Refugee returns peaked prior to 
the restoration of national independence of Timor-Leste in May 2002, and ahead 
of the UN cessation of refugee status for the East Timorese on 31 December 
2002. In 2005, official humanitarian assistance from the Indonesian state ended 
for East Timorese refugees, and these populations were given the opportunity to 
become new citizens. To date, there are little reliable statistics on the actual size 
of the resettled population of East Timorese origin who have become Indonesian 
citizens. Estimates suggest the population to be close to 100,000 in 2010 (see ICG 
2011 for more discussion). A decade since the repatriation program ended, there 
continues to be a small but steady stream of East Timorese who are informally 
and voluntarily heading back to their former homes. 
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Returning to Caicua
On 23 September 2012, six families from Caicua were repatriated with the 
assistance of two humanitarian NGOs. CIS-Timor (Centre for Internally Displaced 
People’s Service) in West Timor has been actively assisting former East Timorese 
refugees since 1999, while Fila Hikas Knua (Working Group to Bring Families 
Back) was formed in 2010 in Timor-Leste through volunteers coming from the 
civil society networks. The two organisations have worked collaboratively since 
2010 to support Timorese families separated by the ‘99 conflict. Building on 
The Frontiers’ (an international NGO) messenger programme, which connects 
dispersed family members affected by conflict through letters and video messages, 
CIS-Timor and Fila Hikas Knua started a voluntary repatriation programme for 
former East Timorese refugees. Both NGOs work with minimal funding from the 
Timor-Leste and Indonesian governments. Each repatriation trip can be costly; 
adding up to US$3,000 for rental vehicles, fuel and food for returnees and 
volunteers. Returnees must surrender their Indonesian citizenship, which CIS-
Timor takes to the West Timor district and provincial authorities for approval. 
Correspondingly, Fila Hikas Knua requests of the village chiefs in Timor-Leste 
who receive the returnees to endorse an official statement acknowledging 
their return and guaranteeing their safety upon reintegration into the village. 
The repatriation process is thus managed foremost by local level authorities and 
civil society. To date, over 180 East Timorese have been repatriated through 
this informal process, and there were plans for nearly 200 people to return after 
the Indonesian Presidential election in July 2014. There are also undocumented 
former East Timorese refugees who have returned illegally either through 
bribing border patrol officers or taking risky paths to evade arrest.
Caicua returnees decided to repatriate after reconnecting with family members 
through the messenger programme, which encouraged them to make subsequent 
trips to their origin village. A number of respondents took the opportunity in 
2001 to obtain Indonesian passports, which enabled them to travel more freely 
across the border. The homeward journey for returnees was drawn out over two 
days; they were accompanied by CIS-Timor as they left Naibonat to travel to 
Atambua where they stayed overnight in the CIS-Timor office. The following 
morning, they continued to the border at Mota Ain. At the border crossing, CIS-
Timor and Fila Hikas Knua managed the immigration process while returnees 
unloaded their belongings from the first truck onto a second truck that would 
take them to Caicua. Akin to the day they fled Timor-Leste, returnees had to leave 
behind most of their belongings and those who had livestock reluctantly sold 
them prior to moving. Other returnees are known to have taken their livestock 
illegally to the bordering villages and then picked them up after repatriation. 
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Due to limited funding, the two NGOs could only hire one truck for each phase 
of the journey, and returnees were restricted to take only what they deemed 
necessary.
Respondents cited a number of reasons for deciding to repatriate. These 
included the desire to reunite with family members; to secure better access to 
land and resources; and to return to one’s birthplace. Jaco, who returned with 
his wife and four children, highlighted his duty as a son to care for his ageing 
parents: ‘My parents are growing older. They have goats and other livestock. 
My brother doesn’t plan on returning so I chose to.’ Jaco’s brother, like many 
retired Indonesian civil servants received a pension and preferred to remain 
in Naibonat. Abel, a returnee in his 40s, shared a similar story. Abel followed 
his brother to Kupang where they lived in the 743 battalion lodging before 
resettling in public housing. Unlike his brother who worked for the Indonesian 
military, Abel worked as a cook and a tailor when he was not occupied with his 
garden. He later married a West Timorese woman and now has two children. 
Abel first returned to Caicua in 2002 to visit his mother, and then again in 2010. 
He decided to return permanently to be a carer for his ailing mother who died 
five months after he repatriated.
After residing in the refugee camps and in the 743 and 744 battalion lodging, 
a number of respondents were given housing assistance by the Indonesian 
government. Some respondents moved onto private land owned by West Timor 
residents where they paid rent or were given access to land in kind through 
established social ties. The neighbourhood of Naibonat began to re-emplace 
the origin community of Caicua among other refugee communities as families 
and friends clustered near one another—particularly social groups originating 
from the eastern districts of Timor-Leste. Jaco and other respondents described 
everyday life in Naibonat as resembling Caicua, ‘even the environment, the flat 
land, and the climate were similar’, they stressed. They engaged in subsistence 
agriculture: cultivating gardens and rice paddies, rearing livestock, and relying 
heavily on the land as the primary source of livelihood. The only difference, 
they contended, was that they had access to smaller parcels of land (typically 
less than one hectare) and they were residing on someone else’s land. As one 
respondent described, ‘our livelihoods were the same in Naibonat. We eat from 
the land. But over there we were not living on our land. We are free now living 
on our land.’
Respondents further highlighted some tensions with local landowners that 
resulted in poor integration in Naibonat. Rosa was quick to acknowledge that 
the newly arrived East Timorese refugees were partly at fault: ‘oh, we had 
troubles everyday! [East] Timor wants something, [East] Timor will get it.’ When 
asked why the West Timorese were fearful of the East Timorese, Rosa continued, 
‘you know, we left here because of a crisis. So when we arrived, they knew our 
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attitudes (jeitu). Some [East Timorese] killed people’s animals, and they [West 
Timorese] couldn’t raise their voice. There were too many of us.’ Indeed, as 
reported in the media, the large influx of East Timorese migrants often provoked 
tension and conflict with local residents particularly concerning land access 
(see, for example, IRIN News 2010).
At the time of their repatriation, in 2012, Fila Hikas Knua provided food rations 
for Caicua returnees. This was supplemented by food rations from the Timor-
Leste Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), which included two karong of rice 
(approximately 15 kilograms) for each individual. Returnees were told that 
MSS would return in the several months to replenish food rations, but this 
had not eventuated a year later when I was in residence in Caicua. The village 
chief of Caicua, together with the relatives of returnees, were central in helping 
to rebuild returnees’ livelihoods. As the food supplies diminished, the village 
chief, who is also a member of kin, bought returnees more household provisions. 
While returnees were in West Timor, their relatives looked after their land and 
properties in Caicua. Upon return, respondents began to cultivate gardens and 
rice paddies on family land, however, most of them were still reliant on their kin 
group for food and economic assistance during the first year. The village chief 
moreover assisted returnees to obtain Timor-Leste electoral and identification 
cards. A number of individuals and families returned in the previous years 
from West Timor through their own means. Similarly, they received no state 
assistance and turned to their kin networks to rebuild livelihoods. 
The dead are also among those repatriated. In 2012, the six returnee families 
brought with them a small coffin containing the corpse of an elderly man who 
passed away in Naibonat in 2009. His body was exhumed to be reburied in 
Caicua—his birthplace—in accordance to Wai’mua mortuary ritual practice. 
Respondents explained that there were more bodies to come across the border, 
however, their return must be preceded by staged negotiations and payment 
exchanges within the kin and affinal groups, which was a difficult feat to 
organise among the geographically dispersed families. As Senhor Supriano, 
A former FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste; 
Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) combatant elaborated: 
‘my brother-in-law is buried there. His family [residing in Naibonat] refuse 
to hand [him] over.’ The village chief suggested that they might exhume and 
repatriate all the bodies of Caicua residents in West Timor in one occasion in 
order to save costs on logistics.
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Caicua–Naibonat flows
Between 30 and 60 former residents of Caicua remain in Indonesia. Some 
individuals have married local West Timor residents, while others have married 
fellow East Timorese who were also displaced in 1999. Still others have migrated 
elsewhere in Indonesia. However, there is a sustained movement of people, 
goods, money and information between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, more 
specifically, a  circulation between the two localities of Naibonat and Caicua. 
Family relatives from Naibonat may stay up to two weeks or a month in Caicua, 
while visitors from Caicua who travel across the border stay a similar length 
of time in Naibonat. Their visits are typically related to marriage or mortuary 
negotiations. School holidays and the end of agricultural cycles are coupled 
with visitations between the two sites. These transnational circulations, which 
can also be described as translocal, have created geographically extended social 
spaces. These spaces challenge the attempts by the Timor-Leste and Indonesian 
governments to clearly demarcate and ‘secure’ the border and also raise questions 
about what constitutes ‘durable solutions’ for displaced populations.
The refugee and forced displacement literatures (with notable exceptions, 
for example, Wise 2006 and Elmhirst 2012) tend not to adopt a ‘translocal’ 
perspective, however, I see translocality as a useful analytical framework 
to problematise the dichotomous notions of thinking of people as either 
‘displaced’ or ‘emplaced’. Studies of translocality stress that as people move 
their affiliations to specific places, along with the social ties embedded in place, 
may not necessarily diminish but rather become extended, multi-layered and 
plural (Appadurai 1996; Conradson and McKay 2007; Brickell and Datta 2011). 
Building on this, paying attention to translocal social relations can cast light on 
the enduring yet dynamic place-based connections established by returnees, 
non-returnees and other family members between the resettlement areas and 
the places of origin. 
Since the colonial days, the two halves of Timor Island have had distinct 
histories despite the populations sharing linguistic and cultural characteristics. 
West Timor was ruled by the Dutch and East Timor by the Portuguese. 
With the departure of the Dutch, West Timor became a part of the Republic 
of Indonesia. When Indonesia proceeded to occupy the eastern half, it kept 
East Timor as a separate province from East Nusa Tenggara. In spite of security 
concerns within the occupied territory, border crossing in certain areas, such 
as Oecussi, became relatively easier. Since the independence of Timor-Leste, the 
Indonesian and Timor-Leste governments have taken steps to accommodate the 
high rates of cross-border movement. For instance, in 2002, the long-standing 
cultural and trade links between the border areas of the two countries were 
officially recognised under the arrangement on ‘Traditional Border Crossings 
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and Regulated Markets’, which enables residents in the recognised border areas 
to obtain a Border Crossing Pass permitting free border crossing for 10 days 
(KBRI 2002). 
This official cross-border scheme does not, however, comprise residents who 
originate from places beyond the recognised border areas, such as Caicua. 
As such, it is common for Caicua residents who travel to Naibonat, and residents 
in Naibonat who travel to Caicua, to tread along the ‘rat trails’ (translated from 
the Indonesian phrase jalan tikus as drawn on extensively by respondents), 
especially since they cannot afford to apply for a passport and pay the visa 
fees. One respondent humorously described the perils of crossing the border 
illegally and fearing capture by border security forces, ‘the local landowners 
don’t mind. They actually warn us, “walk quickly otherwise the military will 
catch you!”’ Notwithstanding the political demarcation of national borders, 
there is much permeability on the ground where local populations on both sides 
seem empathetic to trespassers. 
During social exchanges with non-returnees, returnees and other relatives 
in Caicua often encouraged them to repatriate. Senhor Supriano relayed that 
he did not hold any animosity towards his relatives residing in Indonesia, 
‘we have received those who returned with both hands. Some of us were angry 
initially, but it has been such a long time. I said to them this is your land, 
your birthplace.’ Those who have not returned were typically benefiting from 
Indonesian state pension and welfare schemes. To date, formal community-
level reconciliation processes/ceremonies have not been initiated in Caicua. 
Respondents emphasised that this delay was intentional, without everyone 
present to ensure that individuals’ narratives were consistent with one another, 
there could be potential for misunderstandings to occur. In line with this view, 
the village chief suggested holding a community-wide reconciliation process 
only with the presence of all those concerned. The flow of people, material 
and cultural exchanges between Naibonat and Caicua nonetheless suggest that 
social division within this community is likely to be minimal.
Conclusion
More than a decade has passed since the East Timorese chose to separate from 
the occupying powers of Indonesia. Nevertheless, members of the West Timor 
refugee diaspora (or ‘new citizens’ as they are now referred to in Indonesia) 
are continuing to search for long-term stability in their lives. Caicua village is 
exemplary of the many communities that are overcoming the legacy of the 1999 
conflict. Livelihoods and social life among returnees are independently rebuilt 
with social and economic assistance from NGOs and local kin networks filling 
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the void left by the Timor-Leste state. At the national level, the Timor-Leste 
political leaders have publicly encouraged the return of its refugee diaspora, but 
they have not formally embarked on assisting voluntary repatriation since 2002. 
The repatriation of former pro-integration leaders and militia members presents 
a politically sensitive issue, particularly at the local level where disquiet persists 
among former pro-independence veterans and victims, about the fact that 
perpetrators of violence and crimes have not been brought to justice. Former 
civilian refugees are inevitably entangled in these broader politics, perpetuating 
the vulnerable positions in which they find themselves. They occupy a liminal 
space where they receive few benefits in Indonesia, but are likely to receive 
even less state assistance upon repatriation to Timor-Leste. At the international 
level, East Timorese returnees are technically Indonesian citizens and, as such, 
they have received little assistance from international humanitarian agencies.
For the community of Caicua, the repatriation of former residents in itself has yet 
to provide a ‘durable solution’ to the impacts of the 1999 conflict. Rather, there 
should be more state assistance provided for returnees in the immediate months 
following repatriation. There also needs to be recognition of, and allowances 
made for, the mobility involved in maintaining kinship ties and spiritual 
commitments between non-returnees in Naibonat and the origin community. 
The temporal dimension of repatriation must also be acknowledged here since 
the returnees chose not to repatriate in the early years when official assistance 
was provided. A related question then is, would returnees’ reintegration in 
Caicua have been any different if they had returned much earlier when ‘wounds’ 
were fresh? 
As refugees resettle in a second country, the living conditions in their new 
country or origin country might transform, leading some people to reconsider 
repatriation. Considering West Timor is situated in one of the poorest Indonesian 
provinces, along with everyday pressures over land, and unemployment, 
informal repatriation will likely continue to Timor-Leste if it remains politically 
stable, and makes progress in social and economic development (ICG 2011). 
The translocal and transnational circulations between West Timor and Timor-
Leste highlight the ability to move across the border as an important mechanism 
for accessing resources and securing livelihoods for the East Timorese refugee 
diaspora (cf. van Hear 2006; Long 2010). This demonstrates the need to think 
more creatively about what constitutes ‘durable solutions’ and to take into 
account the dynamism of migrants’ lives. 
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